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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Non-equity financial markets used to be ‘hidden’ in Europe, in the sense 
that relative to their size, they received less attention from ordinary 
investors and the media than equity markets. Given that bond markets play 
a crucial role in the economy through the capital allocation process, 
monetary policy decisions and the hedging of risk, not to mention their 
immense size, this situation was somewhat puzzling, but it has been 
changing. Nevertheless, since the overwhelming majority of bond trading 
is still conducted off-exchange, there remains a certain generalised 
misapprehension among investors and regulators about how these markets 
operate. Therefore this report aims to demystify and elucidate European 
bond markets.  
Chapter 1 highlights recent developments in European bond markets 
in light of the ongoing transformation of the European financial system 
triggered by financial sector liberalisation, the accelerated process of 
disintermediation and the introduction of the euro. The chapter provides 
numerous comparisons with the United States as a benchmark, looking at 
the respective value of outstanding debt securities issued in, and the 
growth rates of various bond market segments. Bond market 
microstructure and recent developments in the architecture of primary and 
secondary markets are examined in Chapter 2, especially in light of the 
evolving phenomenon of electronisation of fixed income trading. Recent 
regulatory measures taken at the level of the EU institutions that will 
impact on European bond markets are summarised in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 
highlights critical aspects of the policy debate as the European Commission 
prepares to undertake its review of Art. 65.1 of the markets in financial 
instruments directive (MiFID). The latter mandates the Commission to 
explore the possibility of extending the pre- and post-trade transparency 
requirements prevailing under the new equities regime to non-equity 
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markets. A final chapter presents a set of policy recommendations based on 
conclusions drawn from Chapter 4. 
In the wake of accelerating disintermediation in EU financial markets 
and catalysed by the introduction of the euro, bond markets – and 
especially the corporate bond market – have grown at phenomenal rates, in 
some segments by over 500% in value terms since 1999. In sharp contrast 
with 1992, when the European bond market was nearly half as small as that 
in the US in terms of GDP, by 2005 they had almost fully converged. Debt 
securities issued in European capital markets are characterised today by 
longer maturities, significantly larger borrowing programmes and greater 
liquidity than they were a decade ago. Impressive rates of growth are also 
mirrored in the market for asset-backed securities, as the phenomenon of 
securitisation also gathers speed, which is part of the overall shift from 
relationship banking to arm’s-length finance on the European continent. 
The explosive growth observed in the primary market was not lost on the 
secondary market, which also witnessed tremendous gains in trading 
volumes, greatly improving liquidity. Both the euro and increasing 
electronic trading are responsible for these developments. 
The new legislative measures introduced as part of the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP) to create a truly integrated capital market, 
although more onerous than the previous regime, should contribute to the 
further growth of capital markets in the EU. The prospectus directive 
accommodates different regimes and maintains a healthy degree of 
regulatory competition for bond issues. The International Accounting 
Standards ‘roadmap to equivalence’ agreement with the US will allow 
other jurisdictions to follow, avoiding a flight of the bond business to non-
EU financial centres. Questions can nevertheless be raised about the new 
MiFID regime, which remains very burdensome for investment firms. 
Going forward, the main task for regulators and supervisors is to make the 
new regime work, through consistent implementation and enforcement. 
The initial evidence on these matters is not comforting, however. 
In light of the forthcoming MiFID review, the issue of whether similar 
price transparency requirements should be applied to bond markets as to 
equity markets remains particularly contentious, because bond and equity 
markets are fundamentally different, in terms both of their structures and 
in the nature of their participants.  
The fixed income business has long been a critical factor in the 
ongoing widening and deepening of European capital markets. A wide and 
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growing variety of product choice has carefully been tailored to meet the 
demands of issuers and investors with diverse needs and has contributed 
in a major way to financial innovation in the EU. Nevertheless, the business 
potentially faces one of the greatest threats yet to its independence as a 
largely self-regulated market. The European Commission will soon review 
for the European Parliament and Council of Ministers whether to extend 
pre- and post-trade transparency requirements to bonds. Whether a 
disclosure framework for fixed income trades that closely resembles the 
existing one for equity shares under MiFID is desirable remains a hotly 
contested point. Because of the specificity of the fixed income business, 
namely, that it is quote-driven and liquidity providers risk their 
proprietary capital to make markets, it is vital that policy initiatives be 
attuned to the risks of imposing a top-down market infrastructure. Any ill-
designed statutory measures that emerge at the European level could 
seriously undermine the dynamism and competitiveness of these markets.  
In the wake of recent investor losses in fixed income investments and 
the growing retail participation in fixed income more generally, there can 
be no doubt that regulators’ concerns about bolstering retail investor 
protection in this market segment are valid. However, it is important that 
such measures not focus solely on introducing statutory regulation 
affecting the microstructure of bond markets, but rather touch especially on 
the wider matrix of improving corporate governance, rooting out conflicts 
of interest in the advisory function and fostering financial literacy among 
investors. The all-important question in the regulatory debate will be to 
find ways, preferably through incentive schemes, and possibly through 
limited statutory regulation but only as a last resort, on how to concretely 
address these legitimate concerns about investor protection while ensuring 
that the proposed measures are the instruments that best address the 
source of the problem. Any proposed measures must also be able to 
achieve the desired results at a minimal cost, without engendering 
unintended spillover effects, such as inflicting damage on the liquidity-
providing function. 
In the debate on investor protection in equity markets, particular 
focus has been placed on best execution and reducing transaction costs. 
Because retail trades are frequent in equity markets, this regulatory 
strategy made sense. However, the retail presence in fixed income can be 
characterised by buy-and-hold type strategies and a wide-spread sense of 
false security regarding invested principal. As a result, regulators would be 
mistaken to focus their attention disproportionately on reducing 
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transaction costs through equity-style best execution requirements. Much 
more important yet is the safeguarding of principal. This CEPS report 
highlights some possible strategies that regulators could employ to this 
effect, including the important question of giving impetus to market 
initiatives aimed at improving documentation standards and encouraging 
the channelling of retail investments in high-yield and complex structured 
products through investment funds. 
If market efficiency is the ultimate objective driving regulatory 
interest in improving price transparency, one must ask whether greater 
transparency will enhance market liquidity. Neither the theoretical nor the 
empirical literature gives unambiguous indications that greater 
transparency would improve liquidity. This is all the more true of fixed 
income markets, since some bonds may be or become structurally illiquid; 
hence, policy initiatives will do little to improve their liquidity. 
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1. Trends in European Bond Markets 
1.1 Development and integration of European bond markets  
i. The shift away from relationship banking to arm’s-length finance  
Over the past two decades, the European financial system has been 
undergoing a deep transformation, evolving from what used to be a 
predominantly bank-based structure to greater reliance on vibrant capital 
markets as a source of funding and risk mitigation. The proximate causes 
driving the ongoing process of change were the nearly simultaneous 
internal and external forces, both political and economic, that weakened the 
power of vested interests staked in preserving the antiquated industrial 
structure of relationship finance prevalent in Europe until that time.1  
First came the liberalisation in the 1980s of capital controls and 
deregulation of the banking sector within what then was the European 
Economic Community (EEC, which became the European Union in 1993). 
Already in the 1970s, following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, 
the gradual trend towards liberalising the capital account was motivated by 
the recognition that shielding the independence of domestic monetary 
policy from global capital movements under a floating-rate system was 
redundant. Subsequently, partly as the logical corollary of relaxing capital 
controls within the EEC (reflecting policy initiatives ultimately aimed at 
achieving monetary union), and partly also due to the dominant influence 
of the neoclassical consensus on the benefits of competition, a wave of 
deregulation in the financial sector swept over Europe. As the EEC was 
laying the groundwork for monetary integration internally, capital 
movements worldwide increased greatly both in magnitude and scope as a 
                                                 
1 For a detailed exposition of the political economy of vested interests stalling 
financial development in Europe for the better part of half a century, see Rajan & 
Zingales (2002). 
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result of the wider phenomenon of financial globalisation. Together, these 
internal and external forces amounted to important pro-competitive effects, 
which in turn improved the efficiency of financial services provision and 
fostered product innovation. The combination of internal liberalisation and 
financial globalisation also paved the way for greater volumes in trading 
that greatly enhanced the liquidity of the European capital market. But 
ultimately, it was the introduction of the euro occurring in the midst of this 
ongoing transformation that provided the most significant impetus to 
deeper integration and to the further development of European capital 
markets, magnifying the positive effects initially brought about by the 
aforementioned forces.  
The reference point for any study of European financial markets must 
therefore be 1 January 1999, when the euro first emerged as a currency for 
wholesale transactions, because this date marks the conclusion of one of the 
most impressive examples of a policy-driven process aimed at overcoming 
market fragmentation.2 From the earliest days of financial integration in the 
EU, it was recognised that achieving a single capital market within the EEC 
was inconceivable so long as no unified currency emerged (Richebächer, 
1969). The introduction of the euro underpinned the development of truly 
pan-European financial markets, whereas in the past financial activity had 
mostly remained constrained within national boundaries and 
intermediated by banks. Bonds and their derivatives – the focus of the 
present study – were not left untouched by this seismic policy initiative. 
Once the cornerstone was in place, there resulted an explosion in cross-
border issuing, investing and trading in fixed income (and other) securities. 
An important by-product was financial innovation. By expanding the 
opportunities to hedge risk on the supply side and to diversify portfolios 
on the demand side, new instruments will allow for more sophisticated risk 
mitigation techniques through interest rate-linked options and futures 
instruments and significantly, the huge growth in over-the-counter interest 
rate swaps; their introduction can lead to greater portfolio efficiency, 
increasing returns for a given level of risk. 
                                                 
2 Although the initial inspiration for the creation of a single currency was political 
in nature (as suggested by the Werner report or the negotiations on the parities at 
which the national currencies would be fixed), the efficiency gains of surrendering 
national control over monetary policy were deemed to be sufficiently large as to 
warrant the creation of a single currency, widely seen as the missing cornerstone of 
the single financial market. 
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As private capital markets have gained in importance in Europe over 
the past two decades, bank financing has correspondingly diminished in 
scale and scope relative to arm’s length financing (although in absolute 
terms, it has risen, reflecting financial deepening). This was certainly not 
the case 25 years ago. In 1980, relative to GDP, bank deposits in the EU 
were 60% larger in continental Europe than in the US or UK; the ratio of 
bank credit to GDP (measured as bank loans to the private sector) on the 
continent was twice that of the latter two countries in 1980 (Rajan & 
Zingales, 2002). Today, this large gap has narrowed considerably: in the 
year 2000, the same ratio was only 30% larger on the continent than the 
US/UK average.3 This amounts to an extremely impressive rate of 
convergence, since 50% of the gap was closed in 20 years’ time. Particularly 
interesting was the convergence in financial structures that occurred over 
the sample period between the UK and continental Europe. Financial 
structures have traditionally been rather disparate across the EU. But as a 
result of policy choices and market-driven outcomes, the convergence 
process underway has been gathering pace since the start of EMU. Murinde 
et al. (2004) analyse the pattern of corporate financing and test their 
hypothesis of financial system convergence across seven EU countries. 
Their results indicate that convergence has been occurring, with a 
pronounced – albeit gradual – shift to heavier reliance on retained earnings 
                                                 
3 Upon closer examination of the figures, one must note – and the cited authors do 
not state it explicitly in their paper – that the gap narrowed only because bank 
deposits relative to GDP have exploded in the UK between 1980 and 2000, rising 
from 28% to 107%, showing a large increase in commercial bank intermediation. By 
contrast, over the same time period, bank deposits to GDP fell in the US from 54% 
to 38%. In other words, relative to the US, the importance of bank deposits in 
Europe actually increased between 1980 and 2000. While it was 120% in 1980, it 
reached 245% by the year 2000. Nevertheless, one must be careful not to 
immediately conclude that there has not been a profound transformation of the 
European financial system in recent years. These figures may also reflect the fact 
that US household savings have deteriorated demonstrably over the same time 
period, possibly explaining the lower deposit-GDP ratio for the US. Vis-à-vis the 
UK, however, the ratios have been converging between 1980 and 2000. The ratio 
was larger on the continent by 230% in 1980 and was actually surpassed by the UK 
by 2000. The point of this exercise is to demonstrate that the convergence between 
the UK and the continental European financial systems was the driving force 
behind the closing of the gap between the respective US-UK average and 
continental bank deposits to GDP ratios. 
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and greater direct recourse to market financing in the form of equity and 
bond issuance, leaving a lesser role for bank lending to play.  
ii. International comparisons of debt, equity and bank loan finance 
Despite the ongoing transformation, European finance still remains largely 
dominated by bank intermediation, both in absolute terms and relative to 
the United States. The following international comparisons with Japan and 
the United States show that relative to equity finance, debt financing – and 
bank loans in particular – remains far more important in the EU (see Figure 
1.1a). At the beginning of 2004, the value of bank assets relative to GDP was 
237%, 73% and 146%, in the EU-15, the US and Japan, respectively.4 By 
contrast, equity financing is more than twice as important in the US as it is 
in Europe (in relative terms), accounting for 116% of GDP in the US 
compared with 62% in Japan and 54% in the eurozone countries. In terms 
of market-based finance, bond markets are more important in the US (and 
Japan) at 169% of GDP, but the EU is not far behind, reaching 142% of GDP 
in 2003. Combining debt securities with bank lending, total debt finance in 
the EU is 379% of GDP, compared with 242% in the US and 315% in Japan. 
 
Figure 1.1a Bond, equity and bank assets markets in EU-12, EU-15, US and 
Japan, end 2003 (% of GDP) 
146%
169% 169%
54%
64% 62%
254%
73%
146%142%
116%
237%
0%
50%
100%
150%
200%
250%
300%
Eurozone EU-15 US Japan
Bond Markets Equity Markets Bank Assets  
                                                 
4 It is interesting to note that if one looks only at eurozone countries, market-based 
finance is even smaller relative to GDP. This is no surprise, since the UK economy 
accounts for the significantly greater value of equity finance in the EU-15 than in 
the eurozone countries alone (64% of GDP compared with only 52%) and the lower 
value of bank assets relative to GDP (237% as opposed to 254%).  
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Figure 1.1b Bond, equity and bank assets markets in EU-12, EU-15, US and 
Japan, end 2003 (€ billions) 
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In value terms, the analysis is similar to the situation relative to GDP, 
since EU and US GDP are more or less equivalent. Total assets of European 
banks have grown significantly over the past decade, nearly doubling from 
about €11.8 trillion in 1995 to €22 trillion by January 2004 (Figure 1.1b). 
Because in 1995 the value of bank assets in the EU was roughly double that 
of debt securities (whose combined total then was €5.1 trillion), bond 
markets had a lot of ground to catch up. Slowly, they are gaining 
importance relative to bank lending, since, at €13.2 trillion (end-2003), the 
value of debt securities issued by EU firms and governments represented 
62% of the total value of bank assets, whereas the same figure stood at 
below 50% in 1995. Coincidentally, they are also gaining in relation to the 
American bond market. In 1999, the total value of debt finance (capital 
market, not bank loans) in Europe amounted to €8 trillion; the 
corresponding figure for the US was €12.7 trillion. By end-2004, however, 
debt finance in Europe reached a value of €13.5 trillion, compared with 
€16.7 trillion for the US. 
Of the three main sources of external finance – bank lending, bonds 
and publicly-traded equities – the last is the least important in the EU, with 
the total market capitalisation of EU exchanges in 2003 (€6 trillion) being 
slightly above a quarter of the value of bank assets. There was a point in 
1999 when equity markets reached the same importance as bond markets, 
but that trend could not be sustained in the aftermath of the collapse of the 
tech bubble, which vanquished the new markets and triggered very 
significant, albeit gradual, declines on the major European exchanges. 
Private equity investment remains a minute fraction of total firm financing 
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in the EU, although growth rates since 1990 have been very impressive 
(Figure 1.2). Net annual investment in 1989 totalled about €4 billion, 
compared with €30 billion in 2003. Over the past 15 years, according to the 
European Venture Capital Association, total investments in private equity 
in the EU rose from €14.8 billion to €140 billion.  
Figure 1.2 Total EU private equity investment (€ billions) 
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Note: Total investment measured at cost. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations and European Venture Capital Association (EVCA). 
 
Due to a different set of initial conditions, a perpetuation of the gap in 
market-based finance between the EU and the US is inevitable, at least for 
the near future. Nevertheless, as disintermediation gains speed in Europe, 
the gap is slowly being closed. This is nowhere more evident than in the 
remarkable transatlantic convergence process that has occurred in bond 
market activity in recent years (see Figures 1.3a and 1.3b below). 
Figure 1.3a Bond markets in EU-15, US and Japan, 1992-2003 (% of GDP) 
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Figure 1.3b Bond, equity and bank assets markets in EU-15, 1995-2003 
(billions of ecus/euros) 
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Whereas in 1992 the size of the European bond market stood at little 
more than half that of the American one relative to GDP (just over 80% 
compared to 150%, respectively), the faster growth of the former has meant 
that in fewer than 10 years, the initially large gap was virtually closed: 
today, the combined value of debt securities in the US reaches 170% of 
GDP, while the equivalent figure for the EU is roughly 140%. 
(Coincidentally, one can also observe a similar trend in Japanese capital 
markets.) As is the case for equities, the European bond market has been 
growing markedly faster than bank finance over the past decade, achieving 
a growth rate of 105% over the period 1995-2004. Corresponding figures for 
the value of bank lending are 86% over the period. 
iii. International comparisons of bond market growth rates 
Because the trend toward deeper financial market integration in Europe 
coincided with the wider trend of financial globalisation, it is difficult to 
determine the proximate cause of the explosive growth in debt issuance 
that occurred in Europe in the late 1990s and early in the 21st century. 
Analysing the counterfactual is one way to arrive at a conclusion: How 
much of that growth would have occurred in the absence of monetary 
union? In order to obtain a rough figure, we compare the growth rates of 
European bond markets with those of the US and Japan. The greater the 
difference between the respective growth rates, the greater is the 
probability that a good part of that difference can be accounted for by the 
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‘single currency effect,’ or specifically European financial market 
integration, as opposed to financial globalisation. 
Since the advent of EMU, European bond markets, propelled by 
private debt issuance, have been growing very rapidly, much more rapidly 
even than those in the United States and Japan (Table 1.1). Overall, over the 
five-year period 1999-2004, the amount outstanding in debt securities 
issued by governments, corporations and financial institutions in the EU-15 
grew by 65%, or some 35% faster than the rest of the world, which only 
achieved a growth rate of 50%. This significantly higher growth rate 
suggests that European integration spurred deeper capital market 
integration, above and beyond what would have been achieved by 
financial globalisation alone. The market for corporate debt securities 
provides just such an example. Whereas the American corporate bond 
market grew by 35% between 1999 and 2004, its European counterpart 
easily eclipsed it with an extraordinary growth rate of 283% over the same 
period. 
Table 1.1 Total growth in amount outstanding of debt securities, 1999-2004 
 Eurozone EU-15 US* Japan Rest of 
world 
World 
Total debt securities 69% 68% 32% 55% 59% 49% 
Government debt 
securities 50% 44% 7% 109% 66% 49% 
Debt securities 
issued by financial 
institutions 77% 101% 60% -21% 95% 65% 
Corporate debt 
securities 283% 216% 35% 1% 56% 43% 
* US figures were calculated in dollar, not euro terms, since exchange rate movements 
would significantly affect the ratios for the US and not reflect true market development. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from BIS data. 
Evidently, the introduction of the euro had a significant impact on the 
currency denomination of many international debt issues, as the greater 
liquidity of the currency and its widespread acceptance as a vehicle 
(reserve) currency along the lines of the US dollar has led to a great 
increase in the choice of the euro as a currency of issuer. Whereas in 1993 
only 25% of international debt was denominated in currencies that today 
make up the euro, today the corresponding figure is around 40%. Figure 1.4 
shows the consolidation in vehicle (reserve) currencies that has prevailed in 
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the past 12 years. Currencies that once had a role in international finance, 
such as the Japanese yen, the Swiss franc and the Canadian dollar, have all 
but disappeared from the international debt market. 
Figure 1.4 International debt issues by currency 
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1.2 European bond market overview and trends 
i. International versus domestic debt securities in the EU 
Worldwide, domestic capital markets remain the dominant source of debt 
finance, although the international debt market has been growing far more 
rapidly.5 In the past 25 years, the total value of domestic debt has trebled, 
whereas the international debt market grew by a factor of 17.6 Growth in 
the volumes of the aggregate world domestic debt market was accounted 
                                                 
5 “The BIS definition of international securities (as opposed to domestic securities) 
is based on three major characteristics of the securities: the location of the 
transaction, the currency of issuance and the residence of the issuer. International 
issues comprise all foreign currency issues by residents and non-residents in a 
given country and all domestic currency issues launched in the domestic market by 
non-residents. In addition, domestic currency issues launched in the domestic 
market by residents are also considered as international issues if they are 
specifically targeted at non-resident investors” (see BIS, 2003, pp. 13-14). 
6 Authors’ own calculations from BIS data. 
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for primarily by the United States and Japan. Japanese domestic debt 
surged in the wake of the severe banking crisis that disrupted the Japanese 
economy for nearly the entirety of this period, the result of an aggressive 
Keynesian fiscal expansion to counter ineffective monetary policy and of 
the political decision to re-capitalise sinking banks. Mostly due to the 
declining state of public finances, as the Japanese debt-to-GDP ratio 
climbed from around 70% of GDP in 1990 to over 170% of GDP in 2003 (see 
IMF, 2004).7  
Over the past 18 years, the growth rates in issuance of international 
debt easily were multiples of GDP growth in many countries, above and 
beyond EU borders, which implies that although the euro may have been 
an important determinant propelling growth within the EU, there were 
powerful external forces at work. Whereas the total value of international 
debt securities (all issuer types) was merely €608 billion8 in 1987, it exceeds 
€9,800 billion today, a pace equivalent to a doubling in value every year. 
The world’s three largest economies display very different characteristics in 
this category: Japan is still a very closed capital market, and perhaps due to 
the conglomerate structure of the keiretsu and the close ties that it fosters 
between corporates and their banks, in addition to the very high savings 
rate of households, Japanese firms have yet to develop a culture of tapping 
global capital markets. Less than 4% of Japanese debt is held overseas (see 
Pesek, 2005). At the same time, it is clear that in the EU, the growth of 
international debt securities in terms of value outstanding has been nothing 
short of phenomenal, particularly since the introduction of the euro (Table 
1.2). Growth rates of international bonds have also been high in the US, 
which has traditionally been a largely autonomous and introspective 
capital market. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Despite these already alarming figures, many analysts argue that this nominal 
figure understates the true state of Japanese public finances, as a number of 
contingent claims on Japanese government coffers are excluded from the figures. 
When the value of contingent liabilities are included, that is, of government 
guarantees to semi-public industries, Japanese public debt is said to exceed 200% 
of GDP. 
8 At current (June 2005) exchange rates. 
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Table 1.2 European bond market growth, 1999-2004 
Country International 
debt securities 
outstanding 
(€ billions) 
Domestic debt 
securities 
outstanding 
(€ billions) 
Growth 
rate, int’l 
debt 
Growth 
rate, 
domestic 
debt 
 1999/3 2004/12 1999/3 2004/12 1999-2004 1999-2004 
Austria 55.4 120.5 120.1 174.1 117% 45% 
Belgium 83.1 179.7 330.3 374.1 116% 13% 
Denmark 18.9 32.4 250.4 356.2 71% 42% 
Finland 31.7 53.6 75.2 95.1 69% 27% 
France 178.1 552.4 1050.3 1645.4 210% 57% 
Germany 433.2 1384.5 1677.3 1715.1 220% 2% 
Greece 20.0 65.1 87.1 167.5 225% 92% 
Ireland 20.5 90.1 26.5 69.7 340% 163% 
Italy 85.9 405.3 1298.4 1827.8 372% 41% 
Luxembourg 6.3 27.8 - - 343% - 
Netherlands 154.4 409.9 303.6 517.8 166% 71% 
Portugal 13.5 75.3 56.5 116.0 457% 105% 
Spain 109.7 344.7 330.8 672.2 214% 103% 
Sweden 75.4 103.4 217.1 240.2 37% 11% 
UK 276.1 833.7 637.5 802.0 202% 26% 
Eurozone 1192.0 3709.0 5356.1 7374.7 211% 38% 
EU-15 1562.4 4678.5 6461.0 8773.2 199% 36% 
US 755.4 1991.5 11944.4 14785.1 164% 24% 
Japan 245.4 176.2 4264.4 6832.6 -28% 60% 
World 3543.1 8262.0 24819.9 33943.7 133% 37% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations with BIS data. 
Domestic debt markets in the EU continue to be dominated by 
government debt, both sovereign and sub-national. In only three countries 
in the sample of 15 in Figure 1.5a below do government issues not ‘crowd 
out’9 private issuance, namely, in Denmark, the Netherlands and United 
Kingdom. On the other hand, some countries’ domestic debt markets 
                                                 
9 ‘Crowding out’ of private borrowing by heavy government borrowing is defined 
(arbitrarily) by the authors as government debt not accounting for more than 50% 
of total value of domestic debt issues. 
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remain completely dominated by government debt, especially those in 
countries like Greece, Hungary and the Czech Republic, which have a 
tradition of less developed capital markets. It is no surprise that the United 
Kingdom has the most vibrant domestic corporate debt market in the EU, 
with a share of just less than one-third of the total value of domestic debt. 
Financial institutions represent the second largest share of domestic debt 
issues after government entities in all EU member states except Denmark, 
where they surpass official sector bonds in value terms. 
Figure 1.5a Domestic debt securities, by sector composition 
 
Figure 1.5b International debt securities, by sector composition 
 
Source: Authors’ own calculations with BIS data. 
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International debt issues are largely, and in some EU member states 
overwhelmingly, dominated by financial institution issues (Figure 1.5b). 
This result should come as no surprise, since financial institutions continue 
to be the main source of finance for European firms, and thereby engage in 
large-scale lending activities for which they must find sources of funding. 
Due to their expertise in, knowledge of, and experience with financial 
markets, banks and other financial intermediaries have a long experience of 
tapping international capital markets for funding purposes. As can be seen 
from the figure, international debt issues by Finnish and Greek entities 
continue to be dominated by government activity, countering the general 
tendency in the EU.  
Interestingly, the EU (defined as European governments, 
corporations and financial institutions) accounts for the majority of the 
international capital market in value terms, capturing a market share of 
over 50% (Figure 1.6a, last column). The source of this domination may be 
proximity to the London-based international bond market as well as a 
mixture of legal, tax and accounting reasons. But it is also due to heavy 
issuance by European governments and financial institutions, which could 
not be met by demand from domestic investors alone. Each accounts for 
over 60% of outstanding global debt issued in these respective categories of 
issuer, and surprisingly, even European corporations have a dominant 
share in their category of issuer (private debt issued by non-financial 
corporations) in the international bond market, also above 50% (Figure 
1.6a, first column). 
It is impressive to notice how quickly EU market share has evolved in 
the mere six years since the introduction of the euro. In value terms, the 
share captured by EU issuers in the international bond market rose from 
below 45% in 1999 to over 55% by end-2004; the market share held by EU 
issuers of international debt securities rose about 15 percentage points, and 
by nearly the same number (although nearly tripling) in terms of global 
domestic debt securities outstanding (Figure 1.6b). True, domestic debt 
securities issued by EU entities have fallen since 1999, but this is primarily 
due to the mixture of fiscal consolidation in the EU and the rapidly 
developing government debt markets in underdeveloped countries.  
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Figure 1.6a EU market share in global international debt securities markets 
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Figure 1.6b EU market share in global domestic debt securities markets 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations using BIS data. 
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ii. Net issuance of international debt securities 
As can be seen from Figure 1.7, net issuance of international bonds by EU 
issuers displays an interesting pattern in comparison with issuers from 
other countries over the period 1993-2004. What is immediately evident is 
the reduced net issuance that resulted from the disciplinary measures 
imposed by the Maastricht criteria in the run-up to EMU from 1993 until 
1999. In 1999, there is a sharp break in the trend, as net issuance of 
international bonds by EU issuers all of a sudden rose dramatically relative 
to the rest of the world.  
Figure 1.7 Share of net issuance of international debt securities, by region 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations from BIS data. 
The recent dominance of EU issuers in total issuance of international 
debt securities can be attributed to two main causes: on the one hand, net 
issuance was unusually strong in the EU in 2002, 2003 and in the second 
half of 2004 by recent historical standards, reaching up to 80% of world 
quarterly net issuance; on the other hand, in the rest of the world, net 
issuance deviated significantly on the downside from the values one would 
expect if one would have extrapolated the historical trend line. In 2003, 
however, net issuance was lower in the EU compared to the two previous 
years, while in the rest of the world, it was on its way back up, which 
explains why the EU’s share in total issuance receded in 2003.  
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iii. Size of international bonds issued by EU entities 
An interesting feature in the international bond market since 1999 is the 
increasing average value of bond issues – straights and convertibles in 
particular, which, although already rising before that date, have grown 
much faster after monetary union (Figure 1.8). Straight bonds – the largest 
source of debt financing in the EU – reached an average size of nearly €500 
million in 2004, up from around €120 million in 1988. This trend is reflected 
even more strongly in the average size of convertibles, which have grown 
from around €180 million to over €600 million in value over the same 
period. Finally, fixed rate issues are larger in size today than 15 years ago, 
but they have not displayed the same kind of steady rise in average value 
as straights and convertibles.  
The increase in debt issue size is not surprising in light of the 
introduction of a common currency and is due to several factors: first, the 
cross-border consolidation that was expected to occur as a result of the 
single currency. As a result, mergers and acquisitions activity 
mushroomed, in effect creating a market for takeover, LBO and joint-
venture financing. Also, issuers could now appeal to investors across the 
eurozone, facilitating access to debt financing and allowing for larger 
funding programmes that would previously have saturated local demand.  
Figure 1.8 Average value of issue by bond type (€ millions) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations with sample international bond market data 
provided by ISMA. 
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iv. Evolutions in debt securities maturities 
Maturities tend to increase as firms become more leveraged (Schiantarelli & 
Sembenellli, 1997). This result is intuitive, since firms with high short-term 
debt to total assets are likely to face refinancing problems, which may even 
result in severe liquidity shortages. Empirical tests have revealed an 
inverse relationship between maturity and firm indebtedness, at least up 
until a certain point. Beyond this point, the relationship becomes non-
monotonic, as very highly-leveraged firms are more likely to default than 
firms with little debt, pushing anxious investors to demand the firm to 
issue short-term paper. Part of the push towards greater leveraging may be 
due to the greater institutional investor participation in capital markets 
fostered by the deregulation of the investment fund industry in the EU. 
Although acknowledging that research on the influence of institutional 
investors on firm leveraging is inconclusive, Davis (2002) cites a study by 
Firth (1995) that demonstrates empirically that the increasing presence of 
institutional investors encourages firms to leverage up.  
Some of these theories may explain why the average maturities of 
debt securities issued by European entities, both official and private, in the 
international bond market have risen across the board between 1990 and 
2003 (except for Sweden and Greece, where the maturities are weighted by 
issue size; see Figure 1.9). Some countries, especially Finland and the 
United Kingdom, have seen considerable lengthening of maturities of debt 
issued by entities registered in those countries, a rise of more than, and 
close to, four years, respectively. Other EU countries, such as Italy, the 
Netherlands and Belgium, have also witnessed non-negligible rises in the 
average maturity of international bonds issued by national entities. 
According to our ISMA sample, the average maturity across all issuer types 
and issue types rose from about 8.75 years in 1988 to around 10.75 years in 
2004 (see Figure 1.10).  
Another possible driver of the lengthening maturity structure of 
corporate debt in the EU is related to the widening and greater diversified 
investor base as a result of the single currency area. In the captive national 
markets, issuers had to respond to domestic investors’ preferences when 
organising borrowing programmes. Until recently, it was by and large 
banks that held the lion’s share of corporate debt. Because banks prefer to 
match closely their assets and liabilities, and because banks’ liabilities are 
mostly short-term, they also prefer to hold assets with relatively short 
duration. 
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Figure 1.9 Eurobond maturities by issuer nationality 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations with data on international debt issues provided by 
the International Securities Market Association (ISMA). 
 
Figure 1.10 International bond maturities 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations with data on international debt issues provided by 
the International Securities Market Association (ISMA). 
The close link between duration and maturity suggests that 
traditional banks with large deposit activities would prefer to hold debt 
with shorter maturities. But as former ‘foreign’ markets in the EU became 
part of the enlarged domestic market, life insurance and pension funds, 
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which previously had been very constrained in their investment activities 
by limits to their exposure to foreign exchange risk, were free to hold assets 
across the EU. As a result, and compounded by the ongoing 
disintermediation, this trend has meant that more debt has ended up in the 
hands of investors that have long-term liabilities, and who will prefer to 
match them with long-term assets. With the demand for corporate bonds 
increasing as the ‘home bias’ phenomenon in portfolio management 
diminished greatly within the EU, it became cheaper for firms to issue 
long-term debt, so one would expect average maturities to rise subsequent 
to the introduction of a single currency. This seems to be the case, as seen in 
the figure above, although there are countervailing trends when one breaks 
down the average maturities by bond type.  
In the international bond market, an interesting trend has been the 
impressive reduction in the maturity of convertible debt over the past 15 
years (Figure 1.11). Whereas the average maturity of convertible issues was 
14 years in 1988, it is below eight years today. Dutordoit & Van de Gucht 
(2004) estimate the average maturity for outstanding convertible debt 
issued by EU firms is 6.71 years and the median value is 5.48 years. This 
development may warrant further research, since the trend is pronounced, 
monotonic10 and goes against the general trend of rising maturities 
observed in debt issued by EU entities in the international bond market.  
Figure 1.11 Maturities of bond types 
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10 A monotonic curve indicates the presence of a trend that is not broken by any 
lapses in the opposite direction, whether brief or prolonged or rare or common. 
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While some governments have been taking advantage of the lower 
financing costs ushered in by monetary union to lengthen the maturity 
structure of their debt (e.g. Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and recent fiscal 
‘sinner’ Germany) others have been consolidating debt at the long end and 
bringing the fulcrum back towards shorter maturities, in order to preserve 
credit ratings from deterioration (Table 1.3).  
Table 1.3 Term to maturity of government debt in the euro area (years) 
End of 1995 End of 1998 End of 1998 End of 2002 End of 2003 
Austria 5.8 5.5 6 6.3 
Belgium - - 6.1 5.9 
Finland - 4.8 4.5 3.9 
France 6.3 6.3 5.9 5.9 
Germany 4.9 6 6 6.3 
Greece - 3.9 6.1 6.3 
Ireland - - 4.5 5.8 
Italy 4.5 5.2 5.6 6.1 
Luxembourg - 7 2.3 1.9 
The Netherlands 6.9 6.5 6.1 6 
Portugal - 3.8 4.5 4.3 
Spain 3.7 5.4 6 6.1 
Euro area - - 5.8 6 
Source: Annual reports of euro area debt managers and Wolswijk & de Haan (2005). 
v. A new asset class: The issuance of ultra-long bonds 
In recent months, European capital markets have witnessed the 
introduction of a new debt class: the ultra-long maturity segment, 
comprised of sovereign and corporate bonds with 50-year maturities.11 
                                                 
11 Ultra-long bonds are not a novelty in the American corporate debt market. The 
Walt Disney Corporation emitted a 100-year ‘Sleeping Beauty’ bond in 1993, 
although it is callable any time after 2023. This was the first debt security with 
century maturity since 1954. The Disney issue was followed by several others, 
including IBM, J.C. Penney and Financial Security Assurance Holdings. But North 
American economic history gives even more outlandish examples: Republic 
National Bank issued a 1000-year bond on October 1997 but it was not the first of 
its kind, as these millennial issues had been used by railroads in the late 19th 
century (Karpoff, 2004). Telecom Italia was the pioneer in the corporate bond 
market, launching a 50-year €500 million debendeture, stretching the yield curve in 
the corporate bond market farther out and further cementing the ongoing 
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Naturally, market integration contributed significantly to the development 
of this new asset class. Yet it was not alone in triggering the mushrooming 
of ultra-long maturity bonds. Time-specific market conditions also play a 
role, as issuers try to lock in the financing advantages offered by 
historically low long-term interest rates. As Figure 1.12 indicates, long-term 
interest rates have been falling in tandem with short-term rates over the 
past four years amid sanguine inflationary expectations, reducing the costs 
of debt financing.12  
Figure 1.12 Short and long-term interest rates in the euro area (%) 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations with ECB data. 
Yet it is especially enormous pressure from the demand side13 
combined with favourable supply conditions that has triggered the already 
high issuance of ultra-long bonds in both the government and corporate 
                                                                                                                            
transition from traditional bank-based financing to capital market access by 
European corporates. 
12 Low yields on long-term debt, particularly in an environment of rising short-
term interest rates, have called market participants to evoke the possibility of a 
bubble in the bond markets (Greenspan’s ‘conundrum’), since markets do not seem 
to be properly pricing risk. Evidence for this can be gathered from the very narrow 
spread between benchmark government securities and riskier prospects.  
13 The 50-year French government issue, initially planned for a volume of €3-5 
billion, was increased to €6 billion after demand exceeded €19 billion (Simensen, 
2005b). 
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market segments, offering mutual benefits to both debt issuers and 
institutional investors: whereas EU governments are looking to take 
advantage of historically low interest rates to lock in cheap deficit financing 
over a horizon of half a century, government debt characterised by an 
ultra-long maturity structure will enable insurance firms and pension 
funds to generate a steady stream of income over extended periods. 
There are signs that other European government issuers are quickly 
going to follow suit to exploit the favourable market conditions prevailing 
at the moment: Italy and the United Kingdom have announced plans to 
launch 50-year ‘Methuselah’ issues; even Greece recently floated a 
successful 30-year bond for the first time, at a surprisingly low 26 basis 
point spread over the German 30-year benchmark that will come to term 
around the same time.14 Part of the reason governments such as the Greek 
and the Italian have been able to issue bonds with long and ultra-long 
maturities stems from the greater credibility of monetary policy in 
Europe.15 Whereas the issuance of 50-year sovereign debt instruments 
would have been nearly unthinkable a generation ago, the more stable 
institutional framework, anchored by the constitutionally guaranteed 
independence of the ECB, has contributed in great part to its inception. 
These new maturities are also likely to impact the euro yield-curve, adding 
depth and creating new opportunities for trading along it. Additionally, 
adding another benchmark security at the tail of the curve enables 
investors to better price risk over long horizons. 
Up until now, EU sovereign debt markets have been largely 
characterised by the domination of bonds with 10-year maturities, and 
overwhelmingly by bonds with maturities shorter than a quarter century, 
as seen in our sample dataset16 from the international bond market: out of 
                                                 
14 This low spread is all the more surprising, since the issue comes shortly after the 
finance ministry was rocked by revelations that Greece had been reporting falsified 
statistics on deficit levels for the better part of a decade. And yet demand for this 
issue was sufficient to push the government to the upper limit of the announced 
€3-5 billion range, at €5 billion (Simensen, 2005a). 
15 Institutional determinants of monetary policy credibility include full 
independence from political pressure, which is enshrined in the existing EU 
Treaties. Although the Federal Reserve is, strictly speaking, less independent than 
the European Central Bank, as measured by the Eijffinger-Schaling index for 
central bank independence. (See e.g. Eijffinger & Schaling, 1993). 
16 Courtesy of the International Securities Market Association (ISMA). 
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399 government debt securities from the international bond market, only 
44, or just under 9%, have maturities longer than 25 years. A more 
comprehensive Merrill Lynch survey indicates that as of 2004, only 6% of 
eurozone sovereign bonds have maturities that exceed 25 years.17 But there 
is little doubt that the trend of lengthening maturity structures in funding 
programmes will be extrapolated into the future, particularly in light of the 
challenges posed by the demographic deficit the European continent faces. 
The rapid ageing of the population means that the insurance industry, as 
well as pension funds, are looking to strengthen their balance sheets, given 
the enormous liabilities they face over the long term.  
vi. Recent trends in European sovereign debt markets  
Vast amounts of research has been produced on European sovereign bond 
markets, especially analyses of yield convergence (see Baele et al., 2004). 
Accordingly, we limit ourselves to a brief overview and instead focus more 
attention on the corporate bond market.  
Sovereign bond markets have long been, and continue to be, the most 
developed segment of European capital markets. For example, they still 
represent today a multiple of the outstanding value of corporate debt 
securities issued in the EU, figures that remain significantly higher in most 
EU countries than in the United States or the rest of the world (see Table 
1.4).  
For a long time, sovereign bonds represented the majority of total 
outstanding debt securities in Europe, although this is no longer the case 
today: debt securities issued by European financial institutions have now 
overtaken government debt as the single largest category of issuer in the 
EU bond market. This is the logical consequence of the pervasiveness of 
public deficits in Europe after the oil shocks and the need to fund these 
budgetary shortfalls efficiently at the lowest cost possible to the sovereign 
issuer. As a result, sovereign bond markets blossomed, their development 
not only spurred by the sheer size of public deficits, but also by direct 
government oversight of their operation and contributions to their design. 
Yet in the run-up to monetary union, fiscal deficits shrank as a logical 
consequence of the convergence programme, leading to smaller markets for 
government debt across the EU. More recently, as some member states, 
namely, Germany, France, Portugal and Italy, have plunged headlong into 
                                                 
17 As reported in The Economist (2005).  
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protracted bouts of fiscal profligacy, public deficits are on the rise with a 
concomitant increase in government debt issuance. The trend described 
above is also due to the explosion in international debt issuance by 
European financial institutions.  
Table 1.4 Relative size of government and corporate debt markets* 
Country Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy 
Relative 
size 
5.8 7.8 3.6 4.5 2.2 6.0 30.7 0.8 5.5 
 
Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Eurozone EU-15 Japan US Rest of 
world 
2.4 5.0 2.4 4.0 2.7 3.9 3.7 5.9 2.6 2.9 
* Cell content represents the ratio of total value outstanding of government debt to corpor-
ate debt. 
Source: Authors’ own calculations with BIS data. 
Because fiscal policy still falls within the remit of the EU member 
states, one cannot speak of a European sovereign debt market as such. 
Unlike the evolving European corporate debt market, government bond 
markets in Europe remain very much a national operation and continue to 
be tightly regulated by the national central banks and finance ministries for 
reasons having to do with monetary policy, financial stability and ensuring 
favourable conditions for the continued issuance of government debt. At 
over €1.3 trillion, Italy’s government bond market remains the largest in the 
EU (and third largest in the world after the US and Japan), followed by 
Germany (€1 trillion), France (€900 billion) and the UK (€500 billion). Of all 
EU countries, Greece and Portugal have witnessed the most rapid growth 
in value of government debt outstanding, a total of over 110% in each case. 
Not surprisingly, they are accompanied by two other ‘sinners’ who have 
recently (and repeatedly) broken the Stability and Growth Pact, France and 
Germany, with respective growth rates of 64% and 91%. 
Government bonds play an essential role in the proper functioning of 
the European repo market, since central government debt represents nearly 
90% of collateral securing repo transactions (ISMA, 2004; Wolwijk & de 
Haan, 2005). In terms of the design of government funding programmes, 
their strategy still remains relatively simple in terms of the choice of debt 
instrument: the great majority of European sovereign bonds are bullet 
bonds with fixed coupons (Cheung et al., 2005). 
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Table 1.5 Government bonds 
Country Gov’t debt securities 
outstanding, 1999-03 
( € billions) 
Gov’t debt securities 
outstanding, 2004-12 
(€ billions) 
Growth rate, 
1999-2004 
Austria 95.0 138.9 46% 
Belgium 244.7 333.4 36% 
Denmark 97.9 97.9 0% 
Finland 69.5 97.9 41% 
France 562.9 923.3 64% 
Germany 555.8 1062.8 91% 
Greece 106.0 224.4 112% 
Ireland 28.0 34.4 23% 
Italy 1050.6 1305.1 24% 
Netherlands 169.8 226.6 33% 
Portugal 46.4 97.2 110% 
Spain 288.9 389.2 35% 
Sweden 152.2 145.8 -4% 
UK 408.4 522.3 28% 
Eurozone 3217.5 4833.2 50% 
EU-15 3875.9 5599.1 44% 
US 3982.3 4261.0 7% 
Japan 2520.5 5270.9 109% 
World 11966.7 17773.8 49% 
Rest of world 1587.9 2642.8 66% 
Source: Authors’ own calculations with BIS data. 
vii. Recent trends in the European corporate bond market 
It is especially private capital markets that have been the driving force 
behind the rapid evolution of European bond markets since the 
introduction of the euro, particularly in light of the fiscal consolidation that 
prevailed in the run-up to the single currency. In this section, we highlight 
developments in the EU corporate debt market and in the market for debt 
securities issued by financial institutions.  
For a long time, the prevalence of relationship banking in financial 
intermediation in continental Europe meant that corporate debt markets 
remained significantly underdeveloped in contrast to the vibrant American 
market.18 For example, at the time of the introduction of the euro, the 
                                                 
18 As explained later in this chapter, there is one notable (and perhaps surprising) 
exception, France, which has a rather developed market for corporate debt relative 
to its continental neighbours.  
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European corporate debt market only accounted for 13% of the world 
market for private debt securities issued by non-financial corporations in 
contrast to a 56% US share. In other words, valued at €475 billion in 1999, 
the European corporate debt market was less than a quarter the size of its 
US counterpart (€2,020 billion).19  
By the end of 2004, however, the global landscape of corporate debt 
markets had changed significantly. From 13% five years earlier, the EU 
market share had more than doubled, surging to 29%. In value terms, the 
amount outstanding of corporate debt securities issued by EU corporations 
reached €1,500 billion in 2004, or 74% of the US corporate debt market size 
(valued in euros), as opposed to less than 25% the value of the US market 
five years earlier.20 Nevertheless, valued at $3,000 billion (€2,038 billion at 
current exchange rates), the corporate debt market in the United States still 
remains easily the largest in value terms, accounting for 40% of the total 
value of corporate debt securities in the world.21 Today, within the EU, the 
leaders in the corporate bond market in value terms are France (€413.5 
billion), Italy (€238.2 billion), the United Kingdom (€192.2 billion) and 
Germany (€175.7 billion). 
The extraordinarily high growth rates recently registered by the 
European corporate bond market reflect the fact that it remains the fastest-
growing segment of the European bond market, growing in value terms by 
216% over the same time horizon and dwarfing the growth rate of the US 
market (30%).22 Despite the high EU-15 average growth rate, some 
countries have seen nothing short of spectacular growth rates in the value 
of corporate bonds outstanding (Table 1.6). For example, the Italian 
corporate debt market has witnessed by far the most spectacular growth 
rate of all EU countries, growing by more than 1,300% since 1999. In 
addition, both the German and Irish markets grew by over 700%, and the 
Spanish one by over 300%. 
                                                 
19 Authors’ own calculations using BIS data.  
20 The US corporate debt markets was valued at $3,000 billion in December 2004. 
Violent movements in the €/$ exchange rates since 1999 mean that comparing the 
figures in terms of a single currency is risky, since exchange rate movements will 
affect the value of the US corporate debt market more than innate growth, 
artificially driving its value down (by up to 30%). 
21 As of December 2004 and measured in terms of euros, not US dollars. 
22 Authors’ own calculations based on BIS data. 
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Table 1.6 Corporate bond market growth rate, 1999-2004 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Lux. 
245% 228% 47% 137% 152% 715% 174% 704% 1360% 100% 
 
Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Eurozone EU-15 Japan US* 
133% 97% 365% 74% 74% 283% 216% 35% 30% 
* US figures were calculated in US dollars to prevent exchange rate movements from 
influencing the true rate of growth.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations; data from BIS and Eurostat. 
In addition to being the largest corporate bond market in value terms, 
the US market also remained for a long time, the largest in relative terms, 
as a percentage of GDP, hovering around 25% in recent years. Yet over the 
last two years, due to phenomenal growth in its corporate debt market 
relative to GDP, Ireland has overtaken the US market in terms of relative 
size, reaching 29.5% of GDP, up from 6% of GDP in 1999 (!). The Irish 
corporate debt market doubled in value from the first quarter of 2003 to the 
fourth quarter of 2004 alone, growing from €21 billion to €43 billion. 
Aggregated across all EU countries, the value of corporate debt securities 
outstanding relative to GDP went from 6% of EU GDP in 1999 to 15.3% in 
2004. Yet as seen in the Irish figures, the aggregate EU-15 statistic hides 
considerable variation in terms of the level of development, depth and 
liquidity of corporate bond markets. French firms have a longer tradition of 
tapping capital markets than their counterparts in other European 
countries, which may explain why, relative to GDP, France has 
traditionally been the leader in the European corporate debt market (ECB, 
2004). In 2004, the amount outstanding of French corporate securities stood 
at 25% of GDP.  
Table 1.7 Corporate bond market to GDP (as of December 2004) 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Lux. 
10.2% 15.2% 14.1% 14.7% 25.1% 8.0% 4.4% 29.5% 17.6% 13.2% 
 
Netherlands Portugal Spain Sweden UK Eurozone EU-15 Japan US* 
19.9% 14.3% 19.8% 12.9% 11.2% 16.5% 15.4% 19.2% 25.0% 
* US figures were calculated in US dollars to prevent exchange rate movements from 
influencing the true rate of growth.  
Source: Authors’ own calculations; data from BIS and Eurostat. 
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As mentioned above, the speed of the transformation to arm’s-length 
finance of some European countries with traditionally strong banking 
structures and correspondingly weak market infrastructures for arm’s 
length finance, such as Italy and Germany, has been nothing short of 
phenomenal. In 1999, the value outstanding of corporate securities issued 
in Italy amounted to €16.3 billion, or 1.5% of GDP. By 2004, however, the 
Italian corporate bond market had grown to €238.2 billion, equivalent to 
17.6% of Italian GDP. Likewise, the German corporate bond market, which 
only amounted to 1% of German GDP in 1999 (€21.6 billion), was 
equivalent to 8% of the same in 2004 (€175.8 billion). At only 4.4% of GDP, 
Greece retains the smallest corporate debt market in the EU-15 in both 
relative and absolute terms. Overall, relative to GDP, corporate bond 
markets have grown very quickly in the EU since 1999 (Figure 1.13). 
Coincidentally, it is perhaps surprising that the UK, which has a more 
market-oriented financial system than France, registers a lower ratio, only 
achieving 11.2% of GDP (although one must beware of exchange rate 
movements influencing this figure).  
These developments illustrate an increased investor appetite for 
exposure to the credit of corporate entities, and in sharp contrast with the 
government bond segment, which is essentially part of the interest rate 
arena; this has been part of the dynamic increase in credit markets in 
general. Some of this increase can be attributed to the development of more 
sophisticated hedging techniques such as credit default swaps and 
comparatively low and stable inflation throughout the EU. At the extreme 
end of the credit spectrum is high-yield debt (also called junk bonds), 
which is sub-investment grade (below BBB), and it is characterised by 
higher returns and higher risk than in the investment grade corporate bond 
market. Default probabilities are elevated compared with investment-grade 
bonds, meaning a heightened risk of principal loss or missed coupon 
payments, risks for which investors require compensation at a premium 
over ‘risk-free’, and the essentially interest rate sensitive government 
securities. Though a fairly new concept itself (having only taken off in the 
United States in the 1980s), the market for high-yield corporate issues is a 
new segment in the European fixed income landscape, only arriving in 
Europe in the mid-1990s (De Bondt & Marqués-Ibáñez, 2005). 
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Figure 1.13 Corporate bond market relative to GDP, 1999-2004 
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Source: Authors’ own calculations; BIS and Eurostat data. 
At times when equity returns are flat and bond yields are depressed 
in an environment of rising interest rates, the demand for high-yield debt 
rises, as has been the case in both the US and EU fixed income markets in 
recent months. Despite the rising demand for junk bonds – which has 
pinched yield spreads over government benchmarks to very low levels in 
comparison with historical trends (Figure 1.14) it is unlikely that the Drexel 
Burnham Lambert heydays of the 1980s will be revisited, especially in 
Europe, where the market is still nascent. Even in the US, which has the 
most developed market in the world for junk bonds, these latter only 
represent about 6% of the total US corporate bond market (De Bondt & 
Marqués-Ibáñez, 2005). As of late 2001, the value outstanding of high-yield 
corporate bonds issued in the EU was on trend to reach €25 billion by 2002 
and their market share fluctuated between 3-4% of the total value of the 
European corporate bond market (De Bondt & Marqués-Ibáñez, 2005).  
There are two types of junk bonds: those that are issued as junk and 
those existing issues that are downgraded to junk due to adverse credit 
events. The latter are known as ‘fallen angels’. Most high yield bonds, 
including those issued by EU corporates, fall into the former category, that 
is, they are issued as securities rated below investment grade. In terms of 
ratings, B rated bonds seem to be in the majority at the time of issue, 
accounting for some 70% of new high-yield issues (see De Bondt & 
Marqués-Ibáñez, 2005).  
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Figure 1.14 High-yield bond spreads 
 
Source: OECD Financial Market Trends, October 2004. 
To summarise, the European fixed income landscape has been 
radically transformed by phenomenal rates of growth in corporate bond 
markets since the introduction of the euro. The latter can be seen as the 
proximate cause of this fast-paced development, because since 1999, 
European corporate debt markets have been growing at several times that 
of those in the US and Japan, or even than those in the rest of the world, 
where the corporate bond segment in emerging markets have been 
growing rapidly.  
viii. Covered bonds and securitised debt 
Issuance of securitised debt has been rising quickly in Europe.23 In 2001, a 
total of €153.6 billion worth of asset-backed securities were outstanding, 
growing to €243.6 billion by 2004, or an increase of 58% in three years.24 The 
European securitisation market is dominated by the United Kingdom, and 
                                                 
23 Europe here is defined as the EU-15 plus the following countries: Czech 
Republic, Poland, Switzerland and ‘multinational’, according to the European 
Securitisation Forum definition.  
24 Data on securitised debt in this section are kindly provided by Marco Angheben 
from the European Securitisation Forum. 
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housing prices are a vital pillar underpinning new issues. Mortgage-backed 
securities are the largest asset component in the European market, followed 
by asset-backed securities. Overall, outstanding securitised debt issues 
account for about 20% of the total value of the European bond market. By 
comparison, in 2003, the combined value of securitised debt in the then 
accession countries (now new member states) was only a tiny €3 billion (see 
Solans, 2004). 
Pfandbriefe25 account for nearly 30% of the German fixed income 
market and 68% of the European covered bond market (followed by 
Denmark, 15% and France, 6%).26 Their attractiveness is derived from their 
very high degree of safety – not once in the past 100 years has an investor 
not fully recovered the value of his principal – the premium they yield over 
German government bonds, as well as their great liquidity.  
New issues of securitised debt remain larger in the UK than in any 
other EU country, reaching a value of €76 billion in 2003 and accounting for 
35% of the total value of the combined European asset-backed securities 
(ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) markets. Spain came in 
second with €37.84 billion, followed by Italy (€33.93 billion) and the 
Netherlands (€20.98 billion). The strong position of the UK is due primarily 
to the importance of its housing market for the overall performance of 
European securitised debt markets, reflected in the fact that 44% (€55.3 
billion) of the European MBS market is backed by UK collateral. In terms of 
the origin of MBS collateral, the Netherlands and Spain are a distant second 
and third place, with respective market shares of only 14% and 13%.  
Issuance in Pfandbrief markets grew quickly (13% year-on-year) in 
2003, reaching a total of €236.2 billion. Not surprisingly, the German 
market accounted for the lion’s share of new issues, but there is an 
underlying trend of internationalisation of the Pfandbrief as a popular debt 
instrument, since 81% of Pfandbrief issues originated in Germany in 2003, 
less than in previous years; likewise, in the Jumbo Pfandbrief segment, the 
internationalisation of the market has been even more rapid: by 2003, only 
42% of all new issues originated in Germany, down from 50% the year 
before (VDH, 2004). A number of reforms to national legislation in several 
EU member states have helped to propel the increasing importance of the 
                                                 
25 Pfandbriefe is a term for bonds that are secured by public sector or mortgage 
loans. 
26 Statistics from the New York Society of Securities Analysts. 
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covered bond market in Europe, in addition to the recent introduction of 
covered bond legislation in a few countries, such as Luxembourg, Finland 
and Italy (see Table 1.8).  
The European securitisation market is characterised by the following 
specificities: it remains highly fragmented in Europe, in the sense that most 
deals are not multinational; large cross-country differences persist due to 
country-specific legal, tax and accounting frameworks and varying 
incentives for banks to package structured products (ECB, 2004).  
Table 1.8 Recent legislative measures in EU member states addressing covered 
bonds 
Year Country Action taken 
1997 Luxembourg  Introduction of covered bond legislation, the lettres de 
gage. It was later reformed in 2000  
1998 Germany  Reform of the Mortgage Banking Act (HBG)  
1999 Finland  Introduction of covered bond legislation  
  France  Revision of the law on obligations foncières  
2001 Spain  First repackaged covered bond, cédulas hipotécarias, 
which are backed by mortgages  
2002 Ireland  Law on covered bonds came into force – asset 
covered securities  
  Germany  Reform of Mortgage Banking Act and the Public 
Sector Pfandbrief Act (OePG)  
2003 Spain  First issuance of covered bonds backed by public 
sector assets – cédulas territoriales  
  UK  First structured covered bond issued by HBOS  
  Austria  First issuance of jumbo covered bonds called 
fundierte Anleihen by Kommunalkredit  
2004 Germany  Another reform of the Mortgage Banking Act and 
Public Sector Pfandbrief Act  
  Sweden  Revised covered bond legislation in force since 1 July  
2004+  Portugal  Reform of covered bond legislation  
  Italy  Introduction of covered bond legislation  
  Austria  Reform of the three Pfandbrief laws  
  Germany  Creation of one Pfandbrief framework which will 
replace the three existing laws  
Source: UBS; taken from Euromoney magazine, November 2004. 
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2. Bond and Bond Derivatives Market 
Structure 
2.1 Primary markets 
i. Bond listings 
Mostly for historical reasons linked to the development of the international 
bond market, the vast majority of bonds listed in the EU have chosen 
Luxembourg or London as their regulatory regime27 (although London is 
the undisputed ‘home’ of the international bond market if secondary 
market activity is considered). Both are characterised by extensive 
disclosure requirements for first-time listings, annual reports and other 
transparency obligations.28 As of May 2005, Luxembourg was still by far 
the location of choice for bond listings (primarily Eurobonds, which 
                                                 
27 For more information on EU regulation concerning the primary market and 
especially the prospectus directive, see chapter 3.  
28 See Esho et al. (2004) To get an idea of the costs of listing an issue on the 
international bond market, the following data from the Luxembourg stock 
exchange are useful. The fee structure is composed of three parts: a visa, listing and 
maintenance fee. First-time listings cost €1,500 for first-time ordinary issuers, 
€1,375 for supranational issuers but only €625 and €560 for subsequent listings. 
These fees apply equally for straights and convertibles multi-tranche issues and 
debt securities programmes. Bonds with warrants are considerably more 
expensive: €2,125 and €1,935 for ordinary and supranational issuers, respectively, 
for first listings and €1,250 and €1,120, respectively, for subsequent listings. Listing 
fees for all types of fixed income securities and all issuers are identical at €600, 
except for debt securities programmes (€1,200 for first listing). Maintenance fees 
vary more across fixed income securities types but tend to increase with the size of 
the issue. By way of comparison, the listing costs for equities are significantly 
greater, with a fee of €2,500 for first listings and €1,250 for subsequent listings, and 
maintenance fees that are multiples of those for fixed income securities.  
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comprised all but four of the total bonds listed), with a total of 25,573 
compared with the next three largest, the London Stock Exchange, 
Deutsche Börse and the Irish Stock Exchange, with 10,454, 8,861 and 7,490 
listings, respectively.29 By contrast, the new member states only account for 
a miniscule fraction of bond listings in the EU. The average number of 
bonds listed on Eastern European exchanges is 84.30 International bonds 
generally are not listed in the new member states, as the total for the 
region’s exchanges is a mere 18 issues. Overall, there are 69,323 total bond 
listings in the EU today.31 Only a small proportion of these bonds, however, 
trade on exchange. 
ii. Underwriting 
In the aggregate, European investment banks hold strong positions as 
bookrunners in the European bond primary market, particularly in euro-
denominated supranational bonds, agency bonds, covered bonds and 
corporate bonds, as the following brief summary of the 2004 league tables 
for primary market activity indicates.32 The top four bookrunners for 
corporate bonds issued in euros were all European banks.33 Together, they 
accounted for a market share of 32.3% in euro corporate bonds in 2004.34 It 
is worth noting that 85% of the EU non-government bonds are 
underwritten and traded in London (TBMA, 2005b) In the jumbo covered 
bonds (Pfandbriefe) market, all the top five, and seven out of the top 10 
bookrunners were European banks, accounting for a combined market 
share of 57.7%. Likewise for the category of all covered bonds, where seven 
of the top 10 were European banks, with a combined market share of 
52.3%. Six out of the top 10 bookrunners in both agencies and 
                                                 
29 Federation of European Securities Exchanges (FESE) statistics (www.fese.be). 
30 Based on the average number of bonds listed on the Bratislava, Budapest, 
Ljubljana, Prague and Warsaw exchanges only, so the figure may not be exact, 
particularly as the Baltic exchanges (Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius) have all been 
acquired by the Scandinavian OMX Group.  
31 www.fese.be. 
32 The following data are drawn from the league tables published in the 8 January 
2005 edition of IFR Magazine.  
33 Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Barclays and Société Générale, in that order. 
34 In addition to these banks, ABN Amro, Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein and 
HSBC also figured in the top 10 for this category, bringing the total to 45.7% for all 
these banks alone. 
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supranationals were European, with respective shares of 35.6% and 59.4%. 
European banks’ performance was weaker in the primary market for 
sovereign debt issues: only one out of the top five bookrunners in euro-
denominated sovereign debt was a European bank. (Deutsche Bank, 
ranked first with a 9.7% share) and there were only five European banks in 
the top 10, accounting for only 27% of the market. 
Underwriting in the international bond market remains fiercely 
competitive, as reflected in the regular churning of lead managers. In their 
interesting work on the determinants of underwriter spreads in the 
Eurobond market, Esho, Kollo and Sharpe (2004) offer important insights. 
For example, private placements command significantly smaller spreads 
than public offerings.35 Private placements are attractive to issuers: 
household name firms with strong credit (and issuing) reputations that 
dominate the international bond market can better tap the markets at the 
time of their choice (e.g. to take advantage of a temporary window of low 
interest rates) with a (quick) private placement instead of alternative 
distribution channels. Spreads are lower for: bearer bonds, whose 
anonymity provisions are attractive to potential buyers; underwriting 
services from non-bulge bracket firms, since the name recognition of the 
most established players comes at a premium and offers the issue 
credibility due to the attached monitoring, signalling and certification 
services (Esho et al., 2004; Chemmanur et al., 1994); bonds issued in US 
dollars; longer maturity issues; and Eurobonds governed by English, as 
opposed to New York, law (Esho et al., 1999).36 Since the advent of EMU, 
underwriting fees have fallen considerably in Europe. Prior to the 
introduction of the euro, Eurobond issues denominated in European legacy 
currencies commanded fees of nearly 0.2% higher than those denominated 
in US dollars; however, since 1999, the situation has reversed: Eurobonds 
denominated in euros command smaller underwriting fees (Melnik & 
Nissim, 2004). 
                                                 
35 In the Eurobond market, outright fees are usually not charged to issuers by the 
underwriters. Rather, they are subsumed into the spread. Intermediation costs are 
recuperated by the underwriter purchasing the entire issue (in the case of a bought 
deal) from the issuer at a price below the offering rate, and selling to investors at a 
profit.  
36 The logic here is that the English system is superior according to the cited study 
for the renegotiation of contract terms with the borrower in the face of default.  
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Finally, one must note that even though their main activity is in the 
primary market, lead managers also play an important role in secondary 
markets by helping interested parties identify holders of bonds issued in 
bearer form, thus contributing substantially to enhancing the overall 
liquidity of the market.  
iii. Public-private cooperation in the primary market – The 
development of primary dealers 
Concerning the primary market for government debt securities, EU 
governments have increasingly turned to private intermediaries to help 
them place their debt issues, such that all EU countries except for Germany 
now distribute public debt issues through primary dealers (ECB, 2005a). In 
addition the issuers often require their primary dealers to offer firm quotes 
in the secondary market as a condition of their primary dealership. Primary 
dealers are reluctant to risk their privileged status, as they typically receive 
several benefits from the issuer; which may vary from having the right to 
buy additional new issues of bonds the day following an auction at 
preferential prices, to arranging securitisations or providing the relevant 
government with advisory services. This public-private collaboration is 
typically formed around supposedly mutually beneficial gentlemen’s 
agreements or contracts between sovereign issuers and market-makers, 
which detail the mutual obligations of each party. A good example of how 
certain member state’s treasuries watch closely over such agreements is the 
so-called MTS ‘Liquidity Pact’, which is discussed in the next section. In 
order to better manage the risks associated with launching innovative 
issues that have not yet stood the test of investor demand, European 
governments have turned increasingly to syndication, as in the case of 
Italian index-linked and 50-year bonds (ECB, 2004). 
iv. Technology in the primary market 
Primary debt markets in Europe have not remained unaffected by 
technological developments. Almost all EU countries have adopted 
electronic auction or tap issuance systems so that the government debt 
issuance process has become very nearly fully automated (ECB, 2004).37 
Electronic trading has spread to the grey market as well. Today, 
                                                 
37 The ECB study cites the UK, Slovakia and the Czech Republic as examples of EU 
countries that have yet to move to automate primary market activity in their 
sovereign issues. 
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Telematico, the same fixed income Escreen-based system that is used to 
power the MTS system, allows the trading of securities for announced 
government debt issues eligible for trading on the MTS system, but whose 
auctions have not yet been held. Access to these parts of the relevant MTS 
system is restricted to the primary dealers of that issuer. The introduction 
of electronic trading brings greater transparency, efficiency and liquidity to 
the grey market, which fulfils several useful functions. These include: 
providing important information to the issuer about the true value of the 
security it is about to offer in the market; protecting members of the 
primary dealer group from participating in badly priced deals and 
suffering losses when placing the issue; and allowing investors and 
regulators to better monitor prices and to detect cases of price 
discrimination in placements (Levich, 1998). The Telematico market only 
allows trading until the auction date, whereupon the issue will graduate to 
the regular MTS trading screens. 
v. Syndicated credits 
For the sake of comparison with primary market activities for debt issues, 
we briefly describe trends in the syndicated credit market. The US 
continues to dominate the global market for syndicated credits. In 2004, the 
total number and volume of syndicated loans were 7,214 and $2.658 trillion 
or €2.2 trillion at current exchange rates.38 Of these, the US market 
accounted for 3,481 loans for $1.332 trillion, or more than half the global 
market in value terms. By contrast, combined EU loans (including the new 
member states) totalled $796.8 billion, led by the UK, which accounted for 
29.8% of the EU total.39 The total number of syndicated loans in the EU in 
2004 was 1107, or less than one-third the US total. In other words, the 
average size of EU syndicated credits ($724.4 million) was significantly 
larger – nearly twice the size of the average US loan ($382.6 million).40 EU 
banks maintained a strong standing as bookrunners in the syndicated 
credits market with 7 out of the top 10 performers, accounting for a share of 
47.7% among the share of 98.9% controlled by the top 10 bookrunners for 
syndicated credits.  
                                                 
38 Data are drawn from the league tables published in the 8 January 2005 edition of 
IFR Magazine. 
39 Authors’ calculations based on the league tables mentioned in footnote above.  
40 Authors’ calculations based on the league tables mentioned in footnote above.  
38 | CASEY & LANNOO 
 
2.2 Secondary markets 
i. The emergence and consequences of the MTS trading system 
The development of secondary markets for government bonds in Europe 
was spurred not only by the sheer size of the accumulated public deficits of 
the past three decades, but also by government efforts to better manage this 
large stock of debt. Enhancing the liquidity of the inter-bank segment of 
secondary markets was seen to be an important step in rendering 
government securities more attractive to investors, and ensuring the uptake 
of new issues by the primary dealers essential to reduce the costs of 
funding debt for the sovereign borrower. Owing to its perennial and large 
deficits, Italy became the third-largest sovereign debt market in the world 
(after the United States and Japan), and the Italian market is today worth 
some € 1.3 trillion. Due to the requirement to employ primary dealers, and 
most significantly monitor their market-making performance, Italy was the 
first European country to utilise electronic trading in its government bonds 
with the creation of an inter-dealer platform called MTS S.p.a. (Mercato dei 
Titoli de Stato) in 1988. The experiment was generally seen to be a success, 
since the system managed to attract a great majority of most secondary 
market activity for Italian Buoni del Tesoro away from the exchange and 
from other over-the-counter venues and was recognised as having 
improved the liquidity of Italian government bonds (see ECB, 2005b).  
Estimates differ as to exactly what percentage of trading volume was 
captured by MTS SpA: an IBRD/IMF (2001) handbook on government debt 
markets suggests a figure as high as 90% while an ECB study (Cheung et 
al., 2005) suggests it is closer to 65%.41 Nevertheless, some commentators 
will argue that by making it a requirement for the primary dealers to quote 
two-way prices on the MTS system, it effectively created a mandatory pool 
of liquidity, removing the incentive of the primary dealers to risk capital by 
trading Italian government bonds elsewhere. In any case, finance ministries 
in other EU member states watched in interest and envy as the Italian 
system lowered borrowing costs and seemed to improve liquidity in the 
secondary market, while giving the Italian government the opportunity to 
closely watch the activities of primary dealers. Yet it is important to note 
that liquidity in the secondary market for Italian treasuries was not 
enhanced solely by the introduction of MTS. A good example is the July 
                                                 
41 But the ECB study takes its figure from an older Italian Treasury document 
published in 2000. 
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1997 decision to do away with revealing traders’ identities provided with 
quotes and to move to anonymity, which had a beneficial impact on 
liquidity in the Italian market.42  
The MTS eventually was extended to EU-15 member states’ bond 
trading except for the UK (which at the time placed no requirement to 
quote specific spreads on its primary dealers), Sweden and Luxembourg.43 
Many of these platforms quickly came to dominate trading in the inter-
dealer market for government debt securities in their respective countries, 
achieving high market shares.44 Besides replication of the Italian system in 
all but three member states, the London-based EuroMTS was launched in 
1999 as a pan-European platform for trading in benchmark securities issued 
from 11 sovereign issuers45 and 4 quasi-government issuers.46 This and 
related EuroMTS markets also employ mandatory quoting and are owned 
by MTS SpA. 
The following paragraphs summarise market-making requirements 
that are standardised across the system and enshrined in the Liquidity Pact, 
an informal agreement between primary dealers and government issuers 
that is monitored by the latter (see MTS, 2003). Liquidity providers must 
display two-way quotes for two-way proposals within a defined maximum 
spread and for a minimum size for at least five hours per day for all the 
bonds it was assigned. A market-maker is free to make and take prices in 
                                                 
42 See Scalia & Vaca (1997). 
43 After Italy introduced the system in 1988, the MTS system was extended to 
Austria (2003), Belgium (2000), Denmark (2003), Finland (2002), France (2000), 
Germany (2001), Greece (2003), Ireland (2002), the Netherlands (1999), Poland 
(2004), Portugal (2000) and Spain (2002).  
44 The notable exceptions were the Spanish bond market, which is dominated by 
local brokers and the state-sponsored Senaf system, and the Greek government-
owned HDAT system for Greek bonds. 
45 Namely, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, The 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. In addition, Polish government bonds are traded 
on the system. In addition, a new system, New Euro MTS, was designed 
specifically to trade government debt securities of the 10 new EU member states.  
46 Namely, Depfa, the European Investment Bank (EIB), Freddie Mac and 
Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) (see www.euromts-ltd.com). But a separate 
platform also exists for trading quasi-government debt, MTS Quasi-government. 
Requirements to trade on this platform are: 8 supporting market-makers, at least a 
AA rating, and a minimum issue size of €2 billion. 
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any bond on the system at its discretion, provided it satisfies its obligations 
in respect of the bonds it has been allocated. Spreads and proposal size 
obligations can vary between maturity buckets and between benchmark 
and liquid issues. To get an idea of the nature of market-making obligations 
on MTS platforms and the constraints they impose, Table 2.1 highlights the 
specifications of the range of bid-ask spreads to which primary dealers 
must adhere in the market for Italian Treasuries, or Buoni del Tresoro 
Poliennali (BTPs).  
Table 2.1 Spreads on different maturity tranches on MTS 
Segment Bucket Liquid (ticks) 
Not Liquid 
(ticks) 
BTP 
 
A (<3.5yrs) 
B (3.5 - 6.5yrs) 
C (6.5 - 13.5yrs) 
D (>13.5yrs) 
4 
5 
7 
20 
7 
12 
16 
45 
Source: MTS group. 
The number of market-makers for government debt securities varies 
across EU member states. Germany (38 participants in the primary 
market)47 has the most of any country, despite (or perhaps because of) not 
having very demanding primary dealer requirements, and Ireland the least 
(10). Italy, which has a larger outstanding debt than Germany, has 31 
participating market-makers on the MTS Italy system. Due to the diversity 
of issuers and large number of primary dealers in Europe, it is perhaps not 
surprising that overall the EuroMTS platform has 51 market-makers. Only 
Deutsche Bank is active as a market-maker on all 15 MTS platforms 
(including the non-sovereign EurocreditMTS). Deutsche Bank also happens 
to be a large player in EU primary markets, capturing the largest market 
share in 2004 for bookrunning in both Euromarket issues and bonds 
denominated in euros (respective shares are 7.5% and 7.8%; totals are €127 
billion and €80 billion; and number of issues are 503 and 303).48 Citigroup is 
present on all systems except for MTS Denmark. A number of large players 
are present as market-makers on many MTS platforms. 
                                                 
47 Members of the Bund Issues Auction Group as of 11 August 2005, published by 
the Deutsche Bundesbank. 
48 IFR Magazine, 8 January 2005: league tables from Thomson Financial. 
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A recent study by the ECB (Cheung et al., 2005) comes to interesting 
conclusions about the microstructure of trading on the MTS trading 
system(s): quoted bid-ask spreads do not differ much at all between 
EuroMTS and the national platforms; MTS markets are very deep, that is, 
the transaction costs for large orders, measured as the bid-ask spread, 
hardly differ from small orders.49 The former result would appear to 
suggest that liquidity does not vary much between the national trading 
platforms and the centralised EuroMTS platform, a sign that the 
government debt markets in Europe have become significantly more 
integrated in recent years, and especially since the introduction of MTS. 
Alternatively, it is also possible that this is a product of the mandatory 
quoting obligations placed on the dealers, since market-making obligations 
are standardised across the system.  
As a result, some observers have argued that the perceived depth of 
the MTS system is only an illusion, since it may be because liquidity is 
artificially standardised across these platforms by the similar or identical 
market-making requirements enshrined in the Liquidity Pact. A 
consequence of this argument is that Citigroup’s controversial trade-
exploiting liquidity imbalances – made public in August 2004 – between 
the cash and futures markets was not such a terrible thing to happen after 
all. In fact, they might even have improved market efficiency if they had 
been carried out as intended – albeit this contention remains highly 
controversial.50 The unique market model created and perpetuated by the 
mandatory quoting system meant that dealers on multiple MTS platforms 
were exposed to having their prices accepted in a wide variety of bonds 
simultaneously. It still remains difficult to tell whether liquidity on the 
MTS system is design-induced or generic. If indeed liquidity in the system 
                                                 
49 For their sample time period, the authors of the ECB study find that in Italian 10-
year benchmarks, quoted spreads for a €5 million trade averaged about 3 basis 
points, whereas a trade of €25 million only paid a slightly more (less than 4 basis 
points), despite the size of the order (Cheung et al., 2005, p. 16). 
50 As argued in an opinion piece in The Banker, 2 September 2004: “In 2004, markets 
cannot operate on the basis of a gentleman’s agreement.” Evidently, regulators 
could not contain their anger, but they were powerless to act since the market 
abuse Directive had not yet been implemented. And whether the trade actually 
constituted true market abuse is debatable. Nevertheless, despite criminal charges 
being dropped, the Financial Services Authority has indicated it will impose a fine 
of between $10-$15 million to indicate its disapproval of the “lack of internal 
controls” (Bradberry, 2005). 
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were but an illusion, it would quickly evaporate for larger orders, which 
has not proven to be the case. Nevertheless, overall volumes on the various 
MTS platforms have decreased since August 2004. Some of this decline may 
be attributed to imperfections in the system revealed by the Citigroup 
trade, but prevailing market conditions in an unstable macroeconomic 
environment has also led to a fall in volumes across most electronic 
platforms and a concomitant rise in the use of voice broking (Bearing Point, 
2005). 
ii. Electronisation of trading  
The introduction of the MTS system was but a piece (albeit a large one) in 
the broader context of a rapid ongoing transformation of secondary 
markets due to the rise of electronisation of trades in the inter-bank as well 
as bank-to-institutional investor (sovereign) bond market segments. Even 
in the corporate debt market, the effects of electronisation are gradually 
beginning to be felt, although predominantly limited to large, investment 
grade issues. According to The Bond Market Association, there are over 23 
multi-dealer platforms for electronic trading of corporate and sovereign 
debt instruments in Europe today. Of these, 11 are national MTS trading 
platforms for sovereign debt, 3 are non-MTS sovereign debt platforms and 
8 are hybrids trading both types of instruments (TBMA, 2005a). Notable in 
the inter-bank (B2B) wholesale bond trading space is ICAP/BrokerTec, 
which trades approximately $450 billion per day.51 
In the bank-to-institutional investor (B2C) space, a different market 
model dominates. TradeWeb, owned by Thomson Financial, has the largest 
market share of electronically-traded government debt. The Tradeweb 
system is based on the Request for Quote (RFQ) model – not the market-
maker model of MTS. In this model dealers are not required to make firm 
prices continuously, but only in response to requests from investors (who 
                                                 
51 The majority of this volume is in euro ‘repo’ (repurchase agreements, whereby 
buyer and seller agree to repurchase the bonds at a future date, usually at a slightly 
higher price, economically representing a rate of interest), euro ‘basis’ trades 
(where a bond is traded against an opposite and corresponding position in a 
futures contract of similar maturity) and US Treasury bonds traded in Europe. This 
very high electronic daily turnover, combined with that of other platforms, such as 
eSpeed, dwarfs the notional volume of trades on the MTS systems, but primarily in 
relation to bonds or transaction types that are not the subject of primary dealer 
agreements. 
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can make the same request to multiple dealers simultaneously). It is an 
interesting question, and so far unexplained, why this model has proved 
far more successful in meeting the needs of institutional investors than the 
continuous quote model which dominates the B2B space. However, the 
answer may prove crucial to the further development of electronic trading.  
Electronic trading is usually successful in capturing market shares 
where standardised products are the norm (Andersen & Baertelsen, 2004). 
However, electronic trading is also sensitive to extremes of price volatility, 
and there is still a significant amount of business traded via voice brokers 
or directly between counterparties. The introduction of the euro was a 
powerful catalyst in standardising government debt instruments. To begin 
with, the great majority of EU government debt is issued in a common 
currency, meaning that debt managers in EU finance ministries have for the 
first time entered into direct competition with each other. Due in part to the 
introduction of a common trading system, benchmark issues at least have 
become more aligned in the EU, with similar issue sizes, maturities and 
coupon rates, increasing the comparability (and thus competition) between 
various sovereign debt issues.  
Generally, the introduction of electronic trading screens has 
substantially improved liquidity on secondary markets for sovereign debt 
in the EU: trading volumes have risen significantly in recent years and bid-
offer spreads have fallen (Andersen & Baertelsen, 2004). These trends have 
been accompanied by a reduction in the variability of trading volume as a 
result of the MTS system.  
Historically, one of the key distinctions differentiating the market 
structure of fixed income from equities is that a vast majority of fixed 
income transactions took place over-the-counter, or outside the exchange. 
This division is perhaps blurring due to the comparative focusing of the 
largest bond markets in a reduced number of venues. Although the vast 
majority of bond trading in Europe is still conducted off-exchange, the 
fixed income landscape has evolved with technological progress, in the 
sense that bond trading has become more centralised, while still remaining 
a hybrid model: the introduction of electronic trading and the capacity of 
these platforms to allow for multiple parties to post and view quotes has 
reduced – although certainly not eliminated – bilateral negotiations 
(especially not in heterogeneous or illiquid securities). Thus, the nature of 
the bond asset class itself makes the complete transfer to an exchange 
environment unlikely, and the hybrid model is very likely to stay. 
44 | CASEY & LANNOO 
 
After the explosion of electronic trading systems that occurred in the 
late 1990s and early years of the present decade, there is now more or less a 
consensus that a period of rationalisation will follow. As of 2004, there 
were 74 electronic fixed income trading platforms in the EU and US 
combined (31 are based in Europe), a six-fold increase since 1997, when 
there were only 11 (TBMA, 2004). At the same time, exchanges are 
positioning themselves to expand aggressively in the OTC market, as 
evidenced by the recent acquisition of a majority share of MTS SpA by 
Euronext and Borsa Italiana and the development of Eurex Bonds and 
Eurex Repo. This may lead to a possible future showdown with dealers as 
they encroach on the latter’s traditional strongholds. In the context of the 
MiFID review, Goldfinger (2003) suggests a repeat of the clashes that 
resulted from dealers and exchanges sparring for control over the policy-
influenced future of market organisation in the early 1990s during 
negotiations over the initial investment services directive (ISD). 
iii. Trading activity in the European sovereign and corporate debt 
markets52 
Altogether, the MTS system comprises the single largest market for the 
trading of outright cash eurozone public debt, achieving €18.4 trillion 
traded on all MTS platforms in the cash and repo markets in 2004.53 As of 
2004, €25 billion in government bonds traded every day on the MTS system 
alone. This sum is believed to have represented 60% of electronic inter-
dealer trading in European sovereign debt at that time.54 If this estimate is 
accurate, on average roughly €40 billion in EU government bonds were 
traded daily in the inter-dealer electronic market alone. It is estimated that 
this represented 65% or so of the whole inter-dealer segment of the market, 
making the total daily turnover somewhere in the region of €62 billion. In 
                                                 
52 We recognise that the data in this section are outdated, as most of them are from 
2004, but for the sake of consistency in, and comparability of, the data, we could 
not bring them fully up to date. As market dynamics evolve at a brisk pace, the 
figures in this section may not deliver an accurate picture of what is actually 
prevailing in the markets today. For example, there is evidence that volumes on 
electronic trading platforms have fallen quite substantially over the past 18 
months.  
53 See www.mtsgroup.org. 
54 This estimate was obtained through telephone conversations with European 
sovereign debt market participants.  
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other words, although electronic trading represented the lion’s share of 
government bond trading in the EU in 2004, a far from negligible portion of 
the outright cash bond market was still intermediated by voice brokers. 
There is even evidence that voice broking has been making a comeback in 
the European fixed income world in 2005, as volatile market conditions 
have lessened the attractiveness of electronic platforms.55 
Despite the relative sizes of the amount of debt issued by eurozone 
governments and the US Treasury,56 the activity in the secondary market is 
considerably less in European debt; it is estimated that the inter-dealer 
market in US Treasury instruments is approximately $200 billion per day. 
This may be due to the fractured nature of eurozone debt issuance in 
comparison with the more liquid bond future and interest rate swaps 
markets. In the eurozone the interest rate benchmark curve can reasonably 
be regarded as the swap curve, while in relation to the USD, it is the US 
Treasury bond curve that dictates the cost of borrowing.  
Electronic dealer-client volume in Europe is smaller than in the inter-
dealer market, but it is increasing; it is now estimated at €22 billion daily by 
a recent study.57 Total electronic trading in government securities in the EU 
can therefore be estimated to be somewhere around €62 billion a day. As 
electronic trading is generally believed to represent about 75% of trading in 
government debt in Europe (80% according to The Bond Market 
Association and 70% according to Celent Communications), the aggregate 
total daily turnover in the European secondary market for government 
debt securities can be estimated at €83 billion for 2004. A 2004 study by 
Celent yields a similar estimate: €84 billion. An €85 billion daily market 
translates into a yearly turnover of some €21.2 trillion.58  
As one can see from Figure 2.1, voice brokering is more important, 
both in value and percentage terms, in the inter-dealer market than in 
dealer-client transactions (35% and 31%, respectively), although in 
                                                 
55 This observation derives from conversations with various market participants.  
56 The outstanding eurozone government debt is approximately €4.8 trillion, 
compared to $4.3 trillion in the US. 
57 See Pierron (2004). 
58 Assuming 255 open market days per year. Following an established convention 
used by the BIS, in the absence of annual turnover figures, daily turnover is 
multiplied by 255, an approximation for the number of days in a year on which 
markets are open (see McCauley, 1999, p. 14). 
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comparison to electronic trading, it remains the minority trading channel 
for Euro government debt, in particular in the inter-dealer market.  
 
Figure 2.1 European government bond trading 
(average daily volumes, € billions) 
 
 Inter-dealer market Dealer-to-client market 
Source: Celent Communications. 
 
Trading in non-government debt securities in Europe remains 
substantially below the trading volumes realised in the sovereign market: 
the total value of sovereign debt trading in the EU is nearly treble the €30.8 
billion traded daily in corporate and other debt securities (see Celent 
Communications, 2004). Therefore, nearly €116 billion worth of debt 
instruments is traded in the EU every day. If these figures are reliable and if 
one can extrapolate them over a year, annual turnover in European debt 
markets today is equivalent to roughly €29.6 trillion.59 In other words, 
trading volumes in the EU are about one-third those in US debt markets, 
where the total US annual trading volume for fixed income is $88 trillion 
(see Joys, 2001). One could interpret these figures as possibly indicative that 
US fixed income markets are still considerably more liquid than their 
                                                 
59 Again, daily turnover is multiplied by 255, an approximation for the number of 
days in a year in which markets are open. 
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European counterparts, particularly as the total stock of debt in the EU is 
80% that of the US (€13.5 trillion vs. €16.7 trillion, as of end-2004).60  
 
Figure 2.2 Electronic vs. voice broking in European corporate bond markets 
(average daily trading volumes, in € billions) 
 Inter-dealer market Dealer-to-client market 
Source: Celent Communications. 
 
As far as the nature of trading is concerned, the B2B inter-dealer 
market easily surpasses B2C dealer-client transactions in both the sovereign 
debt and corporate debt segments in the EU, as can be seen in Figures 2.1 
and 2.2. In volume terms, inter-dealer trades are more than twice as large as 
dealer-to-client in the government bond market and more than three times 
as large in the corporate and other non-government debt segment. B2C 
transactions on these platforms are purely between dealers and 
institutional investors; they are not accessible to retail investors (TBMA, 
2005a).  
That electronic trading dominates voice broking in the government 
bond segment is not surprising, since this result was to be expected after 
the introduction of the MTS system and the pressures to concentrate dealer 
trading on MTS created by the Liquidity Pact. However, other dimensions 
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of the same market, such as asset swaps, switches (where an older bond is 
sold simultaneously with the purchase of a new issue of similar maturity) 
and repo, are traded in a variety of ways: through other electronic systems, 
voice brokers or directly between the banks. Neither is it astonishing that a 
larger proportion of dealer-to-client transactions in sovereign bonds are 
carried out via telephone, as institutional investors have client relationships 
with a limited number of banks, and this market segment typically 
functions on a ‘request for quote’ basis rather than fully interactive bids 
and offers to the market at large. The institutional investor will therefore 
request a price to buy or sell from a set of its chosen banks and choose the 
most favourable terms. 
As one can see in Figure 2.2, the great majority of non-government 
bonds (in volume terms) in the EU are still traded via voice brokerage, as 
opposed to electronic trading. While it is very likely that the corporate debt 
segment of the market will remain a hybrid mix of electronic trading and 
voice broking, the speed of the gains in market share made by electronic 
platforms is still impressive, given that transactions in the non-government 
segment of the market were almost exclusively conducted via telephone 
only a short while ago. For example, in the dealer-to-client segment of the 
European corporate debt market, electronic trading even surpassed voice 
brokerage in 2003 according to Celent – although more recently, there has 
been an upsurge in overall voice-broking in European bond markets. 
Electronic trading has been slower to catch on in the corporate debt 
segment, particularly in less-liquid, high-yield issues. Due to their intrinsic 
illiquidity vis-à-vis actively traded bonds, lower rated bonds, structured 
products and non-bullet bonds with complex features are not well suited to 
electronic trading, and the vast majority of transactions in these 
instruments is still conducted via voice broking (TBMA, 2005a).  
As mentioned above, a number of different electronic trading 
platforms are operational across the EU today. An excellent survey of the 
existing platforms by The Bond Market Association (2005a) highlights the 
diversity of electronic trading platforms present in European fixed income 
markets. The report reaches instructive conclusions about the degree of 
price transparency prevailing on these various platforms: most platforms 
publish post-trade prices for trades conducted on their platforms with 
minimal, if any, delay; post-trade pricing information is provided free of 
charge to platform participants; some platforms sell data to non-
participants (non-vendors) at a fee; most platform trade prices are 
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accessible through a financial data distribution network; and most 
platforms provide significant non-price information (TBMA, 2004, p. 10). 
iv. Over-the-counter vs. on-exchange bond trading in the EU 
It is difficult to tell how much exactly of the secondary market activity in 
fixed income takes place on-exchange versus in the over-the-counter 
market, since the latter is diverse and figures are difficult to obtain. 
However, hardly any trading occurs ‘on-exchange’ in the wholesale or 
institutional market, and the only activity is in the retail segment. Bonds 
are clearly not organised along a model of limit-order markets as equities: 
in value terms, only 2.35% of bond trades in the EU were made via 
electronic order book transactions in 2004.61 Evidently, in terms of the total 
number of trades, the electronic order book gains significance, as we shall 
see below.  
In 2004, a total of 10,334,176 bond trades took place on Europe’s 
exchanges (comprising 5,296,106 electronic order book trades plus 5,009,585 
negotiated deals).62 Since it is difficult to obtain figures for the total number 
of bond trades overall in the EU due to the lack of data for the OTC market, 
we approximate total bond trades for the EU in 2004 in the following 
manner: we assumed that the average over-the-counter trade was the same 
size as the average negotiated on-exchange deal. The average on-exchange 
negotiated deal in Europe in 2004 was €1.52 million (compared to €129,077 
for order book transactions). As mentioned above, the total value of bond 
trading in the EU is around €114.8 billion a day, which comes out to €29 
trillion yearly.63 If FESE’s figures are accurate (so that there is no overlap 
between their figures reported for on-exchange trades and what really are 
over-the-counter transactions), then €9.7 trillion in bonds is traded yearly 
on European exchanges, in which case the value of over-the-counter trades 
in bonds is €29 trillion – €9.7 trillion = €19.3 trillion. Using our 
                                                 
61 Authors’ own calculations using data from FESE, Celent and other authors’ 
calculations. Celent (Pierron, 2004) estimates total bond trading activity in the EU 
to be €114.8 billion daily. We multiply this figure by 255 to get a yearly figure of 
€29 trillion. FESE reports the value of electronic order book transactions in bonds 
in 2004 to be €683.4 billion. Our figure is obtained by dividing the latter by the 
former.  
62 Based on data from FESE and authors’ own calculations. 
63 Again, we calculate yearly figures using the convention of multiplying average 
daily value of trading by 255.  
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approximation that the average OTC trade size in bonds is equivalent to 
the average size of an on-exchange negotiated deal, we estimate that there 
were 12,732,894 bond trades in the over-the-counter market in 2004. Added 
to on-exchange trades assuming no overlap, there were about 23 million bond 
trades in the EU in 2004.64 Since FESE reports 5,296,106 electronic order 
book transactions for bonds on EU exchanges in 2004, their share in total 
transactions is very nearly 23%. In other words, almost a quarter of the total 
number of bond trades in the EU have an average value of €129,077. If our 
estimates are accurate, the landscape of the European bond market more or 
less mirrors the US bond market. ‘Retail’-sized trades65 in the US market 
are large in number (accounting for 65% of total trades), but very small in 
value terms (1.8%).66  
In comparison to the secondary market for equities, bond trading in 
the EU is considerably smaller in terms of total contracts traded, but much 
larger in notional value and number of securities. Even though our estimate 
of 23 million bond trades in the EU market last year is likely to be 
optimistic, at 306 million, total equity trades in the EU in 2004 still were 
nearly 15 times greater.67 Yet in terms of the value of assets traded, the 
situation is the reverse: bond trades outdid equities nearly 3:1. Total 
reported daily turnover on all European stock exchanges combined for the 
year 2004 was €11.2 trillion.68 Nevertheless, trading in both the equity and 
bond markets is dwarfed by the enormous value of transactions in the 
foreign exchange market, whose daily turnover in the London market alone 
is about €754 billion, or the equivalent of €192 trillion yearly.69 
                                                 
64 Admittedly, the ‘no overlap’ assumption is highly questionable. There is 
undoubtedly a high risk of overlap between what exchanges report as on-exchange 
trades and what truly are over-the-counter trades, meaning that our estimate is 
probably inflated, because the exchange figures very likely count some 
transactions as on-exchange activity, whereas they really are over-the-counter 
transactions that were reported to the exchange.  
65 Evidently, defining a ‘retail’ trade as anything below $100,000 in value is 
contentious.  
66 Edwards & Piwowar (2004). 
67 Data from FESE, cumulative for 2004. 
68 Based on data from FESE and authors’ own calculations. This compares to our 
estimate of €29 trillion yearly in European bond markets. 
69 The figure cited on www.thinklondon.com of €754 billion was multiplied by 255 
to get an annual turnover estimate. 
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Beyond aggregate figures, it is interesting to examine differences in 
on-exchange trading of bonds across EU member states and in other 
regions of the world. Despite their small size relative to over-the-counter 
activity and to trading on the MTS system (which is an exchange of 
‘regulated market’ in EU terminology – except for EuroMTS), European 
national stock exchanges still are the most developed and by far the largest 
in the world for bond trading. In 2004, the top five exchanges – and six out 
of the top nine – in terms of bond trading value were all European (see 
Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2 Leading exchanges for bond trading 
Exchange € billions 
1. BME Spanish Exchanges 2856.3 
2. London Stock Exchange  2245.3 
3. OMX Stockholm  1238.8 
4. Copenhagen Stock Exchange  950.2 
5. Deutsche Börse  355.3 
6. Istanbul Stock Exchange  336.8 
7. Korea Stock Exchange 271.7 
8. Colombia Stock Exchange  188.9 
9. Euronext  186.5 
10. National Stock Exchange India 167.2 
Note: WFE quotes in US dollars, which were converted to euro at 
a rate of $1 = €0.8039, the average €/$ exchange rate for 
2004, according to the US Internal Revenue Service. 
Source: World Federation of Exchanges (WFE) 2004 Annual 
Report and authors’ own calculations. 
What is immediately obvious is that a mere handful of exchanges 
dominate on-exchange trading of bonds in the EU. The four Spanish 
exchanges alone (dominated by Bolsa de Madrid) account for 29.3% of on-
exchange secondary activity in bonds (excluding MTS). Together, the 
Spanish exchanges, the LSE, OMX, Copenhagen Stock exchange and 
Deutsche Börse account for nearly 80% (again, excluding MTS).  
That the average size of electronic order book transactions for bond 
trades on EU exchanges is merely a tenth the size of the average negotiated 
deals seems logical.70 Electronic order book transactions are typically used 
                                                 
70 In fact, it is almost tautological, since negotiated deals very frequently arise for 
orders that are too large to introduce all at once into the electronic order book 
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by retail investors or investors who require immediacy (due perhaps to 
profitable private information) and who split up large orders into many 
smaller ones. However, larger trades that result e.g. from institutional 
portfolio rebalancing or dealer inventory management (liquidity trades) are 
typically negotiated in ‘upstairs trading’. As can be seen in Table 2.3 below, 
there is a marked variability in the average size of both order book 
transactions and negotiated deals.  
Table 2.3 On-exchange bond trading: Order book vs. deals 
 Electronic order book transactions Negotiated deals 
Exchange Trades Turnover 
(€ millions) 
Avg. size , € Trades Turnover  
(€ millions) 
Avg. size , 
€ 
Borsa Italiana 3,071,806 151,171 49,212 n/a n/a n/a 
Euronext 1,409,860 19,799 14,043 112,403 166,368 1,480,106 
London Stock 
Exchange 
0 0 0 407,102 2,235,843 5,492,096 
OMX 
Copenhagen 
25,461 46,099 1,810,557 952,031 902,756 948,243 
Bolsa Madrid 29,901 402,137 13,448,948 684,570 2,457,163 3,589,352 
Swiss 
exchange 
518,396 35,577 68,628 138,961 102,371 736,686 
Total EU 5,296,106 683,604 129,077 5,009,585 7,612,540 1,519,595 
Source: FESE 2004 figures and authors’ own calculations. 
The Italian market is known to have a strong retail component, and 
after Euronext (€14,043), Borsa Italiana has the smallest average trade size 
(€49,212) in EU bond order books; on the other hand, the Spanish 
exchanges stand out with an enormous average trade size of €13.4 million 
in the electronic order book, which is several times even the average size of 
negotiated trades. This is perhaps due to the large concentration of 
government debt trading on the Spanish exchange. In the negotiated deals 
transactions, it is not surprising that the largest average bond trade sizes 
are registered on the LSE.  
In terms of the breakdown between on-exchange trades in public 
sector vs. non-public sector bonds in value terms, the former occupies a 
larger total share in trading (55.6%) compared to the latter (42.7%). The 
difference is explained by on-exchange trading of international bonds 
                                                                                                                            
without moving prices significantly against the trading party bringing forward the 
request to trade.  
EUROPE’S HIDDEN CAPITAL MARKETS | 53 
 
(1.7%).71 The Copenhagen Stock Exchange (and OMX more generally, due 
to Copenhagen) is the exception to this rule, since 82.4% of bond trading 
concerns non-public sector securities.72 Another interesting feature is the 
small average size of electronic orders for non-public sector bonds on the 
Italian exchange (€14,305). 
2.3 The structure of European bond derivatives markets 
i. Futures and options 
As shown in Table 2.4, fixed income derivatives have grown at a very quick 
pace in Europe after the introduction of a common currency. Over the 
period 2000-04, the number of contracts for bond derivatives (options and 
futures) in the EU grew by an average annual rate of 32.9%, and the 
corresponding figure for notional value was 36.4% annually.73 Nominal 
turnover in bond options has witnessed the most rapid growth of all these 
categories with annual rates almost reaching 100%. That the options market 
has been growing faster than futures is not in itself surprising, since options 
are a sizeably smaller market than futures, reaching only 30% of the futures 
market in 2004 in terms of nominal turnover and 16% in terms of the total 
volume of contracts.  
Interestingly, most of the growth in fixed income derivatives has been 
driven by the Liffe market, where total contracts in 2004 is 7.2 times what it 
was in 2000, and the value of turnover has more than tripled (Table 2.5). 
Both categories have more or less doubled on Eurex in the same time 
period.  
The market for bond derivatives in the EU is dominated by Eurex, the 
German-Swiss exchange. Eurex enjoys an almost exclusive market share in 
some German government debt futures, e.g. 10-year Bunds and shorter-
term Bobls (5-year maturity range), having successfully over a 21-month 
period recaptured back trading activity in this market segment from Liffe, 
which had a 65% market share in German futures as of 1997) (Pirrong, 
2003). In terms of exchange traded bond derivatives, Liffe has retained the 
                                                 
71 Authors’ own calculations based on FESE data for the month of December 2004 
only.  
72 This is probably due to the very large size of the covered bond market in 
Denmark. 
73 Authors’ own calculations based on data from Table 2.4.  
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long gilt74 futures and options, but it also offers Schatz and Bund futures,75 
Bund options and Japanese government futures.  
Table 2.4 European bond derivatives’ explosive growth 
  2000 2004 Growth in %, 
2000-04 
Bond options Contracts 30,381,359 127,681,324 320.3 
 Notional 
turnover 
(€ millions) 
14,847,514.4 77,700,713 423.3 
Bond futures Contracts 308,066,560 766,287,667 148.7 
 Notional 
turnover 
(€ millions) 
106,850,300.3 265,520,308 148.5 
Total Contracts 338,230,467 893,968,991 164.3 
 Notional 
turnover 
(€ millions) 
121,679,237 343,221,021 182.1 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from FESE and Euronext data. 
Table 2.5 Engines of growth 
Derivative 
Exchange 
Total 
contracts 
2000 
Total 
contracts 
2004 
Total 
notional 
turnover, 
€ millions, 
2000 
Total 
notional 
turnover, 
€ millions, 
2004 
Euronext.Liffe 43,546,371 313,332,048 90,874,843 278,345,872 
Eurex 288,185,156 574,090,908 30,052,951 64,875,149 
Source: Authors’ own calculations from FESE data. 
 
Both Eurex and Liffe are among the most important futures 
exchanges in the world in terms of the total number of contracts traded. In 
but a few years, Eurex has become the single largest futures exchange with 
close to 700 million contracts traded annually, while Liffe ranks fourth 
(Table 2.6). Clearly, in terms of the number of contracts traded, Eurex lies at 
the heart of the bond derivatives market in the EU, easily eclipsing even the 
                                                 
74 British government bonds. 
75 Schatz refers to two-year German government Treasury notes and Bund, to ten-
year bonds.  
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next largest rival, the London Liffe market, now subsumed into Euronext as 
Euronext.Liffe since January 2002. 574 million futures contracts were traded 
on Eurex in 2004, or more 1.8 times the number of contracts traded on the 
Liffe exchange.76  
Table 2.6 Exchange-traded derivatives: Number of contracts traded on biggest 
markets 
2004 Rank Exchange 2003 volume 2004 volume % change 
1 Eurex 668,650,028 684,630,502 2.40% 
2 Chicago mercantile exchange 530,989,007 664,884,607 25.20% 
3 Chicago board of trade 373,669,290 489,230,144 30.90% 
4 Euronext.liffe 267,822,143 310,673,375 16.00% 
5 Mexican derivatives exchange 173,820,944 210,355,031 21.00% 
6 Bolsa de mercadorias & futuros 113,895,061 173,533,508 52.40% 
7 New York mercantile exchange 111,789,658 133,284,248 19.20% 
8 Dalian commodity exchange 74,973,493 88,034,153 17.40% 
9 The Tokyo commodity exchange 87,252,219 74,447,426 -14.70% 
Note: Volume figures do not include options on futures. 
Source: Futures Industry Association. 
Conversely, the notional turnover on Liffe (€278.3 trillion for 2004) 
was 4.3 times larger than Eurex turnover, meaning that the average size of 
futures contracts on Liffe are considerably larger than those on Eurex: 
€847,488 and €115,855, respectively.77 This contrast is due to the nature of 
the contracts traded on the respective futures exchanges, since the average 
value of transactions on exchanges specialising in large-size money market 
contracts such as Liffe and the Chicago Board of Trade is considerably 
higher than the average value for longer-term futures contracts such as 
those traded on Eurex (Jeanneau, 2000). Even so, Eurex still finished third 
among the world’s exchanges after the Chicago Board of Trade ($1,324 
billion) and Euronext.liffe ($884 billion) in terms of daily notional turnover, 
as of 2003 (International Financial Services London, 2004). 
With the advent of the euro, futures contracts designed specifically 
for government benchmark issues in EMU countries other than Germany 
essentially disappeared together with the legacy national currencies. 
Because of their high liquidity, German government bond futures like the 
Schatz, Bund and Bobl had effectively become the hedging instrument of 
                                                 
76 German bond futures account for a large percentage of these. 
77 Authors’ own calculations from FESE data.  
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choice for euro-denominated sovereign debt issues. Presently, all three are 
traded on the Eurex exchange. Eurex enjoys very high liquidity due to the 
importance of underlying German government securities as the anchor of 
the European yield curve, and also as a result of the great degree of 
standardisation in these products (Table 2.7).78 German government bond 
futures are the most traded bond derivatives in the world. The total value 
of OTC cash market in German government securities is estimated at over 
€20 billion daily.79 Recently, Eurex decided to wade into the fiercely 
competitive cash market for German bonds, launching a platform (with 18 
market-makers) that will also allow trading in German Jumbo 
mortgage/state bonds, European corporate bonds and European covered 
bonds.  
Table 2.7 Eurex contract standardisation 
Contract 
standard 
Remaining 
term in years 
Trading unit 
(Contract value) 
Minimum 
issue 
Coupon 
Euro-Schatz 
Futures 
1.75 - 2.25 €100,000 €5 billion 6% p.a. 
Euro-Bobl 
Futures 
4.5 - 5.5 €100,000 €5 billion 6% p.a. 
Euro-Bund 
Futures 
8.5 - 10.5 €100,000 €5 billion 6% p.a. 
Euro-Buxl 
Futures 
20 - 30.5 €100,000 €5 billion 6% p.a. 
Source: Eurex. 
 
Euronext.Liffe enables the trading of highly complex short-term 
interest rate derivatives and represents the core of hedging strategies in the 
euro money markets. Notional turnover in short-term interest rate futures 
exceeded €204 trillion in 2004, compared with only €2.3 trillion in medium- 
and long-term interest rate futures. After the launch of its three-month 
Eurodollar futures and options contracts beginning in March 2004, 
Euronext.Liffe called upon support from a group of designated market-
makers to help establish liquidity by ensuring two-way competitive 
                                                 
78 Obviously, contracts are also highly standardised in the Liffe market, where 
nominal values for trading Schatz futures is £200,000, while it is only £100,000 for 
Bunds and long gilts. 
79 www.eurex-bonds.com. Figures are valid as of early 2003. 
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markets in both the futures and the options contracts.80 Market-making is 
organised along two overlapping 8.5 hour sessions, where seven liquidity 
providers will be actively quoting two-way prices at a given time.81  
A particularity of the microstructure of derivatives markets is that 
security design and liquidity provision are bundled and decided by the 
same economic agents (Bartram & Fehle, 2004). That is, futures exchange 
members determine jointly the characteristics of the options and futures 
contracts offered such that they only compete along the liquidity-providing 
dimension. The purpose of this cooperation is to render trading more 
efficient and voluminous by improving product standardisation, 
preserving anonymity in the trading process and easing netting 
arrangements for the clearinghouse that acts as central counterparty to 
trades (Bartram & Fehle, 2004). Eurex is an electronic order-driven market 
where several market-makers compete to provide two-way quotes that are 
matched against incoming orders. In the Euronext.Liffe market, the Liffe 
CONNECT trading host matches incoming orders in the central order limit 
book. 
ii. Over the counter interest rate derivatives 
The other associated development since the advent of the euro is the huge 
growth in the volume of interest rate swaps. As well as the significant 
increases in bond futures and other interest rate and money market 
products, the development of flexible and negotiable interest rate products 
has enhanced financial institutions and lenders’ risk management and 
hedging, and allowed borrowers to securitise income and insulate 
themselves from future interest rate volatility. Consequently the inter-bank 
market in euro interest rate swaps is now larger in daily turnover than the 
bond futures market, which itself is larger than the volume of underlying 
cash bonds. While Eurex trades in excess of €150 billion in Bund futures 
daily, this includes institutional and retail activity, so the inter-bank 
segment is likely to be significantly less. However, the daily turnover in 
euro-denominated swaps is around €130 billion,82 far overshadowing the 
market in physical government bonds in the same inter-bank segment.  
                                                 
80 www.euronext.com. 
81 For the three hours in the day that the opening hours of the London and New 
York stock markets coincide, 14 market-makers will be quoting prices. 
82 BIS (2004) (http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx05a.pdf). 
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This pattern of greater volumes shifting away from the physical bond 
(which after all represents the cost of government borrowing) can be 
contrasted with the situation in the US. In the US dollar market, US 
government bonds trade in a higher volume (estimated at $200 million) 
than the $80 billion of interest rate swaps. This means that the most 
accurate interest rate curve in the eurozone is generated by OTC activity in 
the inter-bank space, in the absence of a coherent and homogenous cost of 
borrowing for the member state governments. 
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3. Bond Markets and EU Legislation 
3.1 EU FSAP legislation and the bond markets 
Securities market regulation at EU level is older than one might initially 
think. The first piece of legislation dates back to 1979 and relates to the 
conditions for admission of securities to a stock exchange listing. It was 
followed in the 1980s by legislation regarding the regime for issuers in 
capital markets and in the 1990s by regulation covering intermediaries. The 
common deficiency of these rules was, generally speaking, the low degree 
of minimum harmonisation, which did not allow mutual recognition to 
work effectively, and the poor enforcement and insufficient cooperation 
among the authorities. It was a reflection of the low level of development 
and the high degree of state protection and fragmentation that 
characterised Europe’s capital markets until recently. 
The advent of EMU gave rise to a late plan in 1998 to adapt the 
regulatory framework to allow a truly single European capital market to 
emerge in the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). It was followed by the 
Lamfalussy report (European Commission, 2001) in February 2001, which 
adapted the procedures and instituted the structures for securities market 
regulation in the EU.  
This chapter analyses the impact on the bond markets of the new 
FSAP measures and the directives on prospectuses, transparency, market 
abuse and markets in financial instruments and assesses the implementing 
measures that have been adopted or are being discussed. It will first review 
some issues raised with regard to bond markets and intermediaries in the 
pre-FSAP regulatory framework. Annex I lists all EU-level legislation 
related to capital markets regulation. 
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3.2 The pre-FSAP regulatory framework 
Two directives set the basic standards for issuers in capital markets, 
covering the minimum financial and non-financial information that must 
be published and providing mutual recognition: i) the 1980 listing 
particulars directive, which covered the information about securities when 
listing on an organised market (exchange) in the EU, and ii) the 1989 
prospectus directive, which concerned initial public offerings of securities 
that are not to be admitted to listing. Both directives formally applied to 
debt and equity securities – the distinction being based on listed vs. non-
listed – although the 1989 directive was in practice designed for the bond 
markets and carried a specific reference to and definition of euro-securities.  
The utility of the prospectus directive was principally hampered by 
the lack of a common definition of public offer and private placement. This 
was left to the member states, which interpreted it according to their own 
provisions, without mutual recognition. Only four member states 
implemented a specific regime for euro-securities, i.e. Eurobonds, which 
was of course not identical either. 
The free provision of services for intermediaries in capital markets 
with a single licence was established in the 1993 investment services 
directive (ISD). This directive set minimum requirements for investment 
firms to provide their services throughout the EU and for exchanges 
(regulated markets) to offer remote access. Although the ISD had a 
considerable impact on the markets, it was judged inadequate as a means 
of integrating markets and protecting the official market. In particular, 
conduct of business rules were left to the member state where the service is 
provided, transparency provisions were found insufficient, and the rules 
did not apply to multilateral trading facilities (Levin, 2003, pp. 2-5). 
3.3 The FSAP measures 
The Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) contains four measures that have 
a direct impact on bond markets: the prospectus, market abuse, markets in 
financial instruments and transparency directives. These initiatives replace 
previous EU measures in these areas. Another element of the FSAP, the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) regulation, is also critically 
important, because it requires listed issuers to adopt IAS. The FSAP 
measures are closely linked with the Lamfalussy approach, which allows 
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secondary legislation to be agreed upon by a Committee of experts, based 
on proposals by the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR). 
i. The prospectus directive 
The new prospectus directive allows firms to organise European-wide, 
capital-raising exercises on the basis of a single document. A common 
position was reached on the amended proposal on 5 November 2002, after 
a first draft had provoked much controversy and final agreement on the 
text was reached on 7 July 2003. The new regime is composed of three 
segments: one for equity issuers and non-equity issues below €1,000, a 
second for non-equity issues with a denomination of at least €1,000, and a 
third for professional investors.  
The key features of the new regime are:  
1. The definition of ‘public offer’ and ‘private placement’ at EU level. 
2. The introduction of an enhanced disclosure standard, based on the 
IOSCO model, in the form of harmonised requirements for debt and 
equity securities. Accounts need to be prepared on the basis of IFRS 
or local GAAP if ‘equivalent’ to IFRS. 
3. The introduction of a new prospectus system composed of a single 
document or a tripartite of documents. Both forms need to contain 
the same information, but this distinction was made to speed up 
approval of the prospectus, which should go faster with a split 
document. Issuers will thus be allowed to refer to other parts of an 
approved prospectus (incorporation by reference). The tripartite 
document needs to be composed of 1) the basic registration document, 
or shelf filing, containing the general information about the issuer 
and its financial statements, which is to be updated each year; 2) the 
securities note, containing the details about the securities offered to the 
public and/or for listing and the modalities of the operation; and 3) 
the summary note, containing the main items of both. For offerings 
under a programme (multiple issues), a single base prospectus applies, 
containing all relevant information (as the registration document), 
leaving the issuer to refer to the remaining details when making a 
particular issue. 
4. The possibility to offer securities cross-border on the basis of a simple 
and straightforward notification procedure to host country authorities, 
and the concentration of supervisory responsibilities in a single home 
administrative authority. Equity issuers and non-equity issuers below 
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€1,000 need to have the prospectus vetted in their home country, that 
is, the country where the issuer has its registered office. For non-
equity issues with a denomination of at least €1,000 (or the equivalent 
in another currency) and for issues for professionals, there will be free 
choice of the home country of approval of the prospectus. Strict time 
limits apply by which the home country has to approve a prospectus, 
or make comments known to the issuer. 
5. For non-equity securities traded by professionals, special rules apply. 
In that case, there will be no obligation to provide a summary and an 
annual update, to have the prospectus approved in the home country, 
to have IAS equivalence, etc. The minimum denomination for such 
securities is €50,000. Other exemptions from the directive are the 
issue of securities already listed, continuous offerings by credit 
institutions, issues with a total value of less than €2.5 million and 
offers addressed to less than 100 persons. 
6. The maximum harmonisation approach should allow that one single 
standard applies throughout the EU. Member states cannot set 
additional requirements for issuers based in their jurisdictions. The 
implementing measures were issued as a regulation under EU law, 
meaning they are directly applicable and do not need to be 
transposed in national law.  
7. The introduction of a new language regime. Only the summary will 
have to be translated for cross-border offerings in case the prospectus 
is (also) published in a language that is “customary in the sphere of 
finance”. 
In the first draft of May 2001, only one prospectus format was 
proposed, composed of the set of three documents, without the possibility 
of choosing the country of approval of the prospectus. This led issuers to 
complain that the regime would become too onerous and costly. It was 
furthermore argued that the draft was drawn up primarily with equities in 
mind, without sufficiently taking into account the specificities of bonds, in 
particular the eurobonds market. The directive as finally approved takes 
this criticism into account. It gives almost free choice of regime for bond 
issuers, but almost no choice for equity issuers. Hence, although the first 
draft had disregarded the bond markets, this was largely taken into 
account in the amended Commission proposal, the Council common 
position and Parliament’s second reading. 
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Following the Lamfalussy approach, implementing measures on the 
draft directive were adopted by the European Securities Committee on 29 
April 2004. It covers the format, minimum information requirements, 
methods of publication and dissemination and the modalities of 
incorporation by reference. 
Overall, there are no clear views yet on the impact of the new 
directive on the markets. Initial data do not seem to indicate an abrupt stop 
in bond issuance after 1 July 2005. On the contrary, the strong growth in 
European bond markets observed over the last years can be expected to 
continue. Most observers agree that the new directive should create a truly 
single passport for issuers, but there are concerns that it may have a 
negative impact on some segments of the bond markets in Europe, 
particularly for non-EU issuers, because of the IFRS equivalence 
requirement. The specific adaptations that have been made for the bond 
markets, with the special regime for the €50,000 + segment and the free 
choice of home country for €1,000 + bonds, are welcomed, but are seen as 
probably still too constraining. On the other hand, incorporation by 
reference did not exist before and should reduce the cost of issuance. It 
should also be remarked that the new EU regime is more liberal than that 
in the US, which simply allowed no choice of home country. Foreign 
issuers need to follow US rules for issues within the US territory, as is also 
the case for US issuers.  
In the discussion of the possible negative impact of the directive, 
more reference is made to the competitive threat posed by other 
jurisdictions, in particular Switzerland and Singapore. The former country 
introduced a new listing regime for bonds, which came into force on 1 
February 2005. Apart from the local standard and IFRS, the new Swiss 
regime also accepts US GAAP and those of the industrialised countries, and 
some NICs, such as Brazil and South Africa. Moreover, no distinction is 
made between the retail and the wholesale regime, i.e. denominations of 
€1,000 fall in the wholesale regime, and it is not necessary to submit semi-
annual financial statements, as is required under the transparency 
directive, discussed below.83 
In addition, EU financial centres are reacting as well and creating 
alternative regimes. The London Stock Exchange (LSE) started the 
                                                 
83 First listing of an international bond under SWX’s new additional rules, 29 
March 2005 (www.swx.com).  
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Professional Securities Market, which is regulated by the exchange, but is 
not a regulated market as defined by the directive. By following this route 
to listing, issuers will be able to issue any type of debt security or 
depository receipts, according to LSE.84 Luxembourg and Dublin are taking 
similar initiatives to try to pre-empt any possible negative impact of the 
prospectus directive. 
ii. The transparency directive 
Closely linked to the new prospectus regime is the so-called draft 
transparency directive which updates the modalities for periodic and ad-
hoc disclosure of issuers on capital markets. The legislation proposes to 
integrate all relevant requirements of EU law into a single text, broaden the 
scope of securities covered so far and upgrade the current regular reporting 
requirements, following International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS). However, periodic and ad-hoc disclosure also covers non-financial 
information, which is related to different company law or corporate 
governance requirements, and represents a new stream of EU initiatives, 
which is briefly discussed below.  
The requirements of the transparency directive are as follows: 
1. A full annual financial report should be published by issuers within 
four months of the end of the fiscal year and should not only contain 
the audited financial statements, but also a management report. 
2. A full semi-annual financial report should be published by issuers 
within two months, containing a condensed set of financial 
statements and an interim management report. This report does not 
need to be audited. 
3. Interim management statements shall be made 10 weeks after the 
beginning and 6 weeks before the end of each 6-month period. It shall 
contain an explanation of material events that have taken place 
during the relevant period and a general description of the financial 
position and performance of the issuer. Issuers exclusively of debt 
securities with a denomination of at least €50,000 or equivalent are 
exempted from these periodic reporting requirements. 
                                                 
84 Professional Securities Market, London Stock Exchange. The Professional 
Securities Market will be operated and approved as a Multilateral Trading Facility 
(MTF), as defined by the MiFID (see below). It became operational on 1 July 2005. 
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4. For the definition of price-sensitive information, reference is made to 
the text contained in the market abuse directive (Art. 6, see heading 
below).  
5. As regards information dissemination, the directive requires equal 
treatment of all security holders. Member state authorities shall 
ensure there is at least one officially appointed mechanism for the 
central storage of regulated information. Electronic information 
dissemination is permitted. It shall require “the issuer to use such 
media as may reasonably be relied upon for effective dissemination 
of information to the public throughout its territory and abroad” (Art. 
21.1).  
6. Organised dissemination systems. The directive insists on setting 
guidelines for the dissemination of regulated information and 
information provision, but leaves practical arrangements to 
implementing legislation (level 2) and guidelines to be agreed among 
member states in the context of the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators.  
7. Language regime. The same language regime applies as in the 
prospectus directive, i.e. the home member state language and one 
international language (with the exception that there is no summary, 
which needs to be translated in all cases in the host country 
language). For large issues (in excess of €50,000), only one language is 
required.  
The requirements regarding periodic disclosure do not apply to state, 
regional and local authorities, international multilateral bodies or central 
banks. In the draft implementing measures, CESR has made proposals on 
minimum information for half-yearly financial statement and published its 
thoughts on how a single access point may be developed for EU investors 
to obtain financial information on EU issuers. 
iii. Market abuse and insider dealing 
A new directive updates the current insider trading directive and adds new 
provisions on market manipulation, on which no harmonised rules existed 
before, and which is new for many EU member states. The aims of the 
directive are to avoid loopholes in Community legislation that would 
undermine confidence in securities markets. The directive was formally 
adopted on 3 December 2002. The European Commission, following the 
proposals by the Committee of European Securities Regulators, has in the 
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meantime adopted implementing legislation regarding several articles of 
the directive. In the context of disclosure, the most important ones are those 
relating to the definition of price-sensitive information (Arts. 1 and 6.1 and 
6.2) and investment research (Art. 6.5).85 
• Inside information is defined as “information of a precise nature which 
has not been made public (…) and which, if it were made public, 
would be likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those 
financial instruments”. This is also the definition that is used for ad-
hoc disclosure. In the implementing proposals, this is further defined 
as “ex-ante available information an average person would be likely 
to use as part of the basis of his investment decisions in order to 
optimise his interests”. 
• Market manipulation is defined as “transactions or orders to trade 
which give, or are likely to give, false or misleading signals as to the 
supply of, demand for or price of financial instruments”. 
• The directive requests member states to ensure that issuers of 
financial instruments inform the public as soon as possible of inside 
information. This information should be posted on the internet sites 
of the issuers (Art. 6.1). Delays must be justified to the authorities 
(Art. 6.2). Disclosure of information to third parties must be complete 
and effective, and simultaneous for international disclosure (Art. 6.3). 
• Dealings by directors in shares or options must be notified to the 
competent authorities. Member states shall ensure public access to 
information concerning such transactions (Art. 6.4). 
• Investment research and recommendations must be fairly represented, 
and factors that are likely to impair its objectivity must be disclosed 
(Art. 6.5). In the implementing legislation, it is proposed that member 
states make sure that effective organisational arrangements are in 
place to prevent conflicts of interest in investment firms; that material 
conflicts of interest are disclosed and that an overview of all ‘buy’, 
‘hold’ and ‘sell’ recommendations is published on a quarterly basis.  
• Single supervisory authority. Member states must centralise the 
supervision of market abuse and insider dealing into one single 
administrative authority (Art. 11). This requires significant changes in 
                                                 
85 Working documents on the implementation of Arts. 1 and 6, paras. 1 and 2 and 
Art. 6 para. 5 of the European Parliament and Council Directive 2003/6/EC, ESC 
12/2003 and 13/2003. 
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some member states, where first-line supervision is carried out by the 
stock exchange, or through code of conduct arrangements.  
An important issue, which is raised in the implementing legislation, 
is the synchronisation of inside information disclosure in all member states 
to guarantee equal treatment of investors. The question how this will be 
done is left to the member states (level 3) or to implementing legislation. 
The directive was already effectively applied in several member states.  
Table 3.1 Reporting requirements for issuers with listed securities in the 
prospectus, market abuse and transparency directives 
Scope Prospectus  Market abuse Transparency  
Disclosure regime/ 
trigger 
Initial  Inside 
information 
Dealings by 
directors 
Conflicts of 
interest in 
investment 
research 
Ad-hoc (price-sensitive 
information, change in major 
holdings) 
Periodic (annual, bi-annual 
and ‘quarterly’ management 
reports) 
Frequency Annual updates 
of all relevant 
information by 
issuer 
As soon as 
possible 
Max. 3-month delay for 
annual, 2 months for bi-
annual, interim management 
reports in between 
No delay for ad-hoc 
Max. 5 days for changes in 
major holdings 
Dissemination  Issuer’s website 
Press  
Home authority 
website 
Company website Issuer’s website 
Member states must ensure 
timely access 
Language regime Home plus 
international 
language or host- 
country language 
Summary note 
must always be 
translated 
(not discussed) Home plus international 
language or host country 
language 
Single language for issues 
 > €50,000  
Exemptions Lighter regime 
for issues 
> €50,000 
Monetary policy 
and Treasury 
authorities 
No periodic reporting 
requirement for debt 
securities > €50,000 
Degree of 
comitology 
 
11 of 33 articles 2 of 22 articles 12 of 35 articles 
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Competent 
authority 
Home country 
for approval of 
equity issues 
Choice for 
approval of bond 
issues > €1,000 
(not discussed) Home country or country of 
choice of issuer 
Supervisory 
authority 
Fully indepen-
dent (with transi-
tory period) 
Delegation of 
dissemination 
authorised 
Fully 
independent 
Fully independent 
Delegation authorised, but 
subject to caveats, and for a 
maximum period of 5 years 
after entry into force 
Form of 
harmonisation 
Maximum Minimum Minimum 
Implementation 
deadline 
1 July 2005 October 2004 January 2007 
iv. Markets in financial instruments directive (MiFID) 
The cornerstone of the FSAP, the MiFID, sets the rules for intermediaries in 
EU capital markets. The aim of the new directive is to better protect 
investors and preserve market integrity while promoting efficient and 
liquid markets. The directive retains the division between regulated 
markets and investment firms of the 1993 investment services directive 
(ISD), which it replaces.86 
The new MiFID aims to create a coherent, if differentiated, pre- and 
post-trade transparency regime for regulated markets, multilateral trading 
facilities (MTFs) and investment firms, which, at this stage, only applies to 
equity transactions. The MiFID contains stronger rules regarding the 
operation of investment firms (e.g. conflicts of interest) and their relations 
with clients (e.g. conduct of business rules). Unlike the ISD, it applies also 
to investment advice. It introduces for the first time explicit best-execution 
rules and order-handling rules. For regulated markets, the directive 
provides for more harmonised rules regarding organisational 
requirements, admission of instruments to trading and transparency 
requirements.  
Following lengthy consultations within the framework of CESR, the 
multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), comprising ATSs and crossing-
systems, are included in the scope of the directive. This is in line with a 
functional theory of regulation, which stipulates that the functional 
                                                 
86 This part is updated from Levin (2003). 
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characteristics and not the institutional form should determine regulatory 
rights and obligations. Accordingly, the directive imposes similar 
obligations on MTFs as on regulated markets (e.g. transparency and capital 
requirements).  
The main elements of the new regime are as follows: 
• The transparency regime (applicable to equity instruments only):  
o Exchanges. The directive contains a more comprehensive pre- and 
post-trade transparency regime. As for pre-trade information, Art. 
44.1 requires regulated markets to “make public current bid and 
offer prices which are advertised through their systems for shares 
admitted to trading”. It provides a waiver for large transactions 
(Art. 44.2). Regarding post-trade transparency, regulated markets will 
have to publish prices, volumes and times of all equity trades at all 
times on a “reasonable commercial basis” and “as close to real-time 
as possible” (Art. 45.1). Deferred publication is allowed for large-
scale transactions (Art. 45.2).  
o Multilateral trading facilities (Arts. 29 and 30). MTFs resemble 
regulated markets in the sense that they provide a trading facility 
where users can meet. The MiFID accordingly imposes 
transparency obligations on MTFs similar to those imposed on 
regulated markets.  
o Investment firms (Art. 27). Systemic internalisers need to publish 
quotes on a continuous basis for blue chip shares. This provision 
shall not apply for trades above market size. Volumes and prices of 
executed trades shall be published as soon as possible. The client 
limit-order display rule (Art. 22.2) requires investment firms to 
publish those limit orders (instructions to trade at best price, but not 
below a specified limit) that they cannot execute immediately. The 
aim is to ensure that the information content of these orders reaches 
the market. Exceptions are made for large transactions. 
• Best Execution  
Although it was not called for in the 1993 ISD, EU rules in the future 
will also contain provisions on best execution. Art. 21 provides that 
investment firms should execute client orders in such a way that the 
client obtains the “best possible result” in terms of price, costs, speed, 
likelihood of execution and settlement, size and nature (Art. 19.1). This 
execution policy needs to be reviewed on a regular basis. If orders are 
executed outside the regulated market or an MTF, the investment firm 
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needs to obtain express prior consent of their clients (Art. 19.3). These 
provisions apply to all financial instruments including bonds. 
The broader conduct of business rules (Art. 19) are also aimed at 
boosting execution quality. Paragraph 3 provides that clients shall 
receive information on e.g. different execution venues, the costs and 
associated charges. Art. 25 provides that investment firms must 
maintain records for all transactions they have carried out on behalf of 
clients. 
• Conduct of business rules (Art. 19) 
The MiFID considerably extends the 1993 provisions on conduct of 
business. The old ISD rules were vague and left significant discretion to 
the member states (Art. 11). Notably, there was significant ambiguity 
whether the home or the host country rules were applicable. Moreover, 
the rules were badly enforced. 
The new rules require firms to act honestly, fairly and professionally in 
accordance with the best interest of their client, on the basis of some 
general principles. These will be further worked out by CESR, taking 
into account the nature of the service, the type of investment service 
and the character of the investor (retail, professional).  
• Provisions on conflicts of interest (Art. 18) 
Unlike the ISD, the MiFID contains a self-standing provision on 
conflicts of interest. It requires investment firms to identify conflicts of 
interest between themselves and their clients or between clients with 
conflicting interests (Art. 18.1). Investment firms are required to have 
arrangements in place to manage those conflicts and prevent them from 
affecting their clients’ interests. If such arrangements are not enough to 
prevent conflicts, investment firms must disclose the source and nature 
of the conflict to potential clients before undertaking any business (Art. 
18.2). 
• MiFID and the bond markets 
Art. 65.1 requires the European Commission to submit a review to the 
European Parliament “on the possible extension of the pre- and post-
trade transparency provisions to the transactions in classes of financial 
instruments other than shares”. A recent draft of the European 
Parliament (2005) report (Rapporteur: Ieke van der Burg) asked the 
Commission to focus on “possible problems in bond trading, and 
invited the Commission to bring forward proposals related to bond 
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markets under Art. 65.1 of the MiFID on the basis of an analysis of any 
problems that it identifies concerning price transparency in bond 
trading in the European Union” (paragraph 23).87 Although this 
wording was not maintained in the final report and replaced by a very 
vague reference, it remains indicative of the policy pressures that are 
building up regarding this subject. 
As with the ISD, the MiFID does not apply to primary government-debt 
markets. The organisation of these markets is left to the discretion of the 
member states. However, some standardisation has been occurring in 
that market and governments have, in the context of the Economic and 
Financial Committee, agreed on a new harmonised format for primary 
dealers to report on their activities in euro-denominated government 
bonds. Instead of submitting as many as 11 different reports, as in the 
current system, primary dealers will only be required to provide a 
single report that combines elements from all eurozone countries. The 
data provided are one of the key inputs used by the Treasuries to 
monitor the quality of the primary dealers’ contribution to the 
placement of their securities and to the liquidity of the secondary 
market. In the new format – applicable from 2006 onwards – primary 
dealers will provide details on the type of securities traded and the type 
and geographical location of the counterpart.88 This however does not 
address the issues that face the bond market if it becomes mandatory 
for dealers to publish pre-trade bids and offers real-time.  
• The US NMS rule 
Unlike EU best execution rules, which require firms to take into account 
more than only the price, the new Regulation NMS of the US Securities 
and Exchange Commission requires orders for stocks listed on the 
NYSE and other regulated markets to be sent to the market that has the 
best posted price. The rule prohibits bypassing, or ‘trading-through’ 
another market’s quote for both exchange-listed and Nasdaq securities. 
It prevents electronic market centres (ECNs) from competing with the 
                                                 
87 The initial draft of the Van der Burg report (Paragraph 23) asked the 
Commission to focus on “possible problems with access to and transparency in 
bond trading in the European Union, which is much larger than the European 
equity market but is reputed to be less efficient than the bond trading market in the 
USA”.  
88 Economic and Financial Committee, Subcommittee on EU Government Bond 
and Bills Markets, Brussels, 7 April 2005. 
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NYSE for trading interest. The SEC believes that the uniform trade-
through rule would encourage the use of limit orders, aggressive 
quoting and order interaction and help preserve investors’ expectations 
that their orders will be executed at the best displayed price. 
v. Consolidated accounts in IAS or equivalent 
From 2005 onwards, all listed issuers are requested to prepare consolidated 
accounts in accordance with IAS, or equivalent. This requirement caused 
much uproar in the markets, as it was feared that the US would never 
recognise IAS as equivalent, but also since other accounting standards, 
such as the Japanese, would not meet the test. On 20 April 2005, however, 
the EU and the US agreed on a roadmap to eliminate from 2007 onwards 
the SEC requirement for foreign private issuers to reconcile financial 
statements prepared under IAS to US GAAP, thereby removing a final big 
hurdle to the development of European capital markets. Nevertheless, the 
SEC agreement remains conditional on the finding by the SEC staff that IAS 
financial statements and the accompanying reconciliations are faithful to 
and consistent with the US GAAP. 
vi. Conclusion 
Although many concerns were initially expressed on the negative impact of 
the new regulatory framework on non-equity markets and on European 
capital markets in general, it seems that amendments and compromises to 
draft texts cater for different segments of the markets. The special regime 
for the €50,000 + segment and the free choice of home country for bonds in 
excess of €1,000 in the prospectus directive are important concessions to the 
bond markets, allowing the EU bond market to remain attractive for special 
segments, and installing a competitive environment between jurisdictions, 
which does not exist in the US. The IAS equivalence agreement can be 
considered as a final breakthrough for the EU bond markets. 
The main concerns that can be expressed regard the regulatory 
regime for investment firms. The best execution and conduct of business 
rules have become onerous for firms to internalise, and may weigh upon 
market development and innovation. The delay in the implementation of 
the MiFID should give firms more time to cope with these requirements.89  
                                                 
89 According to a Commission press release of 20 June 2005, the Commission 
proposed to extend the implementation deadline by 6 months, until 30 October 
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The work to make the single capital market function effectively is 
now in the hands of the supervisors. Initial evidence on the implementation 
of the new directives shows that much remains to be done. The latest 
transposition statistics show an old bad habit has not yet disappeared: 
notwithstanding the Lamfalussy procedure and the instalment of the ‘level 
3’ Committees, most member states have not managed to have the directive 
implemented in national law within the time foreseen. This was also the 
case with the two directives discussed above, which had to be implemented 
at the time of writing this report, the market abuse and prospectus 
directives. On the other hand, the increased cooperation between 
supervisors and the higher scope for secondary legislation than had 
previously been the case should allow for more consistency in the 
application of the rules across the member states.  
 
                                                                                                                            
2006. The proposal also gives firms and markets another six months (until 30 April 
2007) to adapt their structures and procedures to the new requirements. 
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4. Bond Market Liquidity, Efficiency 
and Transparency: The Role of 
Public Policy 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the role of public policy in contributing to and 
enhancing bond market liquidity and efficiency. In a first section (4.2), we 
review why bond markets occupy a vital function in the economy, detailing 
the various ways in which they contribute to economic growth. This section 
serves to highlight the importance of enlightened policy-making in the 
form of targeted and constrained interventions, so as to harness the benefits 
of wide, deep and resilient bond markets. The next section explains the 
context in which the MiFID Art. 65 review will take place and sets out 
guiding principles for regulators to follow when deciding whether to 
impose new statutory rules on market players or extend existing rules, and 
highlights the differences between stock and bond markets in terms of the 
objectives of market participants. It analyses why market rules designed for 
stock markets are not optimal in the fixed income business. Section 4.4 
reviews the importance of liquidity and its contribution to market 
efficiency, since the debate surrounding MiFID Art. 65 seems to be swirling 
especially fast around the liquidity-transparency nexus, and examines the 
question of price transparency against an existing transatlantic benchmark. 
A final chapter presents a set of recommendations based on conclusions 
drawn from the present chapter.  
4.2 Economic growth and the benefits of dynamic bond markets 
i. Introduction 
Abundant research [e.g. Levine (2004), Beck, et al. (1999a), Levine, et al. 
(1999) Levine & Zervos (1999) and Edison, et al. (2002)] has documented 
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how developed, liquid and integrated markets contribute to economic 
growth by facilitating the efficient allocation of scarce economic resources 
and risk across space, time, and states of nature. Once it has been 
established that developed and properly functioning financial markets 
power the engine of growth in a capitalist economy, it is logical to examine 
what role bond markets play more specifically. Surprisingly, the research 
on finance and growth has, until very recently at least, focused almost 
entirely either on stock markets and banks, or on financial markets more 
generally, to the exclusion of bond markets. Recently, however, this lacuna 
has been addressed in the emerging literature on the importance of bond 
markets for economic growth (see e.g. Herring & Chatusripitak, 2001, or 
Fink, et al., 2003).  
Financial market integration also promotes the efficiency of the 
financial sector, since a number of financial activities display economies of 
scale and benefit from the pro-competitive environment of open (economic) 
borders (European Commission, 2002). There are a number of reasons why 
the further integration of bond markets would specifically contribute to 
greater economic efficiency in Europe.90 These include: greater competition 
between issuers due to the greater supply of similar (or homogeneous) 
securities across borders (Pagano & von Thadden, 2004), between 
intermediaries that translate into lower transaction costs, relaxation of 
national investment restrictions for pension funds and insurance 
companies that allows for greater portfolio diversification and 
correspondingly higher risk-adjusted returns, more accessibility to external 
sources of finance, better hedging opportunities, and the higher rates of 
innovation that prevail in large, open markets. In the following paragraphs, 
we briefly summarise the vital functions fulfilled by bond markets in the 
economy. 
                                                 
90 European bond markets are known to be significantly more integrated than their 
equity counterparts. This is particularly true in the sovereign debt segment. Jean-
Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, put it this way in a recent 
speech: “As a broad assessment of the level of integration in the wholesale 
markets, I would say that it is almost perfect in the money market, including its 
related interest rate derivatives markets, very well advanced in the government 
bond market, fairly high in the corporate bond market, and least advanced, but 
increasing, in the equity market. (BIS, 2005).  
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ii. Funding 
(Primary) bond markets contribute to economic dynamism first and 
foremost by relaxing the constraints that impede firms’ access to external 
funds. In the absence of deep and well-functioning financial markets, 
profitable investment opportunities identified by managers as such often 
cannot be exploited: the pool of capital needed to translate growth potential 
into profits is constrained by the availability of cash reserves (retained 
earnings) or by relationship ties that bind corporate treasurers to their 
usual bank lenders. Well-functioning primary markets create the possibility 
for governments, corporates and financial institutions to raise debt finance. 
A bond amounts to an inter-temporal contract between an agent holding a 
surplus of cash today (the investor) and one who faces a cash shortage (the 
issuer). The investor lends cash to the issuer in exchange for a steady 
(usually annual or bi-annual) stream of cash flows (coupons or interest 
payments).91 If there is a surplus of projects yielding positive net present 
values today relative to available cash, borrowing enables firms to 
profitably mobilise future capital today. In turn, profits deriving from this 
investment are used to pay off the debt with interest at a defined date in the 
future. This exchange of cash across time facilitates inter-temporal 
consumption for the investor, and inter-temporal investment for the issuer, 
leading to a higher effective rate of utilisation of existing capital (which, in 
a dynamic context, effectively creates new capital). The result is that the 
economy becomes dynamically more efficient and grows.  
Bank lending can, broadly speaking, provide the same welfare gains 
described above by allowing firms to finance investments in excess of their 
internal financing capabilities. Yet the primary advantages of issuing 
securities over borrowing from banks are the diversification of funding 
sources and the competition for underwriting and placement an issuer can 
stir up among primary dealers and investors to obtain the most favourable 
borrowing terms possible. Evidently, the scope for such competition as well 
as for funding diversification is seriously constrained in the case of 
relationship banking.92 While the size of banks loans are limited to the 
                                                 
91 This is the case of a plain-vanilla bond. Obviously, there are a number of other 
types of bonds that do not match these characteristics, for example, variable rate 
coupons, convertibles, etc. 
92 Although admittedly, a long-term relationship with a single bank could lead to 
favourable lending terms for a reliable client.  
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corporate bank’s lending capabilities, the funds that can be raised on the 
international capital market are virtually unlimited (in normal 
circumstances) so long as the issuer is deemed sufficiently liquid and 
creditworthy as the debt burden increases.  
Secondary debt markets provide mechanisms for the efficient pricing 
and management of that debt. In addition, they facilitate the pricing of risk 
by creating reference (benchmark) rates. They also enable investors to 
hedge risk. Yields on long-term bonds proxy inflationary expectations by 
market participants, thereby providing information to central banks that is 
essential in implementing effective monetary policy decisions. Finally, 
money market instruments can contribute to a stable and efficient 
payments system by acting as collateral. More broadly, efficient secondary 
markets for debt securities fulfil important public functions by contributing 
significantly to both financial stability and liquidity, quasi-public goods 
that foster financial development and economic growth. But the 
relationship between developed bond markets and economic growth goes 
much deeper yet than only the funding channel, as dynamic debt securities 
markets impact positively on monetary policy, hedging strategies, financial 
stability, portfolio and liability management. 
iii. Monetary policy 
Bond markets play a key role in the implementation of monetary policy. 
Because of their forward-looking nature, they provide central bankers with 
important information on the inflationary expectations (and by extension, 
on the interest rate expectations) of market participants, as reflected in the 
spreads of longer-dated government bonds over money market 
instruments. Bond derivatives markets in turn provide useful information 
on the degree of uncertainty regarding future interest rate movements 
(Issing, 2002). The comprehensive nature of market data and the fact that, 
unlike surveys of market participants, they actually reflect real economic 
decisions, renders them invaluable to central bankers. The efficiency of 
bonds, bond derivatives and swap markets reinforces the quality of 
information available to monetary authorities, thereby enabling the latter to 
better calibrate market responses to changes in interest rates; it also enables 
them to better communicate the central bank’s strategy to the markets, 
thereby reducing uncertainty in the market, and with it, volatility. As a 
result of both these informational effects, efficient and developed bond 
markets foster a more stable and accurate monetary policy stance, with 
positive results for economic growth. 
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iv. Pricing and hedging 
Secondary debt markets provide mechanisms for the efficient pricing of 
private and public issues. This function of price discovery is particularly 
important in liquid markets for heavily-traded debt securities, such as 
supranationals, government bonds and AAA-rated quasi-government and 
corporate issues. Government securities have traditionally been viewed as 
reliable hedging instruments against interest rate risk and have long 
represented a benchmark against which non-government securities are 
priced. Certain attributes of government bonds render them particularly 
well-suited to these functions, including: low liquidity premiums (because 
they are so heavily traded), negligible probability of default and well-
developed market structure, complete with supporting repo and 
derivatives markets (IMF, 2001, Chapter 4). As we have seen, however, this 
is less true of the eurozone, particularly when contrasted with the position 
in the US.  
Bond markets facilitate the pricing of risk across asset markets by 
creating risk-free benchmark yields along a spectrum of maturities (yield 
curve). Real returns on benchmark government issues represent the anchor 
of risk pricing along the yield curve. In turn, these risk-free rates represent 
the backbone of discount rates used to calculate present values for assets 
and investment projects alike. Today, in some market segments, interest 
rate swaps have now overtaken government bonds as the standard 
benchmarks.93 According to Batten et al. (2004), European fixed income 
markets were the first to move away from the traditional approach of 
referencing government yields as benchmarks, shifting instead to greater 
use of interest rate swaps. This phenomenon occurred as a result of the 
absence of a coherent euro benchmark curve based on government 
securities. 
Dynamic bond markets also enable investors to better manage and to 
hedge risk. Financial institutions in particular make extensive use of 
government bonds to hedge their considerable exposure to interest rate 
                                                 
93 This phenomenon is not strictly limited to the EU. As the US was successful in 
consolidating its fiscal deficit in the latter part of the 1990s (to the point where 30-
year Treasury bonds were abolished), there was concern among market 
participants that long-term US benchmark debt would become increasingly illiquid 
relative to past levels, reducing their attractiveness for hedging purposes. This has 
led to an increasingly prominent role for swap futures in the US market (see IMF, 
2001).  
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risk, because they are the least risky assets and their yields are highly 
correlated with yields on private debt (IMF, 2001). For example, as the IMF 
study indicates, primary dealers who underwrite government issues (e.g. in 
a bought deal) tend to sell government bonds short, in case the value of 
their long positions would fall, threatening a capital loss. The development 
of capital markets is conducive to financial innovation, leading to new 
instruments such as interest rate options and futures that will create new 
hedging opportunities and enhance the effectiveness of risk mitigation. 
Finally, a vibrant secondary market for debt securities can contribute 
to a stable and efficient payments system by facilitating the use of 
collateral. The high liquidity and high degree of standardisation of 
government benchmark issues make them attractive as collateral, especially 
those securities on the short end of the yield curve.  
v. Financial cycles and stability 
The development of debt securities markets and market-based financing 
structures in Europe more generally over the past two decades has changed 
the role banks play in the financing cycle (Welteke, 2000, p. 2). Financial 
cycles should become less pronounced as the European economy shifts 
away from relationship-based banking, because a greater diversification of 
funding sources, especially by raising funds in the international capital 
market, provide a certain continuity in the stream of borrowing that may 
not be matched by the lending patterns of domestic banks during economic 
downturns. Bond markets disconnect lending activity from domestic credit 
conditions, smoothing the flow of funds in the case of a credit crunch as 
domestic financial institutions cut back on lending activities (De Bondt, 
2002; Davis, 2001). Because the volatility of credit extended to the private 
sector diminishes (De Bondt, 2002) with developed debt securities markets, 
the relationship between real economic activity and financial cycles 
weakens. As the real economy becomes less dependent on domestic credit 
conditions, boom-bust investment cycles diminish along with the 
variability in rates of economic growth, which itself feeds back into a more 
favourable investment climate (and correspondingly higher growth). 
Another drawback of relationship banking is that the political ties 
that have traditionally been associated with it often amount to a perverse 
incentive structure. Implicit government guarantees of large banks breed a 
culture of insufficient accountability of credit portfolio managers, which 
can undermine financial stability in the long run (Rajan & Zingales, 2002). 
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vi. Market discipline 
Public markets for debt securities contribute to economic efficiency by 
ensuring that credit allocation decisions are market-driven instead of being 
influenced by political considerations or cronyism, supported by an 
infrastructure that is conducive to an environment of greater transparency. 
As information asymmetries gain importance with the diffusion of debt 
holdings, greater transparency in financial accounts is necessary (e.g. 
through more stringent disclosure requirements) along with a large 
community of financial analysts and respected rating agencies to monitor 
credit developments (Hakansson, 1998). In the case of relationship banking, 
the credit risk is concentrated in a single institution, which has intimate 
knowledge of the borrower’s credit standing. Once a firm issues public 
securities, however, the diffusion of claims held against the issuer leads to a 
collective action problem of who will intensively monitor credit 
developments within the firm. Unlike relationship bankers, who accrue 
detailed information about a borrower over repeated lending programmes, 
investors buying debt on secondary markets sometimes know very little 
about the issuer’s credit standing. Thus, the combination of asymmetric 
information and the collective action problem necessitates the creation of 
independent rating agencies that assess the balance of (credit) risks specific 
to an issuer. Bond markets exercise a powerful disciplining mechanism in 
the form of ratings downgrades that punish fiscal profligacy in the case of 
government issuers and unbridled borrowing in the case of corporate 
issuers. Investors will react to ratings events and heightened credit risk by 
demanding higher yields, increasing the cost of funding for issuers.94  
With respect to sovereign debt issues, bond markets provide the 
added benefit that they allow public deficits to be financed in a non-
inflationary manner when market discipline is effective (European 
Commission, 2002). By helping to enforce fiscal discipline, secondary 
markets for debt securities contribute to price stability. Without well-
                                                 
94 A good recent example in Europe is the announcement by the rating agency 
Fitch that Italian public finances had suffered a “marked deterioration”, prompting 
the agency to change the rating outlook for Italy from stable to negative. This move 
suggests a possible downgrade in the near future. Already, S&P lowered Italian 
sovereign debt from AA+ to AA in 2004, making it the first eurozone country to 
suffer a downgrade since the introduction of the euro. Following the Fitch 
announcement, yield spreads of Italian bonds over their German counterparts 
widened by 1 basis point to about 11 basis points overall (see Chung, 2005).  
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established markets for government securities, the only available 
instrument for governments to cover budgetary shortfalls is to print 
money, which results in the building up of inflationary pressures.95  
Corporate debt markets also can improve corporate governance and 
the market for corporate control (De Bondt, 2002, p. 7). They promote the 
efficiency of the economy by facilitating the conditions for corporate 
restructuring and liquidation. 
vii. Liability and portfolio management  
Well-functioning bond markets provide a useful platform for long-term 
liability management, particularly for insurance firms and pension funds. 
In the case of these types of financial activities, where liabilities weigh in at 
long maturities, it is helpful for portfolio managers to obtain a regular 
source of fixed income. In the case of highly-rated vanilla bonds, the 
advantage of such instruments is that (in the absence of inflation) their real 
(as opposed to nominal) value can be determined very precisely, unlike 
other types of debt instruments such as convertibles or equities. Portfolio 
management benefits from liquid bond markets since they offer a very 
wide range of securities whose returns tend to be correlated, facilitating 
hedging. On the other hand, debt instruments can generate unique payoff 
structures that can diversify the sources of income. 
viii. Conclusion 
Liquid and efficient bond markets occupy a vital function in the economy. 
They foster market discipline, reduce the temptation for governments to 
seek recourse via inflationary financing (and therefore contribute to price 
stability), promote financial stability by mitigating the effects of the credit 
cycle and by facilitating hedging activities, offer instruments that are used 
as a basis upon which to price risk along the yield curve and across all asset 
classes, increase the opportunities for portfolio diversification and 
encourage more efficient liability management. More broadly, efficient 
secondary markets for debt securities fulfil important public functions by 
                                                 
95 Whether or not there is a 1:1 relationship between increases in the money supply 
and inflation has been the matter of considerable debate among academic 
economists. The consensus view today is that in the short term, frictions such as 
money illusion and fixed wages (as opposed to automatically adjusted wages) do 
not support such a relationship. However, there is virtually unanimity among 
experts that in the long term, this relationship is a strong one.  
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contributing in a non-negligible manner to both financial stability and 
liquidity, quasi-public goods that foster financial development and 
economic growth.  
Because of the important functions bond markets exercise in the 
economy, it is essential that they be allowed to flourish. At the same time, it 
is natural for regulators to take an interest in discerning if the existing 
market architecture and the prevalent self-regulatory model are conducive 
to efficient, deep, fair and liquid markets.  
4.3 Regulating bond markets in Europe 
i. Why the recent attention on bond markets? 
The shift away from bank lending to corporate debt issuing as a source of 
funding gives regulators good cause to take a closer and greater interest in 
bond markets (Langton, 2005). Apart from this natural consequence of the 
ongoing transformation of European financial markets, the debate in 
Europe has been motivated by several phenomena: the controversial 
prospect that equity-type price transparency rules may be applied to bond 
markets in the context of the MiFID Art. 65.1 review. Second, bond 
markets, which are far less familiar to the average citizen than stock 
markets, have recently come under public scrutiny—perhaps unfairly, due 
to a number of events triggered by questionable, unrelated business 
practices and outright corporate malfeasance, as in the cases of Parmalat 
and Ahold. Nevertheless, the string of recent corporate defaults in the EU 
(very high by historical standards), leads one to wonder to what extent 
greater transparency would have at least alleviated some investor losses. 
Indeed, since the year 2000, there have been 41 corporate debt defaults in 
the EU, and no fewer than 20 in the year 2002 alone (S&P, 2005). By 
comparison, there were only 7 of them between 1991 and 1999 (S&P, 2005). 
Finally, although one must note that the Citigroup affair was a case of poor 
judgment, rather than an issue of transparency per se, it is not unfair to say 
that in that particular case, the unique structure of cash government bond 
markets drew public attention, accompanied by regulatory scrutiny in 
several EU countries.96 For the first time since the introduction of the euro, 
                                                 
96 Reading the leaked memo that initiated the controversy, however, one discovers 
that the ultimate objective of Citigroup’s fixed income traders on 2 August 2004, 
was to render the European sovereign debt market less transparent and to have 
fewer dealers providing liquidity in secondary markets, along the lines of the 
market for US Treasuries.  
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questions were asked about how real the market made at the request of 
member states actually was, and whether primary dealer structures 
reinforce the fractured shape of eurozone debt markets. In the minds of 
regulators on both sides of the Atlantic, clamours from distraught investors 
for “something to be done” justify the new-found public interest in 
determining whether the existing, predominantly self-regulatory 
framework governing bond markets is sufficiently aligned with public 
policy objectives. Naturally, public calls for public authorities to intervene 
in market activity should not translate automatically into new statutory 
measures. To begin with, it is likely that such action often results from a 
failure to properly enforce existing regulations. Second, in line with the 
European Commission’s new regulatory approach, any additional statutory 
measure should stand the test of a rigorous market failure analysis and, 
perhaps more importantly, once statutory measures are agreed upon as the 
most effective way to treat a problem, the degree of regulatory intrusion 
should be proportional to the associated policy objectives while 
satisfactorily passing a cost and benefit analysis.  
Parallel to these recent events in credit markets, an ongoing and 
powerful trend, namely, Europe’s demographic decline, virtually 
guarantees that retail investor participation in fixed income markets, 
although relatively low today, will rise substantially in the coming years. 
Whereas in 1950, 23.2% of the population was over 50 years, the same age 
group is projected to reach 44% by 2025 (European Commission, 2004). As 
they grow older, retail investors become more risk-averse, looking to re-
balance their portfolios to a predominantly fixed income composition. 
When this individual behavioural shift to risk-aversion is aggregated across 
the European economy, the impact on financial markets will be significant. 
Since the retail investment community in the EU will be composed mostly 
of ageing or retired workers within a few years, it is safe to predict that 
fixed income securities will acquire a greater importance in terms of their 
relative share in portfolio investments than was the case in the past.  
ii. Principles for bond market regulation 
Answering the normative questions ‘why regulate bond markets?’ and 
‘how?’ has acquired a particular importance today, in light of the emerging 
public debate and informal EU Commission consultations on whether 
certain MiFID price transparency prescriptions ought to be applied to bond 
markets. The expected rise in retail investor participation in bond markets 
poses a major challenge to regulators to strike the right balance between 
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protecting investors on the one hand and not damaging an infrastructure 
that has developed out of the wholesale business on the other. It is an issue 
that is likely to only intensify with time, as retail participation will continue 
to be propelled by technological developments, the ageing crisis, low 
returns on interest-bearing deposit accounts (in a climate of continued low 
inflation) and any continued poor performance by equities, as was the case 
in recent years. In the United States, where such figures are more readily 
available than in the EU, retail participation in bond markets grew by 70% 
between 1995 and 1999.97 
In very general terms, the key policy objectives with regard to the 
proper functioning of bond markets include:  
• Efficiency 
• Liquidity 
• Stability 
• Fairness 
• Transparency 
• Competitiveness/market self-determination 
It is debatable whether transparency ought to be an objective for 
market regulators to pursue for its own sake. Arguably, the best way to 
characterise the objective of transparency is as an intermediate objective 
and not as an end in itself. That is, one could consider transparency to be 
desirable only insofar as it contributes to market efficiency, liquidity and 
stability.  
During the latter part of the 1990s, however, a consensus emerged 
among regulators that transparency was a desirable trait for securities 
markets, leading to a revolution in trade-related disclosure. In fact, the 
objective of transparency had reached such high priority that it was to be 
the ‘golden rule’ of the new international financial system, according to 
former IMF director Michel Camdessus (1999, p. 3). At the time, debt 
markets were almost completely in the dark in terms of price 
transparency.98 The existing pre-trade price publications customarily made 
                                                 
97 See testimony by Doug Schulman (2004) before the United States Senate 
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
98 The notable exception is in the US, where as discussed above it is the “on-the-
run” Treasury bond yield curve that is the benchmark for USD interest rates. In 
this market pre-trade transparency has an intrinsic commercial value not just for 
EUROPE’S HIDDEN CAPITAL MARKETS | 85 
 
by brokers were enhanced by the introduction of GovPX in 1991 in the US. 
For less liquid bonds, post-trade price transparency requirements became 
the norm and were gradually introduced over time, the best example being 
the TRACE system implemented in the US in July 2002. Transparency in 
general is today considered an important property which helps to ensure 
market quality. In its Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation, 
IOSCO (2001) recognises in Principle 27 that “regulation should promote 
transparency of trading” and lists transparency as one of its three core 
objectives, along with efficiency and fairness. One could argue that 
transparency is also a determinant of, and, in some cases, a precondition for 
fair, stable and efficient markets. In the words of Michel Camdessus (1999), 
p. 3): “Markets cannot work efficiently, and they will remain vulnerable to 
instability in the absence of adequate, reliable, and timely information from 
all quarters.” At the same time, there is abundant evidence that 
transparency, despite a common misconception to the contrary, will not 
always improve market quality. Thus, the academic literature recognises 
that there exists an optimum degree of (price) transparency: “Even though 
understanding of this area is very incomplete, the evidence that there is not 
a simple, unidirectional relationship between transparency and the quality 
of markets deserves considerable weight in policy-making” (Allen et al., 
2001, p. 40; see also O’Hara, 1995). 
Mainly for historical reasons, but also because of the relative absence 
of any considerable retail investor activity until very recently, secondary 
corporate bond markets have largely operated outside the scope of 
government statutory regulation, including in the realm of transparency 
provisions. Although most bonds are listed on exchanges—Luxembourg 
and London for the overwhelming majority of international bonds—due to 
the regulatory restrictions on institutional investment placements (they are 
often precluded from holding unlisted securities for investor protection 
reasons), trading in bonds is mostly over the counter (OTC).99 Given the 
initial conditions, i.e. that bond markets were (and still are) 
                                                                                                                            
the purposes of trading but also pricing and other reference benchmarking for 
other interest rate products.  
99 Exchange listing is often seen as a requirement for widening the investor base 
and enhancing the acceptability of bonds, particularly when institutional investors 
are prohibited from holding unlisted securities. The predominance of OTC trading 
is due to the relative ease of trading because of the absence of minimum trading 
amounts, less restrictive trading times, and expeditious and prompt settlements. 
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overwhelmingly driven by wholesale transactions, regulators did not see 
the need to interfere in the established self-regulatory governance structure 
– to the extent that bond market activity was not prejudicial to other policy 
objectives, such as financial stability – as they deemed institutional 
investors to be sufficiently sophisticated to look after their own interests. 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, regulators are curious to assess whether 
the self-regulatory framework adequately protects certain classes of market 
participants, such as retail investors. Since concerns for the latter’s welfare 
have received so much attention in both the EU and the US recently, we 
will suggest a strategy for enhancing their protection in bond markets 
without necessarily disturbing the transparency equilibrium. Central to any 
possible regulatory initiative is the importance of highlighting the 
differences between debt and equity markets—the topic of the next section.  
Whatever the outcome of the Art. 65 review, the very successful 
evolution of European bond markets in an almost exclusively self-
regulatory environment over the past few decades imposes a certain 
responsibility on the part of regulators to proceed slowly and with caution, 
if and when they deem it necessary to intervene further in the bond market. 
iii. Some fundamental differences between stocks, bonds and their 
respective market microstructures 
Bond markets, and fixed income markets in general, differ from equity 
markets in terms of three broad categories: instruments, investor types and 
objectives, and market microstructure. Differences between stocks and 
bonds do not stop at the characteristics of these financing instruments but 
also include: the type of investor, the trading/holding strategy and a 
number of variables related to market microstructure, including 
particularities of market-making, extent of retail investor participation, 
degree of inter-dealer trading and the price discovery process. These 
differences are highlighted below. 
Instruments 
Fixed income securities are much more complicated and varied than 
equities. Whereas equity issued by a firm is everywhere the same in terms 
of risk and cash flows, the same cannot be said of debt securities. On the 
other hand, bonds can be issued in a number of different currencies and 
maturities, either in the domestic or international market, or a combination 
of both in the context of a borrowing programme; with fixed rate or 
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floating rates, with or without coupons; callable, puttable or neither; 
secured or unsecured; senior or junior; convertible or straight. This 
incredible diversity in financing choices provided by the bond requires a 
certain degree of sophistication on the part of the investor to fully 
appreciate and manage the risks that are inherent to this instrument. 
Default risk is certainly not the only source of risk in a bond. Other sources 
of risk may or may not include: currency risk, interest rate risk, price 
movements surrounding a corporate treasury’s decision to call a bond, to 
issue more bonds, to convert a bond, etc., meaning that retail investors may 
not, contrary perhaps to their expectations, recover the full amount of the 
principal invested. Some fundamental differences between stocks and 
bonds are highlighted in Table 4.1.  
Table 4.1 Differences between stocks and bonds 
 Equities Bonds 
Market microstructure   
Price-discovery  Trades carry significant 
information about 
counterparties’ 
knowledge of firms’ 
prospects. Trades are 
information rich 
Trades can carry firm-
specific information, but 
much rarer than for equities; 
mostly price movements 
respond to macroeconomic 
developments  
Market-making Market-maker at an 
informational 
disadvantage vis-à-vis 
traders with private 
information, leading to 
wider bid-ask spreads 
Characterised by fewer 
information asymmetries, so 
market-makers are less 
disadvantaged than in 
equities.  
Inventory 
management 
More active inventory 
management 
(It would seem so, since 
inventory imbalances are 
not easily rectified by 
hedging) 
More passive. Inventory 
imbalances can be redressed 
through hedging strategies, 
so inventory does not need 
to be re-balanced 
continuously 
Inter-dealer trading 40% (LSE)a 47-60% (for govt. securities); 
about 60% for corporate 
bonds 
Inter-dealer trading by 
inter-dealer brokers 
40-60% (LSE)a 95% (US Treasuries); 98% 
(UK gilts)a 
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Retail investor 
participation 
Considerable, not only in 
volume, but also in value 
terms. 
In the US 60% in volume 
terms, but only 1.8% in value 
terms.b In the EU, our 
estimates in Chapter 2 reveal 
a situation that more or less 
mirrors the one in the US. 
Time for counter-
parties to respond to 
quotes posted by a 
dealer 
Almost instantaneous for 
blue-chip stocks 
1-2 minutes for plain vanilla 
bond; 10 minutes for bonds 
with complex features, e.g. 
call/put provisions, sinking 
funds, etc.; up to one day for 
illiquid bonds and for 
transactions > $10 millionc 
Order flow Continuous, small tickets Discontinuous, much larger 
tickets traded 
Security   
Maturity Infinite Finite (except for UK 
consoles and other 
perpetuals). Most maturities 
< 50 years 
Heterogeneity Single stock; no 
heterogeneity in the 
asset’s payoff structure: 
equities are alike 
Multiple debt issues per 
firm, varying in currency of 
denomination, maturity, and 
yield  
Hedgability Few instruments 
available for hedging; 
suggests that inventory 
imbalances are best 
redressed by readjusting 
inventory 
Relatively easy to hedge: 
numerous comparable 
instruments improve 
hedgability; offers greater 
flexibility for inventory mgt  
Liquidity Depends on stock type: 
blue chip, mid cap or 
small cap. Smaller issues 
are less liquid, but still 
trade hands frequently 
relative to most bands; 
absent market distress, 
liquidity remains more or 
less constant over time 
Similar pattern of liquidity 
across all bonds: 
immediately after issuance, 
trading is high but 
eventually the issues make 
their way to buy and hold 
investors and subsequently 
become illiquid; issues more 
liquid on the run than off the 
run 
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Investor   
Type of investor Retail investors, mutual 
funds, hedge funds  
Dominated by pension and 
insurance funds; very little 
retail activity in value terms; 
more concentrated holdings 
a Gravelle (2002, p. 16). 
b Harris (2004) defines a ‘retail’ transaction as $100,000 or less. The arbitrariness of the cut-off and 
its large nominal value warrant a cautious interpretation of these figures. 
c Saunders et al. (2002). 
Investors 
Institutional investors constitute the cornerstone of the European corporate 
bond market in both the investment grade and speculative grade segments. 
While 46% of the European primary market in investment grade debt is 
accounted for by institutional investors, the corresponding figure is 47% for 
the high-yield end of the market (see Figures 4.1 below). In both market 
segments, private clients only account for 4% of total holdings. Hedge 
funds account for 9% and 23% of holdings in the investment grade and 
speculative grade markets, respectively. Nevertheless, due to leveraged 
positions and active trading strategies, they may account for a significantly 
larger ratio of trading turnover.  
Essentially, pension and insurance fund trading strategies will 
revolve around avoiding or minimising mismatches in the maturities of 
their assets and liabilities, as opposed to staking speculative positions. 
Liquid and high credit bonds present lower intrinsic volatility than shares 
due to having a fixed notional amount and calculable yield. Because their 
liabilities tend to have long horizons, pension and insurance funds look for 
assets with long maturities. As ‘buy and hold’ investors, their bond trading 
strategies are not very sophisticated and they are not active traders. It is 
primarily for this reason that liquidity in bond issues recedes very quickly 
after issuance. Likewise, the trading strategies of individual retail investors 
are typically ‘buy and hold’, so as to secure a reliably constant stream of 
income over time. As more specialised (speculative or hedge) funds enter 
the market, one could envisage greater liquidity in high-yield debt, for 
example, than historical data would lead one to expect. In addition, the 
relaxation of regulatory restrictions on pension and insurance fund 
operations might encourage institutional investors to take advantage of 
their new found autonomy to trade more actively in secondary markets.  
 
90 | CASEY & LANNOO 
 
Figure 4.1. Breakdown of European non-government bond markets by investor 
type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: TBMA (2005b). 
Market microstructure 
One of the single most important differences between stock and bond 
markets relates to the different underlying price discovery processes. Some 
generic features of bonds and equities affect the way they are traded on 
secondary markets and the behaviour of market-makers. Perhaps the most 
fundamental difference relates to the degree that information asymmetries 
are present in the trading process, which itself is a result of the huge range 
and diversity of the bonds’ universe. Privileged information about an asset 
or the flow of orders for an asset is a crucial determinant of trading and 
market-making decisions, since it allows those who have an informational 
advantage to act profitably on that information.  
But unlike stocks, whose (potential) dividends vary greatly over time, 
(plain vanilla) bonds yield a predefined cash flow over time. In the case of 
such bonds, the source of price variability is therefore unrelated (except for 
the positive probability of default) to variability in the expected cash flow. 
This property of bonds makes it rather difficult for traders holding private 
information about a firm to consistently trade profitably in bond markets. 
Unlike stocks, the value of a bond, default probabilities aside, has less to do 
with firm-specific characteristics than it does with wider macroeconomic 
variables, such as contemporaneous and expected interest rate movements. 
The degree of informational advantages traders can have vis-à-vis 
counterparties is therefore extremely limited in government debt markets, 
and more limited in the corporate bond than in equity markets (See 
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Fleming, 2001). Information asymmetries in the bond market are further 
reduced by the role of rating agencies and independent opinions they 
provide on the current likelihood of future default by debt issuers. 
Determining the price of equity requires far more knowledge about a firm’s 
operations, opening the way for information asymmetries to widen 
between ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. The way traders interact with each other 
and with market-makers is therefore fundamentally different in equity and 
bond markets.  
Nevertheless, corporate bonds and especially the high-yield segment 
do offer opportunities for profitable trading to arise from private 
information. The risk of default is always present, and it is a variable that is 
conducive to the formation of private information. But since credit risk 
does not vary much from day-to-day, the argument that wide spreads are 
necessary to protect the market-maker against informed traders all the time 
could seem tenuous: the opportunity of trading profitably on inside 
information related to the probability of a firm defaulting on its debt being 
very rare, it cannot represent a regular motivation to trade. Pre-trade 
transparency is essential in equity markets because equities are traded on a 
regular basis, and the view of the future performance of the issuer or its 
sector is inevitably subjective. Unlike bonds, which have a short life, equity 
securities discount cash flows that are projected ad infinitum and can be 
affected by an array of different variables. Because a host of variables 
impact stock prices and stock valuation is very sensitive to any new 
information, the efficient discovery of fair prices requires frequent trading. 
While other variables such as liquidity also play a role in the determination 
of bond prices, the fundamental determinant of price really is the credit 
risk. Yet interest rate movements only occur occasionally and default 
probabilities usually vary slowly over time, so pricing the potential for 
credit events to affect default probabilities need not require constant 
trading.  
Theory predicts that when the information endowments of trading 
counterparties are heterogeneous, the party with the lesser information 
endowment will suffer greater costs of executing the trade. Generally, 
based on the reality of equity market trading, market microstructure theory 
has assumed that the market-maker is the uninformed trader and that his 
customers have information privileges. Hence, the wider observed bid-ask 
spreads, since the liquidity provider seeks to protect himself from his 
information disadvantage. As explained above, this relationship breaks 
down in bond markets.  
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Until recently, standard market microstructure models have been 
based on two different sets of traders: the informed and the uninformed. 
While uninformed traders only care about liquidating their positions, and 
therefore are less concerned with the timing of their trade, informed traders 
care more about immediacy, since the private information they hold 
concerning the value of an asset must be traded upon quickly. Their ability 
to advantageously observe the order flow represents an important source 
of private information for bond market dealers. The order flow in debt 
trading is indicative, as it can yield useful information to market-makers on 
how rival market-makers manage their inventories and on the fluctuations 
of market demand for particular securities. In other words, the privileged 
access of liquidity-providers to information they can infer from market-
making activities (e.g. order flow that is ‘internalised’ and that they can 
exclusively view) gives them an edge over other dealers and, possibly, their 
less-valued clients.  
iv. Fundamentals of retail investor protection in bond markets 
Asymmetric information 
The protection of consumers has always been a priority for regulators in all 
markets, especially in cases where it is difficult for the buyer to properly 
ascertain the quality of the good or service that is purchased. Financial 
products and services require particularly diligent regulatory oversight to 
protect unsophisticated investors who not only are at an informational 
disadvantage from the start, but who are also susceptible to advice that can 
be biased from conflicts of interest and can only ascertain the quality of the 
product or service gradually over time. The incompleteness of financial 
contracts leads to a classic principal-agent problem, since the value of the 
service/product delivered depends largely on the diligence and honesty 
with which the agent executes the delegated task. In cases such as these, 
transaction costs are not limited to the cost of executing the transaction 
alone, but also comprise attendant costs related to: monitoring agent 
behaviour after the contract is signed, verifying product characteristics and 
whether disclosed information is accurate and complete, and reverting to 
the law in cases of fraud, breach of contract or failure to address conflicts of 
interest (Llewellyn, 1999). 
When transaction costs are high, users may feel deterred from 
increasing their time opportunity cost of executing transactions by 
searching for best deals. This impatience, or the need for immediacy, makes 
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the user more vulnerable to capture by his established broker/market-
maker. Alternatively, high transaction costs can deter retail investors from 
even entering the market. This is especially true in times when public 
confidence in markets is low, as is the case today following a spate of 
financial scandals on both sides of the Atlantic. To the extent that 
mandating price transparency can reduce transaction costs and increase 
public confidence in markets, it will be a key instrument in the regulator’s 
toolkit. Yet whether mandating a greater degree of price transparency will 
in fact drive down transaction costs remains a contentious debate, not least 
because – as a recent study by The Bond Market Association (2005a) shows 
– pre-trade transparency is already high in the EU sovereign debt market, 
and is rapidly coming to the fore in the corporate bond market. 
A strategy for retail investor protection in bond markets 
As a starting point, it is important to be mindful that no degree of 
legislation will guarantee full investor protection in any segment of the 
capital market. Fundamentally, investing in capital markets is a risky 
enterprise, because all investments are accompanied by an inherent, or 
systematic, component of risk that can never be fully diversified. Contrary 
to popular belief, principal invested in fixed income markets is therefore 
always at risk. No matter how secure an investment may seem, there is 
always a positive probability of default – however small – on one or more 
coupon payments and/or on the principal, as evidenced from the 
(admittedly rare) default on an investment grade issue. For example, since 
1991, there have been four investment grade corporate debt defaults in the 
EU (S&P, 2005). The figures were significantly higher in the global debt 
market. Although there were no investment grade defaults in 2004, the last 
time this happened was in 1996. Since the year 2000, there were 28 
investment grade defaults and 14 in the year 2002 alone (!) (S&P, 2005, 
Table 4.2).  
Default need not mean loss of all, or even any, principal, since in the 
wake of a corporate bankruptcy, assets can be ring-fenced for certain 
classes of (senior) creditors. Nevertheless, defaults often do entail 
significant losses for investors, particularly of the retail variety, who tend to 
be lower down in the pecking order of bond investors during bankruptcy 
proceedings (particularly if their assets are not held in portfolios managed 
professionally).  
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Table 4.2 Corporate debt defaults in the EU 
Year Total 
defaults 
Investment 
grade 
defaults 
Speculative 
grade 
defaults 
Default 
rate (%) 
Investment 
grade 
default 
rate (%) 
Speculative 
grade 
default rate 
(%) 
Total debt 
defaulting 
(€ bil) 
1991 1 0 1 0.76 0 50  
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1993 1 0 1 0.51 0 20  
1994 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1995 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1996 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1997 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1998 0 0 0 0 0 0  
1999 5 0 5 0.86 0 6.58 0.74 
2000 3 1 2 0.46 0.18 2.02 0.49 
2001 8 0 8 1.09 0 7.27 2.21 
2002 20 1 16 2.1 0.15 12.8 16.72 
2003 8 2 5 0.82 0.28 3.4 11.72 
2004 2 0 2 0.23 0 1.22 1.07 
Source: Standard and Poor’s. 
In the debate on retail investor protection within the context of the 
upcoming Art. 65 review, perhaps too much attention has been paid to the 
issue of price transparency. Focusing only, or disproportionately, on the 
price transparency dimension is to reduce to a single issue what really is a 
multi-dimensional one. Retail investor protection in fixed income markets 
is best thought of as a vector of complementary components, which are 
listed in Table 4.3. To be fair, a number of these points have already been 
addressed in the new EU regulatory framework for securities markets, 
enshrined in the FSAP, which has extensively addressed conflicts of 
interest, information asymmetries between clients and service providers, 
etc. This table merely serves as a call for regulators to focus on what we 
believe to be the key elements of any regulatory strategy for investor 
protection in bond markets. In some cases, responding to the points below 
will only require proper implementation and enforcement of existing 
legislation rather than the creation of new legislation. In others, they may 
require new legislation, for example, if, subsequent to debate and cost-
benefit analyses, it is decided that direct retail investor participation in the 
high-yield segment should be curtailed and it is mandated that their 
investments be channelled through funds  
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Table 4.3 Components of retail investor protection 
Conflicts of interest   Conflicts of interest in research and in the sales of 
wholesale type instruments to retail investors 
ought to be avoided through self-imposed or 
statutory measures, depending on the credibility of 
the former. 
Education and 
information 
 Policy measures should be taken to ensure that 
retail investors are aware of their rights and of the 
courses of action to which they are entitled when 
they perceive fraud. 
 Raising awareness of associated risks is an essential 
component of enhancing investor protection. 
 So is furthering investor’s understanding of how 
liquidity is provided and behaves in the bond 
markets. 
 Retail investors should be provided with 
information, including price information, that is 
clear and most relevant to their ability to make 
informed investment decisions. 
 Principle of caveat emptor must be remembered. 
Principal protection  Far more important for retail investors than 
transaction cost reduction is to retain their 
principal, so policy measures ought to focus more 
on ways (not necessarily statutory rules) to 
minimise losses from default, rather than putting 
into place statutory rules that may save retail 
investors very little on transaction costs (since very 
few trades are executed per retail investor, unlike 
in equity markets) and damage market quality, 
especially liquidity, in the process. 
Suitability of 
instruments 
 Complex structured products, high-yield debt and 
other risky investments ought to be marketed to 
institutional and high-wealth, not average retail, 
investors. If the latter seek higher risk-return 
investments, they should be encouraged to go 
through funds. 
Statutory regulation 
minimisation 
 Statutory regulation minimisation is essential to 
preserving the competitiveness and dynamism of 
bond markets, so it is particularly important at the 
wholesale level. 
 Nevertheless, it also yields benefits at the retail 
level. For example, aware of the risks they are 
undertaking, retail investors should be able to 
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decide their own risk profiles. Clark (2005) 
discusses the need to protect retail investors from 
products that were specifically designed for the 
retail level, which can yield low returns, be subject 
to little competition, etc. 
Fund use  Retail investors ought to be encouraged to use 
funds, particularly for placements outside a select 
group of the highest quality (very low credit risk, 
high liquidity) corporate, government and quasi-
government issues. 
 There should not be mandatory channelling of 
retail investors through funds. Retail investors 
should have the option of direct participation in 
the bond market, at least for liquid, high-grade 
issues. This will provide an incentive to fund 
managers to offer competitive services to their 
clients, particularly in a fragmented market such as 
the EU, where competition between funds remains 
limited. 
Transaction cost 
reduction 
 Investors have the right to expect and should know 
how much they must pay in terms of transaction 
costs when trading bonds. In dealership markets, 
transaction fees related e.g. to trade clearing and 
settlement are subsumed into spreads, which also 
cover the cost of liquidity provision in terms of 
inventory risk, but retail investors should be able to 
discern whether they have been dealt a fair price, 
i.e. one that is competitive in the marketplace. 
 Greater transparency in the determinants of bid-
offer spreads would enhance competitive pressures 
among the broker-dealers. Price transparency is 
but one way among several to increase competition 
between market-makers or ‘systematic 
internalisers’.  
 Ultimately, technological progress creates the 
potential for transaction costs to fall. Nevertheless, 
it is important to remember that electronic trading 
need not necessarily reduce transaction costs, as 
this will rather depend on the business model 
adopted by its operator.  
Documentation  Event risk can strike suddenly, when investors 
(and even institutional investors and credit rating 
agencies) are caught unprepared. Thus, 
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documentation plays a key role in protecting the 
principal of unsecured debt holders. 
 Measures to improve documentation, which ought 
to be market-led development, can nevertheless be 
encouraged by regulators.  
Size of denominations  Denomination sizes ought to be reduced, at least 
for the most liquid issues of creditworthy issuers, 
so as to allow retail investors to reap the benefits of 
direct investments in these issues. Doing so will 
also probably enhance the liquidity of these issues, 
as retail investors bring greater heterogeneity to 
the existing class of debt holders.  
 
Educating investors 
Unsophisticated investors may wrongly believe that their capital (principal 
invested) is safe and that they are guaranteed regular interest payments. 
Yet corporate bonds are by no means risk-free investments, as the rising 
number of fallen angels100 suggests; high-yield corporate debt only yields 
attractive returns because the risk of default is anything but negligible. 
Likewise, the inverse relationship that prevails between interest rates and a 
bond’s price is counterintuitive for those who (wrongly) believe that higher 
interest rates mean higher coupon payments on fixed rate bonds. This 
hypothesis was corroborated in a recent survey of US fixed income retail 
investors by the NASD: over 60% of retail investors were found to be 
unaware of interest rate risk.101 That retail investors are becoming more 
active in bond markets is not a sufficient reason in and of itself to warrant 
regulatory intervention, as the industry has rightly pointed out on 
numerous occasions. Regulation cannot remove the probability of a 
company defaulting on its debt, nor can it remove interest rate risk. Parallel 
to due diligence requirements on the sell side, the buyer must also be 
judicious and apply common sense to any investment decision on the basis 
of caveat emptor. Investor education is therefore a primary pillar of investor 
protection. 
 
                                                 
100 ‘Fallen angels’ is corporate jargon for formerly investment grade debt that was 
downgraded to junk status.  
101 See www.investinginbonds.com. 
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Conflicts of interest and suitability of instruments 
Any regulation to improve bond investor protection should be preceded 
first and foremost by due diligence on the part of salespeople, in order to 
ensure that conflicts of interest are not guiding their advice to clients. 
Complex structured products, high-yield debt and other risky investments 
ought to be marketed to institutional and high-wealth, not average retail, 
investors, who know little about the fixed income business and have little 
capital to spare. This vector of investor protection has nothing to do with 
price transparency but is rather one of principles, or where principles are 
wanting, one of deterrence through fines and other penalties. Likewise, 
conflicts of interest in in-house research activities, where researchers take 
orders from colleagues in the front office or management to indirectly 
promote company products, can be a source of investor losses. Yet these 
can be (and have increasingly been) addressed by installing Chinese walls 
which serve to minimise opportunities for such conflicts of interest and the 
sale of wholesale-type instruments to retail investors ought to be avoided 
through self-imposed or statutory measures, depending on the credibility 
of the former. 
Principal protection vs. transaction cost reduction 
The central policy objective related to investor protection in bond markets 
ought not to be the elimination of risk (which is impossible), but to find 
ways for investors to minimise risk given their preferred risk profile. 
Because of the nature of fixed income (bond) investments and the risk that 
principal will not be recovered, principal protection ought to be the 
primary focus of regulatory efforts aimed at increasing the level of 
protection of retail investors. For the purpose of clarification, principal 
protection does not necessarily entail statutory rules that fundamentally 
alter the way business is conducted in fixed income markets. It may 
perhaps not even entail greater price transparency, although this assertion 
is quite debatable.102 The point is rather that policy measures taken to 
reduce transaction costs for retail investors will not in any way guarantee 
                                                 
102 Some regulators have argued, for example, that if retail investors had had easier 
and more immediate access to bond price information, they could have at least 
mitigated their losses in the numerous corporate defaults that have occurred in 
Europe in the past three years. Although the contrary view is that since this 
information would have been interpreted by the investors’ advisors, what really 
matters is the quality of advice.  
EUROPE’S HIDDEN CAPITAL MARKETS | 99 
 
that their principal will be better protected. Thus, it is important for 
regulators to bear in mind that for the retail investor with capital placed in 
fixed income securities, the question of transaction costs is only trivial 
compared with the importance of preserving their principal. This is due to 
the fact that although it is a component of investor protection, reducing 
transaction costs acquires far less importance in a setting of infrequent trading. 
Despite this, investors have the right to expect and should know how much 
of the spread they pay is actually due to prevailing market conditions and 
what portion of it is actually covers transaction costs, because in dealership 
markets transaction fees such as clearing and settlement are all subsumed 
into spreads. Greater transparency in the determinants of bid-offer spreads 
would enhance competitive pressures among the broker-dealers. 
If the ongoing electronisation of bond markets (although it is in the 
early stage, especially in the European corporate debt segment) eventually 
induces a shift in the nature of bond trading, so that assets that are 
relatively illiquid today trade hands more frequently in the future, then it 
will make sense for regulators to focus more on transaction costs faced by 
retail investors in bond markets. Most likely, the European corporate bond 
market especially has not reached that stage of maturity, so that in today’s 
environment, principal protection ought to remain the focus. 
Statutory regulation minimisation 
Driven by technological progress, globalisation and the invention of new 
financial instruments, markets are evolving today at a rate that makes 
flexibility a top priority for all market actors. Regulators must take account 
of the degree and speed with which markets are evolving, and centre any 
regulatory strategy foremost on the amount of flexibility it offers market 
operators. In a world of such rapid change, regulations that seek to impose 
a top-down market architecture can deliver a fatal blow to the ability of 
markets to attract foreign capital. A world in which (constrained) 
regulatory competition is the norm necessitates careful attentiveness to the 
notion of efficient regulation which does not hinder market self-
determination. In the words of Arthur Levitt, former Chairman of the SEC, 
the role of the regulator is not to  
 …impose or dictate the ultimate structure of markets [but] rather to 
establish, monitor and uphold [a regulatory] framework that gives 
competition the space and sustenance to flourish. Markets can then 
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develop according to “their own genius” for the ultimate benefit of 
investors.103 
This position seems to be echoed by Charlie McCreevy, EU 
Commissioner for the Internal Market, who has outlined his programme 
for the next five years in a recent Green Paper on financial services,104 
which places great emphasis on market self-determination and 
competitiveness. Concerning the core of the current policy debate on 
liquidity versus transparency, as Wallenstein (2000) notes, it is important 
that regulatory efforts to improve liquidity remain sensitive to market 
structures, existing business models, and to the behavioural characteristics 
of the institutions participating in those markets. Otherwise, there is no 
guarantee that regulatory efforts will bear fruit and that liquidity would 
improve. In fact, liquidity could even recede. If this were the case, market 
quality would suffer, with adverse consequences for the welfare of retail 
investors. 
Encourage use of funds 
For many retail investors with little knowledge of fixed income markets 
and limited funds, one of the surest avenues of protection (relative to going 
it alone) may be to have recourse to professional investment advisors and 
to invest in funds, at least for sub-investment grade issues. First, due to the 
number of debt securities, it is very expensive for a single investor to hold a 
properly diversified portfolio, which is done efficiently through buying 
into a fund. In addition, unlike equity portfolios, bond portfolios generally 
have to hold many more securities in order to be diversified. This is due to 
the fact that equities can have significant upward, as well as downward, 
potential. Yet bond returns are characterised by an asymmetry between 
limited upward potential and absolute losses in case of a default. 
There ought to be a serious policy debate in Europe about whether 
investments in fixed income securities by retail investors ought to be 
channelled into bond funds. Already, this is practiced in a few countries 
around the world, such as China. The basic idea is that investment 
professionals are better equipped to protect the capital of retail investors, 
not least because they have the ability to respond immediately to credit 
                                                 
103 As quoted in Ruth (1999).  
104 See European Commission (2005).  
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developments, whereas even relatively sophisticated, financially literate 
retail investors usually respond to market developments with a long lag. 
Nevertheless, mandating that funds act as the only channel of access to 
bond markets for retail investors is undesirable primarily for the reason 
that allowing direct participation in the market acts as a disciplining 
mechanism on funds. Without such an option, funds would not have the 
incentive to offer the best possible terms to their clients. Already, it is well-
known that the fund industry in Europe is relatively inefficient compared 
to its American counterpart.  
Perhaps the best way to proceed is to encourage/mandate retail 
investors to use bond funds for any investments below investment grade, 
or for fundamentally less liquid investment grade issues, while leaving the 
option open for them to have direct access to liquid, high-grade securities. 
An added advantage of the direct access option is that it can contribute to 
greater market liquidity, because retail investors represent a class that 
introduces greater heterogeneity into the market, with different 
characteristics, objectives and trading patterns than the wholesale players. 
As a result, liquidity improves. 
Documentation 
As the funding of European corporations continues to evolve from a model 
previously dominated by bank lending to a more market-oriented one, the 
locus of credit risk has diffused from a handful of credit institutions to 
manifold and dispersed investors. Nevertheless, legal and market 
structures have not evolved concomitantly with the shift to greater 
disintermediation in the European corporate debt market, so that banks 
retain disproportionate protection relative to bondholders (Eyerman & 
Hatton, 2004). 
The disproportionate protection enjoyed by banks at the expense of 
the less concentrated remainder of an issue’s bondholders results from the 
fact that in a crisis, fresh lending by banks, usually secured, automatically 
‘jumps the queue’ in front of unsecured lenders. These latter may have 
been guaranteed in a bond covenant that secured lending would be capped 
at a certain amount, or a so-called ‘negative pledge’. Part of the problem is 
that rating agencies usually do not take account of the weakness or strength 
of covenant packages in their assignment of ratings, so that bond investors 
may be completely unaware of the level of event risk they face. 
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In 2002, a group of 26 institutional investors, referred to collectively 
as the G-26 (Gang of 26), drafted a charter to strengthen bondholder rights 
in an attempt to call more attention to their demands for greater protection 
from event risk. Event risk can strike suddenly, when investors (and even 
institutional investors and credit rating agencies) are caught unprepared. 
Due to infighting and strategic positioning by the signers,105 the G-26 
charter never really went anywhere, but the precedent was important, as 
important lessons can be drawn from the exercise, first and foremost by 
bringing the issue of covenants and negative pledges more particularly to 
the fore. Nevertheless, this initiative has recently regained momentum with 
the involvement of the German asset management association, BVI. The 
question of negative pledges is one that ought not to be understated, 
especially since covenant protection is traditionally much weaker in 
continental Europe than it is in the British Isles (Hatton, 2005). Bolstering 
the effectiveness of negative pledges therefore constitutes one of the key 
avenues for enhancing the protection of bondholders’ interests.106  
4.4 Transparency and liquidity 
One of the focal points of the ongoing policy debate concerns liquidity—
and how it can be enhanced by various regulations (e.g. on price 
transparency), since liquidity is probably the best metric by which to 
measure market quality.  
i. What is liquidity and how to define it? 
What is liquidity and what are its properties/benefits that make it so 
desirable a policy objective for financial markets? As noted by Frank 
Fernandez (1999), liquidity is the lifeblood of financial markets. There is 
hardly an area of financial activity that is not explicitly or implicitly tied to 
liquidity. It affects asset pricing, credit risk, financial market development, 
capital structure, option pricing, market microstructure, and monetary 
                                                 
105 In order to be truly effective, the G-26 proposal would have had to have been 
adopted by a wider group of investors and they must have agreed in concert to 
refuse to buy debt from issuers that do not ensure the effectiveness of negative 
pledges. Evidently, game theory predicts that such a situation is unsustainable. 
One or several investors would be too tempted to buy up attractive issues, even if 
the collective demands of the G-26 had not been met.  
106 A negative pledge is a clause in a bond covenant that provides some protection 
for unsecured borrowers against event risk.  
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policy.107 Liquid debt securities provide tangible benefits to investors, 
issuers and other active participants in capital markets, such as central 
banks.108 Secondary market liquidity is an important factor in determining 
portfolio choice; in reducing credit risk and promoting financial stability; in 
determining capital structure; in reducing transactions costs from trading 
activities; and in reducing flotation costs.  
Various definitions of liquidity exist, without there being a consensus 
on what exactly is meant by liquidity. Table 4.4 gives an overview of all the 
variables that are commonly used to proxy liquidity. Measuring liquidity 
effects is not an easy task, especially as the interaction between liquidity 
and expected returns may be non-linear (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986). 
Table 4.4 Measuring corporate bond liquidity: Individual securities 
 Theoretical relation to liquidity 
 
Empirical relation to 
liquidity 
Issued 
amount 
Predicts a positive correlation: Larger 
issues should trade more often because: 
1) More investors hold the security, 
decreasing costs of information and 
increasing trading volume for portfolio 
optimisation 
2) Market-makers more willing to 
transact: inventory holding costs are 
lower because lower information costs 
due to more coverage/analysis/recog-
nition and higher trading volume 
Less robust than 
theoretical predictions: 
both positive and 
negative correlations 
have been identified: 
some large issues 
relatively illiquid and 
some small issues 
relatively liquid 
Age 
(time from 
issuance) 
Predicts a negative correlation: The closer 
an issue is to maturity, the less liquid it 
becomes: 
1) Lead manager commitment to 
making market in the newly issued 
bond only a short-term obligation 
2) New issues tend to be under-priced 
so speculative trading is rife 
immediately after issue 
Theoretical predictions 
are verified and even 
strongly confirmed in 
empirical results: 
strong negative 
correlation, as shown 
by yields rising with 
age (increasing 
transaction costs) 
                                                 
107 See O’Hara (2004).  
108 Central banks hold liquid debt securities as reserve assets because large 
amounts can be bought or sold with little impact on the price (Fleming, 2001). 
Effectively, a liquid portfolio for a central bank amounts to a very low risk of 
incurring major capital losses while conducting open market operations.  
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3) Issue is absorbed into buy-and-hold 
portfolios, so trading tends to decline 
with time 
Price 
volatility 
Predicts a negative correlation: the higher 
the volatility of a security’s price, the 
more illiquid it becomes: price volatility 
means greater unpredictability of price 
movements and more risk undertaken 
by the market-maker, so spreads 
widen, increasing cost of trading 
Mixed picture: mostly a 
positive correlation: 
bid-ask spreads widen 
as volatility increases; 
but some studies show 
trading volume in-
creases with price 
volatility, thus pushing 
down the liquidity 
premium 
Yield 
dispersion 
Predicts a negative correlation: if yield 
dispersion widens, market participants 
are less in agreement on value of a 
bond, increasing uncertainty and 
driving up liquidity premium 
No empirical evidence 
Missing 
prices 
Predicts a positive correlation: A good 
indicator of the illiquidity of a bond is 
the reported end-of-the-day price if 
intra-day data are not available. If the 
price at the end of the day is identical to 
that of the previous day, it is highly 
likely the bond did not trade; likewise 
if there is a missing price. 
Little empirical evidence 
Spreads Predicts a negative correlation: 
1) If spreads widen, incentives to trade 
fall as transaction costs rise 
2) Causality may run the other way also 
because wider spreads may simply 
reflect that the bond in question is 
illiquid for structural, as opposed to 
market structure, reasons 
Many studies show 
unambiguous negative 
correlation between 
spreads and liquidity, 
with widening spreads 
being both a cause and 
a consequence of 
greater illiquidity 
Market 
participants 
Predicts a positive correlation: The greater 
the number of active traders, the 
greater the probability that at any given 
point, dealers will want to re-balance 
their inventories and investors their 
portfolios 
Generally a positive 
correlation, although 
studies for bond 
markets have been 
very limited 
Source: Authors, with cell content largely based on literature review by Houweling et al. 
(2003, pp. 9-14). 
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ii. How liquidity affects asset pricing 
There is an important link between liquidity and proper asset valuation. 
Asset pricing depends to a certain extent on liquidity. Recent evidence 
suggests that liquidity risk in bond markets is priced (de Jong & Driessen, 
2004; Amihud & Mendelson, 1991; Elton & Green, 1998). Thus, liquidity has 
very real economic effects. By affecting asset pricing, liquidity affects the 
allocation of capital in both a static and a dynamic context. 
Typically, an asset’s equilibrium value is determined on the basis of 
the present discounted value of future cash flows and their risk, whether 
relative to the portfolio held by an investor or relative to the probability it 
will yield the expected cash flows. The yield spreads of corporate bonds 
over (virtually) risk-free government debt are far too large to be explained 
by historical default rates alone. This conundrum is even more pronounced 
in the high rated segment of the market, where default probabilities are 
very low, but where variations in credit spreads persist and remain 
inexplicably large in absolute terms (De Jong & Driessen, 2004). According 
to many researchers, the abnormally wide spread of corporate bond yields 
over risk-free assets compared with that justified by historical default 
patterns is best explained as the pricing of liquidity risk. The so-called 
‘liquidity premium’ can be thought of as the equivalent of buying an option 
contract, since liquidity allows an investor to move swiftly into and out of 
positions with little risk of exposing himself to adverse price movements.  
iii. Liquidity and financial market efficiency 
Efficient capital markets are characterised by the quick exploitation of 
arbitrage opportunities. Arbitrage can have a static as well as a dynamic 
dimension. In static terms, it means that cross-sectional discrepancies in 
pricing, say between inter-linked asset markets such as futures and the 
underlying cash market, disappear almost instantaneously. In a dynamic 
setting, liquidity contributes to the informational efficiency of markets. 
Information efficiency is often measured as the speed of convergence of a 
security’s price upon its fundamental value. The more liquid an asset, other 
things such as information endowments being equal, the more likely it will 
converge rapidly upon its true economic value. The dynamics of price 
discovery are therefore facilitated by liquidity, which feeds back into 
greater pricing efficiency. Efficient price formation means that observable 
prices integrate all available information related to an asset’s price, which 
ultimately leads to efficient resource/risk allocation. Thus, liquidity 
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contributes materially to the fundamental purpose of financial markets, 
which is to allocate capital (and risk) efficiently on the basis of observed or 
expected prices.109  
Another way to emphasis the importance of liquidity is by reviewing 
how market efficiency suffers from illiquidity. Liquidity suffers from high 
transaction costs to trading. For example, when market-makers enjoy a 
quasi-monopoly, they can charge wider bid-ask spreads in inter-dealer and 
dealer-to-customer trades, reducing the incentives for counterparties to 
trade and thereby reducing trading volume. Likewise, liquidity can suffer 
from various impediments to trading such as poor market design 
(structural illiquidity), imperfections in the trading infrastructure (leading 
to trading frictions), increasing market fragmentation, and illogical 
behavioural patterns by market participants, related to trader/investor/ 
market-maker sentiment, such that e.g. asset prices over- and under-shoot 
their fundamental values, or e.g. market liquidity can suddenly and 
inexplicably dry up, particularly in times of market stress, as in the case of 
‘liquidity black holes’.110 Very evidently, illiquidity hurts price discovery, 
as shown by Furfine & Remolona (2002), since the price impact of trades 
increases in times of market stress [illiquidity] (Fleming, 2001). 
In sum, liquidity is essential for:  
• the price discovery process 
• asset pricing 
• the rate and quality of assimilation of new information into asset 
prices 
• capital structure decisions 
• portfolio strategy decisions 
• risk-taking and hedging 
• flexibility (equivalent to an ‘option’ for traders to buy or sell) 
• developing market structure. 
                                                 
109 Arbitrage here is considered a behaviour that is beneficial to market efficiency, 
since it relates to mean-reverting speculation that drives assets back to their 
fundamental values. That is, price formation is a stable system. Yet there also exist 
forms of destabilising speculation that drive prices away from a stable equilibrium. 
Arbitrage, interpreted as the deliberate riding on the directional momentum of 
trading in order to make short-term profits, can lead to market imbalances, and 
ultimately, to a financial crisis. If liquidity is used by traders to engage in 
destabilising speculation, one wonders whether it is so desirable after all.  
110 See Persaud (2000).  
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The importance of liquidity in ensuring the economic efficiency of 
capital markets means that the role of public policy is vital: if misdirected, 
public policy can seriously harm the liquidity of markets; on the other 
hand, regulations that foster higher-quality markets at little cost are 
beneficial to the economy.  
iv. Transparency 
Does transparency in bond markets increase liquidity? The market 
microstructure literature has established that while a certain degree of 
transparency is good for overall market efficiency and liquidity, there is a 
point at which transparency may conflict with liquidity provision. In other 
words, as the degree of transparency increases, welfare gains initially rise, 
but subsequently fall as too demanding requirements could lead dealers to 
withdraw from market-making. This realisation leads one to raise the 
question: what degree of transparency is desirable? Can one talk of an 
optimal degree of transparency? If such a concept exists, how to reach it? 
Unfortunately, very little research, whether theoretical or empirical, 
exists on bond market microstructure, so it is difficult, if not impossible, to 
answer these questions today. Wallenstein (2000) calls the corporate bond 
market one of the most empirically understudied areas of the economy. 
Two reasons can explain the absence of extensive research on bond market 
microstructure: first, the inter-dealer market, by far the largest component, 
is known to be very opaque to non-market participants, because of its sheer 
size and diversity. The lack of publicly available statistics and more general 
information about the organisation of these markets has stifled attempts by 
researchers to identify with any degree of precision what, if any, 
inefficiencies and market failures may arise and whether regulators’ calls 
for more transparency are justified or not. A second reason is that as a self-
regulated, inter-dealer market that is widely perceived to be running 
smoothly, the OTC bond market has attracted less attention due to the 
limited scope for public policy intervention. The lack of centralised 
reporting of trades,111 resulting from the very small share of transactions 
that are exchange-traded as opposed to being conducted over-the-counter, 
is seen to be one of the main culprits.112 However, the question must be 
                                                 
111 This situation has since change in the United States with the introduction of the 
TRACE system.  
112 See Wallenstein (2000, p. 124). 
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asked why these markets have developed as OTC and what the (potentially 
harmful) consequence would be of a ‘concentration rule’ for bonds. That 
there does not exist any significant literature on the subject, as related to 
bond markets, complicates the task of analysis. We will therefore limit 
ourselves to raising a few questions and to reviewing the US experience 
with TRACE and drawing lessons from it for the EU.  
What may appear to be a clear mandate for policy to improve 
liquidity will be misguided if the relation is the inverse of the one described 
above. In other words, transaction costs may be higher precisely because 
certain securities fundamentally lack liquidity. This brings us to the cause 
of the lack of liquidity. Is the dearth of liquidity due to the patterns of 
investment by the holders of debt securities, or the wide variety of bonds 
that preclude the exposure of investors’ capital to more than a few (in terms 
of direct investments, that is, as opposed to funds)? There is some evidence 
for this. Or is trading in some securities thin because they are illiquid and 
therefore imply a higher transaction cost that could negate the trading 
profits that could accrue? While in some markets it appears that market 
liquidity can be improved by mandating that market-makers adopt certain 
provisions, such as price transparency, such provisions will do little or 
nothing to improve the liquidity of a fundamentally illiquid asset, or one 
that quickly becomes illiquid (such as most corporate bonds after their first 
few days or weeks of issuance). In a case such as this, introducing price 
transparency will only create costs for the market-maker, with few benefits 
in the form of enhanced liquidity. For example, as Edwards et al. (2004) 
report, of the 70,000 TRACE-eligible securities, only 22,453 traded more 
than once in the whole of 2003 (!). As a final point, it is important that 
regulators be mindful that increased price transparency will not eradicate 
fraudulent practices by bond issuers, or misleading information or conduct 
by underwriters, especially practices that could put an investor’s principal 
at risk. 
v. Degree of price transparency in US and EU bond markets 
A recent study published by The Bond Market Association (2005a) on the 
current state of price transparency in European bond markets finds that 
both pre- and post-trade price disclosure is high in the EU, at least for 
wholesale players in government debt securities. Corporate bond price 
transparency, meanwhile, has been improving steadily, according to the 
same report. 
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While the obligation to publish trades no later than 15 minutes after 
trade execution in the US market gives a powerful impetus to extending 
price transparency to retail trades, unsophisticated bond investors in the 
EU currently do not enjoy such a privilege, at least not directly (they could 
obtain the information indirectly through their broker or data vendors). 
What is more, by July 2005, the time threshold for post-trade price 
dissemination in the US had been cut twice since the introduction of 
TRACE (see Box 4.1) – a post-trade reporting service that became 
operational in July 2002 – and is now set at 15 minutes.  
A good starting point for analysing the potential impact of any future 
EU regulation of bond markets is to first look in detail at the US experience 
with price transparency in the corporate debt market and draw the lessons 
that can be learned from that experience. The introduction of TRACE, and, 
Box 4.1 The US TRACE system 
Transaction information that traders are obliged to report to NASD: 
 NASD symbol 
 Number of bonds traded 
 Price (and state commission) 
 Indication of whether the trade was a buy, sell or cross 
 Date of trade execution 
 Counterparty identifier 
 Principal, agent or agency cross 
 Time of trade execution 
 Reporting side executing broker in case of ‘give up trade’ 
 Counterparty introducing broker in case of ‘give up trade’ 
 Stated commission 
 Trade modifiers 
 Yield 
Dissemination of reported information would follow these conventions: 
 Must be TRACE eligible security (i.e., only SEC-registered US and foreign 
firms, investment and non-investment grade, and dollar denominated debt that 
is depository eligible) 
 Security whose initial issuance size was over $1 billion, whether investment 
grade or not 
 If reported trade size > $5 million, an identifier for large trades will replace the 
exact amount traded with the symbol 5MM+ (old pre-TRACE FIPS rules had 
set the floor at $1 million) 
 Timeframe for price dissemination after a trade initially set at 75 minutes, and 
subsequently was reduced to 15 minutes. 
Source: Put together from Ayanian (2002). 
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to a lesser extent, its precursor FIPS, and the wealth of data it generates for 
researchers has led to greater interest in econometric studies on bond 
markets.  
Nevertheless, the few studies that do exist tend to focus on the 
American municipal bond market, whose particularities render the 
transposition of these studies’ conclusions to the international bond market 
or to European bond markets somewhat risky. TRACE, and its creation was 
motivated by the realisation that post-trade transparency plays an 
important role in bond market price discovery and that price dissemination 
allows all market participants to obtain a better insight into the quality of 
the prices offered (since in a dynamic context and in liquid markets, post-
trade transparency contributes to pre-trade transparency). Perhaps more 
importantly, price dissemination can contribute in a material way to the 
creation of a single investor ‘market price’ for any given (liquid) security. 
Finally the greater inter-connectedness of trading platforms gave investors 
more choice and stiffened competition between market-makers.  
Interestingly, some academic studies in the US have taken data from 
the TRACE system to analyse whether investor savings were at all 
significant after the introduction of the dissemination system. Perhaps the 
most cited among these is the paper by Edwards & Piwowar (2004), who 
claim that TRACE has realised tremendous gains for retail investors by 
reducing transaction costs very substantially (on the order of $2 billion, and 
these authors even argue that their chosen econometric methodology has 
understated the total savings). Controversy surrounding their chosen 
method of analysis continues to swirl, however, not least because it 
remains uncertain whether the reduced transaction costs were merely 
correlated with, as opposed to driven by, increased price transparency. For 
example, market participants claim to have observed similar reductions in 
transaction costs in bond markets in Europe over the same time period as a 
result of lower volatility (mirrored in the US market), enhanced market-
driven pre-trade transparency and greater competition among dealers for 
order flow.  
No academic or other study that we are aware of has made a 
systematic assessment of corporate bond transaction costs in the EU. 
Undoubtedly, the absence of widespread data dissemination is an 
important factor in that research void. Data reported in the TRAX system, 
published by its operator, the ICMA, remains less detailed than the TRACE 
system, and it is impossible to track any degree of information from the 
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transaction costs of individual trades. In practice, the same criticism can be 
made of the TRACE data, since the spreads prevailing at the time of a trade 
are not published). With the current limited availability of detailed data in 
the EU, it is difficult for market analysts and researchers alike to ascertain 
the true level of liquidity in bond markets. Although traders and other 
professionals active in the markets will have a better idea than academics, 
regulators and central bankers perhaps of the level of liquidity prevailing at 
a point in time, the scenario of fragmented markets without a central 
reporting system where trade quotes can be obtained for trading purposes 
probably makes it difficult for smaller players to obtain a completely 
accurate picture of overall market liquidity. Such a scenario has the 
potential to generate adverse welfare consequences by benefiting large 
market dealers at the expense of smaller ones.  
While it may still be too early to tell, there are indications that the 
implementation has been beneficial. Industry executives and regulators 
share an overall positive opinion of TRACE. One must consider how 
ambitious the project was, given the context in which it was introduced. A 
largely opaque secondary market in corporate bonds was converted 
through a process of phased implementation and subject to careful 
regulatory and industry oversight, into a largely transparent one, although 
certain concerns have been expressed regarding the impact of TRACE on 
liquidity in lower-rated securities. 
Regulatory concerns surrounding bond markets are complicated by 
the fact that they are overwhelmingly an institutional, as opposed to retail, 
market. Even within the category of institutions, the great majority of bond 
trading is conducted in the inter-dealer market, not dealer-to-customer, 
where the customer is an institutional investor along the lines of a mutual 
or pension fund. But the fact that direct retail participation in the market is 
non-existent or minimal and that institutional investors have the 
sophistication to master the ins and outs of the bond market is not in itself 
an argument against price transparency. If institutional investors, such as 
mutual funds, face high transaction costs from trading in bond markets, 
there are direct costs to the retail investor, albeit the costs are accrued 
indirectly, first through the intermediary of the investment firm. It is 
unlikely that a fund would not pass on the costs of trading at excessive 
spreads to the customer, lowering the latter’s return on investment. 
Nevertheless, if institutional investors as a group feel that price 
transparency ought to be improved, there is every reason to expect that, as 
faithful clients of market-makers, their request would be honoured by at 
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least some liquidity providers. After all, such an outcome is only natural in 
competitive markets. As the TBMA report (2005a) records, that is exactly 
what appears to have happened in Europe since 2002.  
As a final point, in the current policy debate on the MiFID application 
to bonds, the question of transparency is often limited to the dimension of 
price transparency for trade reporting purposes. But in the regulator’s eyes, 
transparency as a policy objective goes deeper than mere post-trade 
transparency and is guided by the philosophy that market activity ought 
not to be taking place behind a veil. There are four policy objectives that fall 
under the umbrella of transparency, which is seen as necessary to maintain: 
1) financial stability, 2) retail investor protection, 3) competition among 
financial services providers and 4) capital markets that discourage 
fraudulent and criminal activity. The benefits of market transparency do 
not derive from price transparency alone, which is but one component of it.  
The most pressing challenge ahead for EU regulators revolves around 
designing a regulatory framework that simultaneously encourages and 
facilitates further retail participation in bond markets without impacting on 
the competitiveness of EU financial markets and on the principle of market 
self-determination. An important final point is also that retail investor 
protection in bond markets is not necessarily ensured by even full price 
transparency, since those conditions do not in any way guarantee that the 
investor will recuperate the entirety of his invested principal. As mentioned 
above, the most important objective related to retail investor protection 
ought not to be transaction costs (albeit still important as a secondary 
objective), but rather the safeguarding of principal, which is fundamentally 
a credit (and therefore corporate governance and accounting issue). 
Ultimately, whether transparency ought to be increased in fixed 
income markets by regulatory measures depends very much on the 
ultimate goal of such a policy measure. If the objective is enhanced retail 
investor protection, this policy may well be misguided, since the key to the 
protection of retail investors in fixed income markets, unlike in equities, is 
the preservation of principal, because retail investors invest in fixed income 
precisely because they feel they can get a steady cash flow from coupon 
payments without any risk of losing their capital. On the other hand, if 
increased price transparency is considered in order to enhance market 
liquidity, this policy measure requires careful consideration. The academic 
literature is not helpful. In other words, it is too early to discern the nature 
of the relationship between liquidity and price transparency. 
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5. Conclusions 
There are preliminary indications today that the European Commission 
might seek to enhance transparency in the bond market under the dual 
argument of increasing investor protection and improving market 
efficiency. For a number of reasons elucidated in this report, we urge 
measured and deliberate action on the part of regulators as they embark on 
the MiFID Art. 65 review, because it is by no means clear that transparency 
is the best policy instrument to address either of these concerns. This caveat 
is motivated by the following concerns:  
 The unclear nature of the relationship between price transparency 
and liquidity 
The exact nature of the relationship between price transparency and 
liquidity remains a contentious matter and most of the academic research 
has pointed to a non-linear association between the two variables. That is, 
liquidity is initially found to improve as transparency increases, but too 
much transparency can damage liquidity. Too much transparency has the 
potential to damage the liquidity-providing function by discouraging 
market-makers from risking their capital to supply it, which would reduce 
market efficiency. There is certainly not enough evidence on an 
unambiguous or linear relationship between price transparency and 
liquidity at this point that would warrant statutory measures aimed at 
improving price transparency in the European bond market in the name of 
market efficiency. Thus, blanket transparency requirements covering the 
entire universe of bonds are likely to hurt liquidity and reduce market 
efficiency in some market segments, particularly in already less liquid 
instruments. As far as retail investor protection is concerned, one can 
question to what extent transparency is the right policy instrument to meet 
this objective. 
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 The likelihood that greater transparency is not a win-win situation 
for all market participants: some are likely to be worse off 
It is not clear that increasing transparency would lead to a win-win 
situation for all market participants. In fact, there is evidence to the 
contrary. For example, when MTS introduced anonymity of trading on its 
Italian platform in 1997, liquidity improved and transaction costs fell for 
institutional investors who traded in large blocks. Nevertheless, there are 
also both theoretical and empirical examples indicating that increasing 
transparency increases the costs of liquidity provision and the costs for 
investors to unwind large positions. For example, the introduction of the 
TRACE post-trade reporting system in the US has lowered transaction costs 
for retail investors making direct investments. However, it may have 
increased transaction costs for institutional investors. Since the vast 
majority of retail investments in fixed income are channelled through 
funds, such policy measures designed by regulators to protect retail 
investors might paradoxically damage the very interests they are designed 
to protect, as funds pass on higher transaction costs to their retail clients, 
e.g. in the form of lower returns. 
 The risk that excessive attention is placed on transaction costs, 
rather than principal protection, in a regulatory strategy for retail 
investor protection 
Bid-ask spreads, or transaction costs more generally, ought not to be 
considered the only criterion for judging market quality. If the primary 
objective of introducing greater price transparency into bond markets is to 
reduce bid-ask spreads, market quality does not necessarily improve as a 
result, and transaction costs need not necessarily fall either. In addition, in 
the case of bond market segments characterised by infrequent trading, 
reducing transaction costs is a secondary concern compared with 
minimising the risks of not recovering the principal.  
If the objective guiding a regulatory strategy to improve transparency 
is to enhance retail investor protection, focusing on transaction costs may 
well be misguided policy: the key to the protection of retail investors in 
fixed income markets, unlike in equities, is the preservation of principal, 
rather than minimising transaction costs. True, transaction costs for the 
retail investor will probably fall if the Commission were to mandate greater 
post-trade transparency. Nevertheless, the typical retail investor follows a 
buy-and-hold strategy in fixed income investments. Within such a strategy, 
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only twice in the lifetime of the investment are transaction costs incurred: 
when the asset is purchased and when it is sold at maturity. 
Retail bond trades are infrequent, and retail investors invest in fixed 
income assets precisely because they often mistakenly feel they can get a 
steady cash flow from coupon payments without incurring any risk of 
losing their capital. Therefore, the focus of policy-makers in the field of 
investor protection ought to be on the points elicited in our strategy for 
retail transactions in debt securities: investor education, suitability of 
instruments, principal protection, reducing conflicts of interest, 
encouraging fund use, and, as an objective secondary to these, ultimately, 
transaction cost reduction.  
 Related to the preceding point, a danger that what is essentially a 
wholesale market is fundamentally redesigned to suit the needs of 
the minute group of retail investors who seek direct access 
Bond markets remain an overwhelmingly wholesale business in terms of 
traded volumes. Whatever retail participation there is, it is usually indirect. 
One must therefore question to what extent investor protection concerns 
ought to be the primordial regulatory imperative—as opposed to market 
liquidity or efficiency, for example—and whether the policy debate is 
excessively influenced by these concerns. Policy decisions may entail trade-
offs between regulatory objectives. In the face of such a trade-off, it is not 
clear why investor protection concerns—when they are addressed by 
measures that may be inimical to market liquidity, such as e.g. greater price 
transparency—ought to be the overriding imperative given the wholesale 
nature of the bond business. 
Therefore, there ought to be a serious policy debate on whether direct 
retail participation in bond markets, for sub-investment grade securities 
and less liquid investment grade issues should be curtailed in order to 
prevent retail investor concerns from driving the design of markets when 
the retail segment of the market is so small compared to the inter-dealer 
and institutional segments. 
At the same time, we do not recommend the mandatory use of funds 
for retail investors across all debt classes, particularly in very liquid EU or 
US government bonds or liquid, highly-rated corporate debt securities. 
Direct retail investor participation in bond markets enhances market 
liquidity and acts as a disciplining mechanism on bond funds. This 
consideration is all the more important in an environment such as the EU, 
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where asset management is known to be far below its potential efficiency 
and where competitive forces are not yet given a free rein.  
The central policy objective related to investor protection in bond 
markets ought therefore not to be the elimination of risk (which is 
impossible) but to find ways for investors to minimise risk, given their 
preferred risk profile. 
 The different transparency imperatives for equity markets and 
bond markets, and even in various segments of the bond universe 
If the Commission were to mandate provisions for pre- and post-trade 
transparency in bond markets, it should not create blanket provisions that 
cover the whole fixed income universe, as is the case for equities. This is 
due to the recognition that typically, one equity share exists for a firm, 
whereas the same firm can issue hundreds of bonds in different currencies 
and with different maturities, risk profiles and yields, options such as 
convertibility into equity shares, seniority, etc. As a result, if regulators 
pursue transparency, statutory transparency requirements should be 
carefully tailored to specific market segments. For example, there is little 
economic justification for imposing costs on market-makers to increase 
post-trade transparency of fundamentally illiquid bonds that trade less 
than once a year. The value at which the last trade was conducted may be 
of no economic significance whatsoever a year later. The vast majority of 
corporate bonds hardly ever trade hands: for example, of the 70,000 or so 
TRACE-eligible corporate bonds, only some 22,000 were traded in 2003. 
Occasionally, market regulation is influenced by lessons learned from 
academic research. For a variety of reasons, research on market 
microstructure has focused almost exclusively on equities. Virtually no 
academic literature exists on bond market microstructure. As a result, 
regulators must be careful not to draw hasty conclusions from such equity-
centric literature. As we have shown in Chapter 4, the numerous 
differences between stocks and bonds, not only in their characteristics, but 
also in their investor base, holding patterns and surrounding market 
architectures, render the applicability of theoretical models developed in 
the academic literature to bond markets questionable at best.  
 The risk that regulation imposes a top-down market architecture 
that reduces flexibility and innovation  
Before the Commission mandates greater price transparency in bond 
markets, it ought to assess to what extent market-driven solutions can 
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deliver the same result in a more efficient and market-friendly (and hence 
growth-friendly) way. For example, technological progress and financial 
innovation have led to a marked improvement in pre-trade transparency in 
the European bond market, in the form of inter-connected electronic 
trading platforms.  
A central facet of any regulatory strategy is to clearly identify market 
failures and, conditional on this, to find the appropriate and least costly 
regulatory instrument to address a specific market failure. Whether 
transparency ought to be increased in fixed income markets depends very 
much on the ultimate goal of such a policy measure. As we explained in the 
report and above, whether transparency is the best instrument to pursue 
the objectives of investor protection and a smooth operation of securities 
markets in the bond universe is highly debatable. 
Above all, the very successful evolution of (corporate) bond markets 
within an almost exclusively self-regulatory framework over the past few 
decades, coupled with their explosive rates of growth and innovation, 
imposes a certain responsibility on the part of regulators to proceed slowly 
and with great caution, if and when they deem it necessary to intervene 
with new statutory measures. These conclusions are all the more important 
in the context of the Lisbon Agenda, as the EU struggles to restore growth 
and competitiveness to flagging national economies. 
 The danger of seeing transparency as an end in itself without 
properly assessing whether it is economically justified  
It is not clear why bond market transparency should be an end in and of 
itself, and there is no economic justification for treating market 
transparency as an end for regulators to pursue for its own sake. As it 
stands, the MiFID does not sufficiently spell out why more, rather than less, 
transparency is desirable. For example, the recitals of MiFID only argue 
that transparency is necessary to achieve the regulatory objectives of 
“protecting investors and ensuring the smooth operation of securities 
markets”. These recitals do not explain what are the mechanisms by which 
transparency leads to enhanced market efficiency and investor protection, 
nor do they recognise the possibility of a trade-off between transparency 
and liquidity. In other words, greater transparency could precisely lead to a 
less smooth functioning of securities markets, and hence may not be the 
proper instrument (at least in certain market segments) to pursue the 
objective of market efficiency or stability.  
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